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I. INTRODUCTION
Of recent years there is a movement in the international economic
area towards limiting public discretion in handling private complaints
about foreign unfair trade practices. This movement manifests itself par-
ticularly in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the European
Economic Community (the "EEC" or the "Community"). Procedures
have been developed through which private petitioners can request their
national government to investigate and, if need be, retaliate against un-
fair trade actions of foreign countries. This contribution analyzes these
procedures, as they have been established in the United States and the
EEC. It will conclude that they not only serve to protect individual in-
terests in international trade policy, but also reinforce the liberal trade
principles developed since the Second World War in the context of
GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade').
The following example illustrates the difficulties facing the business
community in challenging a trade restriction abroad.
Suppose a Dutch exporter of cheese ("X") learns about a proposal
for a United States regulation affecting the labelling of his products. X
fears this regulation will restrict his export opportunities to the United
States, because the new requirements are likely to create confusion and
uncertainty in the minds of United States consumers. Moreover, X be-
lieves the proposed regulation does not conform to the Standards Code
negotiated during the GATT Tokyo Round concluded in 1979.2 The
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 (hereinafter referred to as "GATT"). GAIT law is authoritatively discussed in J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). The interrelationships between GATT
law on the one hand, and the United States and European Community law on the other, are lucidly
brought out in E. McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATr, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY (1982 & Supp. 1983).
2 For an evaluation of the Tokyo Round (also referred to as "MTN") negotiations within the
GATT framework, see Jackson, The Birth of the GAT-MTNSystem: 4 ConstitutionalAppraisal, 12
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federal agency which has drafted the regulation disagrees with X's asser-
tion, however, and is unwilling to make an exception for X's products.'
In his subsequent attempts to challenge the final regulation, X confronts
the following obstacles.
The title of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which implements
the Standards Code (the "Code") states encouragingly that no federal
agency may engage in any standards-related activity that "creates unnec-
essary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States."' 4 Yet that
does not help X very much. The statute provides just one exclusive rem-
edy. Governments, and governments only, may direct complaints to the
Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"),5 which is
responsible for the international trade policy issues that arise under the
Code.6
Furthermore, the statute expressly bars the construction of any pri-
vate cause of action against standards-related activities in the United
States, involving allegations that they violate United States obligations
under the Standards Code.7 This is in line with the general position
taken by Congress that none of the GATT Codes negotiated during the
Tokyo Round ought to have domestic law (Le., self-executing) effect in
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980). The text of the Standards Code (officially called "The Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade") is reproduced in GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 8 (1980). In the
United States, the Standards Code is ;-plemented through sections of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2531-2573 (1984). In the EEC the Standards Code is implemented through
Decision 80/45/EEC, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 14) 36 (1980). For commentaries on the Stan-
dards Code from different perspectives, see Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical
Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 5 (1982), Comment, Technical Analysis of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 179 (1980).
3 X would have had to approach this agency informally, because no federal agency may con-
sider a formal complaint or petition against a United States standard regarding an imported product.
19 U.S.C. § 2561 (1982). Federal agencies, however, generally allow interested parties to submit
written comments to proposed regulations before they are adopted. See, eg., Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, Cheeses and Related Cheese Products; General Standards of Identity for "Certain
Other Cheeses". 49 Fed. Reg. 17,018, 17,039 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 133) (proposed Apr. 20,
1984).
4 19 U.S.C. § 2532 (1982). Note that standards-related activities are not deemed to constitute
an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the United States if the "demonstrable purpose"
of this activity is to achieve a "legitimate objective" (e.g., the protection of health or consumer
interests) and if such activity "does not operate to exclude imported products which fully meet the
objectives of such activity." 19 U.S.C. § 2531 (1982).
5 19 U.S.C. § 2552 (1982). This section also allows non-signatory governments, who extended
rights and privileges to the United States which are substantially equivalent to those contained in the
Standards Code, to submit complaints about Standards Code violations to the United States Trade
Representative (hereinafter referred to as "USTIR"). See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 209-11
(describing United States implementation of the Standards Code's dispute settlement provisions).
6 19 U.S.C. § 2541 (1982).
7 19 U.S.C. § 2551 (1982).
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the United States.' Thus X cannot very well expect United States courts
to review the disputed regulation against the Code's norms.
Since United States law does not seem to offer a basis to challenge
the standard restricting the sale of his products in the United States mar-
ket, X considers submitting a complaint in Geneva with the Surveillance
Committee established by the Standards Code.9 In overseeing the imple-
mentation of the Code by its signatories, the Surveillance Committee
lends assistance in the settlement of disputes between them.'0 Private
complainants, however, have no standing before the Surveillance Com-
mittee.1 Consequently, should X approach the Committee, the Com-
mittee would not entertain his complaint.
In sum, X's only recourse would be to request his government to
intervene. Because of the Community's exclusive powers in international
trade matters, the Dutch government would have to refer X to the Com-
munity authorities in Brussels.' 2 Yet before the adoption of the EEC
complaint procedure in September 1984, the Community authorities
were not obliged to investigate X's complaint, and to the extent they did,
they had complete discretion in deciding how and when they would dis-
pose of his case.
X's odyssey epitomizes the position of those exporters who, relying
on GATT norms, seek to overturn trade barriers they encounter in for-
eign countries. National courts rarely have granted GATT provisions
the force to invalidate conflicting domestic law.' 3 In 1947, the GATT's
drafters briefly considered the possibility of direct citizen access to an
international trade organization, but this idea was quickly rejected at the
time'4 and has not made much headway since.' 5
8 See 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) and (f) (1982).
9 GATI, 26th Supp. BISD 22 (1980) (art. 13 of the Standards Code).
10 GAIT, 26th Supp. BISD 22-26 (1980) (art. 14 of the Standards Code).
"1 Id.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
13 See generally Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, 20 COMMON MKr. L. Rav. 397 (1983) (criticizing the Court's decision not to grant direct
effect to certain GATT provisions). See also Bourgeois, Effects of International Agreements in Euro-
pean Community Law: Are the Dice Cast?, 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 2201, 2217-18 (1984) (defending the
Court's decision not to grant direct effect to GATT provisions). In his study, Petersmann briefly
reviews the application of GATr by United States and Japanese courts. Petersmann, supra at 418
n.53. Detailed analyses of GATrs status in United States domestic law and application by United
States (federal and state) courts may be found in Hudec, The Legal Status of GA7T in the Domestic
Law of the United States, in GAT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Hif & Petersman eds., to
be published by Kluwer in 1986 in its series Studies in Transnational Economic Law); Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249
(1968).
14 "At the time the fear of the 'supernational' was as great as the fear of the 'supernatural' and
the theory of governmental sovereignty prevented any serious consideration of direct relations to
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Recently, certain countries have designed bilateral consultation
mechanisms with a view to amicably resolving complaints of exporters.
A notable example is the Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee
("TFC"), established in 1977.16 The TFC is a government-to-govern-
ment forum which admits and investigates private complaints about Jap-
anese government practices (e.g., customs procedures and product
approval procedures) restricting United States exports to Japan. First, a
United States exporter approaches the United States Department of
Commerce ("Department"). The Department may open a "case file"
and raise the matter in the TFC's Washington Support Group (consisting
of Commerce officials and Japanese embassy personnel). The Tokyo
Group (consisting of Ministry of International Trade and Industry
("MITI") officials and United States embassy personnel) may subse-
quently become involved in seeking a resolution of the complaint. The
Senior Review Committee, co-chaired by the Assistant-Secretary of
Commerce and the Director-General of the Trade Administration Bu-
reau of MITI,17 provide overall guidance to the TFC process.
The TFC mechanism is rather loosely structured. Private complain-
ants fully depend upon the willingness of the Commerce Department to
initiate a TFC investigation, the outcome of which is contingent on the
willingness of the Japanese government to change its practices. More-
over, the TFC process does not work under any time constraints, nor is it
subject to public scrutiny. Through the years, TFC has come to focus on
company-specific problems in basic industries, such as the chemical and
metal industry.18
Japan, often accused of shielding its market against import competi-
tion, in 1982 took the unusual step of creating an "ombudsman" for the
purpose of settling grievances from foreign business related to the degree
of openness of the Japanese market and its import inspection procedures.
The Office of the Trade Ombudsman (the "OTO") acts under the author-
individual persons." J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 187. Among international organizations GAIT is
no exception in this respect, since no international organization will interpret its law at the request of
a private party. H. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTruTIONAL LAW 681 (2d ed. 1980).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 382-90 (containing proposals for a private right to petition
GATT, through which a preliminary interpretation of certain GATT principles may be requested).
16 See generally Weil & Glick, Japan-Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market
Drawn from US. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 845, 859-902 (1979) (analyzing
TFC's "case law" generated in the first years of its existence).
17 Id. at 860 n.94.
18 Telephone interview with McClellan DuBois, Special Assistant to the United States Undersec-
retary of Commerce (Oct. 31, 1984). Complaints of high technology industries against Japanese
trade practices are handled by the "High Technology Working Group," a separate structure co-
managed by the United States Department of Commerce and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
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ity of a Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, in cooperation with the minis-
tries involved in a particular complaint.19 More than two years after its
establishment, however, foreign observers judge the OTO to be a quali-
fied success at best.
The Japanese ombudsman does not have independent authority to
settle complaints, but merely passes them on to the agency which does
have jurisdiction over the matter. Many corporations with subsidiaries
in Japan are reluctant to approach the OTO because of the possibility of
losing goodwill, and prefer to rely on their own contacts within the dif-
ferent ministries. OTO officials have a short-term position with the
ombudsman's office, which has led some to believe that they will be re-
luctant to urge foreign complaints upon their prospective employers (/ e.,
the ministries concerned).20 Significantly, the number of complaints sub-
mitted to the OTO recently has dropped. 1
In those instances where informal settlement processes do not give
satisfaction to private complainants, the complainants will be dependent
on their government's support to press objections against foreign trade
barriers, either bilaterally or before the appropriate international forum.
The discretion a government traditionally enjoyed in pursuing a private
complaint on the intergovernmental plane can be appreciated if one con-
siders the institution of diplomatic protection.
This classic institution is connected with state responsibility for in-
fringements of individual rights of aliens (e.g., unlawful detention or ex-
propriation without payment of fair compensation).2 The affected
person (natural or legal) may turn to his national government and re-
quest protection. If his national government takes up his claim and in-
tervenes with the foreign state, this action is deemed an exercise of
diplomatic protection. Nowadays it is generally accepted that govern-
ments are under no duty to exercise diplomatic protection.23 The com-
19 See generally Okita, Role of the Trade Ombudsman in Liberalizing Japan's Market, 7 WORLD
ECON. 241, 249-50 (1984).
20 Kreutzer, Japanse Ombudsman voor Handelsproblemen Heeft Weinig Macht, Elseviers Week-
blad, May 12, 1984, at 24.
21 Id.; Why the Japanese trade nut is still tough to crack, Financial Times (London), September
17, 1984, at 5 (citing a 1983 survey conducted by the Japanese government which found that only a
third of those foreign concerns with grievances bothered to file them with the O.T.O.).
22 See generally J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 293-301 (9th ed. 1984).
The term "diplomatic protection" was introduced by the United States scholar E.M. Borchard in his
pioneering work DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915).
23 C. ROUSSEAU, DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 116 (10th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 212 (1965). The government's dis-
cretion in exercising diplomatic protection has been endorsed by the International Court of Justice.
Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 1, 44 (judgment of Feb. 5, 1970).
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mon view is that the State does have discretion in weighing the national
interest against the private claim in order to take into account a variety
of factors such as the proportionality of the importance of the claim
against the resources required to resolve the issues it presents, the priori-
ties involved in selecting one claim over another, and, perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the political implications resulting from an exercise of
diplomatic protection.
These factors also play a role when a private petitioner requests that
a government take up his complaint with respect to foreign unfair trade
practices.24 Yet unfettered public discretion in this area has come under
attack by exporters and academic observers. Where it concerns interna-
tional trade, governments actually stimulate citizens to venture outside
their national territory in promoting export activities. By way of reassur-
ance, governments often remind both exporters and potential exporters
of specific commitments to liberalize international trade which many na-
tions have undertaken in the context of GATT. In practice, however, the
enforcement of these commitments leaves much to be desired because it
undermines the liberal trading framework, and also acts to the detriment
of the business community, which sees its investment in export activities
imperiled.
The discrepancies perceived in international commitment and na-
tional compliance have incited many exporters, supported by academic
24 This has led me to argue on an earlier occasion that such a request must be regarded as an
appeal for diplomatic protection. Bronckers, A Legal Analysis of Protectionist Measures Affecting
Japanese Imports into the European Community, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 54, 68 (V6lker ed. 1983). Upon further reflection, however, I believe this transposition is
inappropriate, given the differences in context between the institution of diplomatic protection (L e.,
protection of rights of aliens) and the complaints about foreign unfair trade practices.
These differences are reflected in the GATT framework for dispute settlement, which does not
contain requirements similar to those pertaining to an exercise of diplomatic protection. For exam-
ple, it is still a rule of public international law, albeit with certain qualifications, that a state claim on
behalf of one of its citizens abroad is not admissable unless this citizen has exhausted the local
remedies in the foreign state which is alleged to have injured him. See generally STARKE, supra note
22, at 299-301; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 495-505 (3d ed. 1979).
GATT's dispute settlement provisions (Articles XXII and XXIII) do not set forth such a require-
ment. These provisions are discussed infra text accompanying notes 35-46. A Contracting Party
may request consultations with another party (which must afford sympathetic consideration to such
request) and may submit its complaints to the GATI membership regardless of whether the individ-
ual trader who was affected by the disputed practice and who brought this matter to his govern-
ment's attention exhausted the legal remedies available to him in the jurisdiction of the respondent
party.
In short, GATT law does not contain a local remedies rule, and no instances have been reported
where this issue was raised in dispute settlement proceedings. One should recognize, though, that
exhaustion of local remedies may be prescribed by national law in connection with procedures al-
lowing private petitioners to complain of foreign unfair trade practices. See infra text accompanying
note 137.
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observers, to insist on private participation in the enforcement of interna-
tional trade agreements.2 5 In the early 1960s this movement lead to the
introduction of a provision in United States trade legislation allowing the
business community to request public hearings on foreign trade barriers.
Gradually, these provisions have evolved into a full-fledged complaint
procedure, limiting the Executive's latitude in investigating and pursuing
a private complaint on the intergovernmental level. Yet it is important
to note that this procedure maintains the Executive's discretion to decide
whether or not at the outset to take retaliatory measures against the for-
eign government concerned, even if the private complaint is found to be
justified. Only recently, but mainly for different reasons, the EEC
adopted a similar private complaint procedure.
This article will consider the effect of private complaint procedures
on trade relations between GATT contracting parties. It will first ad-
dress the complaint procedure established by Section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301"). Following a survey of the scope of
the Executive's retaliatory authority, this article will sketch the history of
the private remedy created by Section 301. Next the discussion will fo-
cus on three procedural themes: (i) the requirements private complain-
ants must meet in order to successfully invoke Section 301, (ii) the relief
private complainants can expect once the United States government
takes up their complaints and (iii) the position of Section 301 vis-a'-vis
other private remedies in United States trade law, particularly with re-
gard to the United States domestic market. This article will then ex-
amine the origin and outlook of the novel Community complaint
procedure ("the EEC instrument"), which Section 301 fomented, with
reference to the themes outlined above. Finally, this study will appraise
both the potential and the pitfalls of private involvement in the enforce-
ment of GATT commitments.
At the outset it should be pointed out that the term "unfairness", as
it is used in this article, does not denote uniform normative standards. It
will be seen, for example, that trade practices which can be considered
unfair according to United States law may go unchallenged when judged
according to GATT norms. Indeed, one of the objectives of this study is
to inquire whether United States and EEC notions of unfair trade prac-
tices correspond with the fair trading standards developed in GATT.
25 Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional Problems of Economic Interde-
pendence, 16 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 453, 477 (1979) ("(I)t may no longer be possible to carry on
economic international relations by traditional or habitual diplomatic techniques... Perhaps what
is needed is to develop national structures which allow citizen participation and consensus building
on international trade policy in conjunction with counterpart constituencies and citizens from other
nations") (emphasis in original).
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The sequel of this inquiry is to determine whether the response to foreign
unfair trade practices, as envisaged by United States and EEC domestic
law, conforms with GATT procedures. With this in mind, it seemed
convenient to use the term "foreign unfair trade practices" in a descrip-
tive sense, without distinguishing its differing content at all times.
II. UNITED STATES COMPLAINT PROCEDURE EMBODIED IN
SECTION 301
This chapter of the article will focus on the procedural innovations
wrought by Section 301, which allows private complainants to trigger
intervention by the United States government against foreign unfair trade
practices. Yet Section 301 also merits consideration from another angle,
the extent to which Congress has delegated authority to the Executive to
retaliate against foreign trade practices which it deems to be unfair.26
Through Section 301 Congress empowered the President to take action
against foreign governments engaging in unfair trade practices both at
the request of a private complainant and on his own motion.27 Before
broaching an analysis of the procedural aspects of the private remedy
created by Section 301, this article will indicate briefly the scope of the
Executive's retaliatory authority.
A. Scope of the Executive's Retaliatory Authority
In 1794, Congress authorized President George Washington to re-
strict the imports from and exports to foreign countries, whenever he felt
that these countries discriminated against United States commerce.2 8
Congress repeatedly reaffirmed this grant of authority. 9 At a time when
international standards of fairness in trade were not well-developed, with
the exception of certain rudimentary notions expressed in bilateral
Friendship-Commerce-and-Navigation ("FCN") treaties, essentially the
Executive was called upon to exercise its own judgment on the propriety
and expedience of retaliatory action.
In the GATT, however, the international trading community has
articulated standards of fairness, while providing for dispute settlement
procedures in case objection is made against practices of a contracting
26 Congress has the power to regulate United States international trade policy. "The Congress
shall have Power... (t)o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
27 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 304, Pub. L. 98-573
(1984).
28 Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of
Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569, 573 n.18 (1982).
29 See generally Gadbaw, Reciprocity and its Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 14 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 691, 702-09 (1982); Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 573.
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party which allegedly violate these standards. The question then arises
whether action under Section 301 is limited to GATT-related issues and
should conform with GATT procedures. This article will show that
Congress has extended the scope of the Executive's retaliatory authority
beyond GATT rules.
1. Extension: Beyond GATT Nullification or Impairment
Section 301 currently empowers the President:
(A) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement,
or
(B) to respond to any act, policy or practice of a foreign country or instru-
mentality that
(i) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits
to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts United States commerce.
30
While the quoted language dates from the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, Congress expressly defined the meaning of the catch-words "unjus-
tifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory" for the first time in the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984 as follows:
Unreasonable.-The term "unreasonable" means any act, policy, or prac-
tice which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the
international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be
unfair and inequitable. The term includes, but is not limited to, any act,
policy, or practice which denies fair and equitable-
(A) market opportunities;
(B) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise;
or
(C) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights.
Unjustifable.-
(A) In general. The term "unjustifiable" means any act, policy, or prac-
tice which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international
legal rights of the United States.
(B) Certain actions included. The term "unjustifiable" includes, but is not
limited to, any act, policy, or practice described in subparagraph (A)
which denies national or most-favored-nation treatment, the right of
establishment, or protection of intellectual property rights.
Definition of discriminatory.-The term "discriminatory" includes, where
appropriate, any act, policy, or practice which denies national or most-fa-
vored-nation treatment to United States goods, services or investment.31
The addition of these statutory definitions in 1984 was not meant to ex-
pand the President's authority established in the 1979 Act, but to clarify
30 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(a).
31 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(f)(2).
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existing law and to emphasize certain particularly offensive foreign
practices.32
Through the inclusion of the "unreasonableness" criterion, Con-
gress clearly extended the Executive's retaliatory authority beyond viola-
tions of the GATT codes of conduct.33 The legislative history of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, in explaining the "unreasonableness" cri-
terion, referred to
restrictions which are not necessarily inconsistent with trade agreements,
but which nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under
trade agreements or which otherwise restrict or burden U.S. Commerce (em-
phasis supplied).34
The clause, "which nullify or impair benefits," corresponds with the
GATT's central dispute settlement provision, Article XXIII. 3  In Arti-
cles XXII and XXIII, the GATT has made arrangements to settle dis-
putes, while indicating which governmental practices are deemed
offensive in the context of GATT. Article XXII sets forth a general obli-
gation for the GATT Contracting Parties to consult with one another at
the request of any party. Such preliminary consultations are a prerequi-
site to formal dispute settlement proceedings pursuant to Article XXIII.
a. Establishing GATT nullification or impairment
Article XXIII of the GATT stipulates in paragraph 1 that
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting party
of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, or (c) the existence of any other situation
is actionable should a contracting party consider that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired (emphasis supplied).3 6
32 S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1983).
33 Where reference is made hereafter to the GATT, this includes the Codes negotiated during
the Tokyo Round. These Codes (relating to subsidies, dumping, customs valuation, government
procurement, technical barriers to trade, and import licensing, apart from a number of sectoral
arrangements and understandings), elaborate on provisions of the General Agreement. The texts of
the Tokyo Codes are reproduced in GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 3-191 (1980). See supra note 2. This
contribution does not examine the sectoral arrangements (concerning bovine meat, GATT, 26th
Supp. BISD 84, certain dairy products, id at 91, and civil aircrafts, id at 162).
34 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 234-35 (1979).
35 See generally R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WoRLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
(1975); Hudec, GATTDispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round- An Unfinished Business, 13 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
36 The Tokyo Codes on standards, GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 8, 22 (1980) (art. 14.2); government
procurement, id at 33, 49 (art. VII.4); subsidies, id at 56, 71 (art. 12.3); dumping, id at 171, 185
(art. 15.2); and customs valuation, id at 116, 128 (art. 19.1) contain similar language, also making
allowance for non-violation complaints. The Code on import licensing, id at 154, 159 (art. 4.2),
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
If the disputing parties do not reach an amicable settlement of their dif-
ferences, the complaining country may take its case to the entire GATT
membership. Article XXIII does not provide for a particular procedure
to be followed then, but it has become customary for the GATT Council
(acting for the GATT Contracting Parties) to establish a panel which
prepares a report analyzing the relevant issues and proposes resolutions.
Yet it should be noted that a complaining party is not entitled to a panel
proceeding. In the Understanding on Article XXIII procedures reached
during the Tokyo Round, the signatories stopped short of granting a
complaining party the right to a panel investigation. 7 This was a negoti-
ating success for the EEC which had resisted proposals from the United
States and Canada for automatic recognition of the right to a panel.38
Panels operate as independent adjudicatory bodies, traditionally
consisting of officials of governments who are not parties to the particu-
lar dispute. Many disagreements are settled by the disputing parties dur-
ing the panel proceedings or on the basis of the panel report, before the
GATT membership has even considered its findings. Should a complain-
ant not be satisfied with the outcome of the settlement proceedings, how-
ever, the GAIT Contracting Parties may take the rather unusual step of
authorizing the complainant to retaliate against the other disputant if
they consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such
action.3 9
does not make provision for an independent dispute settlement mechanism and refers to the relevant
provisions in the General Agreement.
Complaints may also be warranted according to GATT, art. XXIII, para. 1, if a contracting
party considers that "the attainment of any objective of the Agreement of being impeded." This
extension does not add anything to the "benefits" formula. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasona-
ble" Foreign Trade Practice" The New Section 301 and GA7T Nullification and Impairment, 59
MiNN. L. REv. 461, 480 (1975).
37 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance, GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 210 (1980), to which is annexed an Agreed Description of the
Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (art. XXIII.2), id, at 215.
These documents leave the impression that voluntary settlement of disputes is strongly favored, thus
restraining the use of the panel procedure. Hudec, supra note 36, at 177-78. The GATT Ministerial
Declaration adopted on Nov. 29, 1982 reaffirmed that "consensus will continue to be the traditional
method of resolving disputes" although "obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be
avoided." GAIT, 29th Supp. BISD 9, 16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as GATT Ministerial Declara-
tion].
In contrast, a complaining party is entitled to the establishment of a panel if the dispute falls
within the terms of one of the Codes (with the exception of the Import Licensing Code).
38 See EUR. COMM. COM. (79) 514 final, at 218 (1979).
39 Only once in GAIT history did the Contracting Parties formally approve of retalitory action
under GAIT, art. XXIII. See infra text accompanying note 154.
In accordance with customary usage, capital initials in Contracting Parties refer to actions
taken by the GAIT's Contracting Parties acting jointly, in their capacity as the decision-making
organ of the GAIT organization. See GAIT, art. XXV, para. 1. On the GAIT's status as a de
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The underscored phrases of Article XXIII demonstrate that the
General Agreement allows complaints not only when its provisions are
infringed, but also in "non-violation" cases where a contracting party
feels its benefits under the Agreement are being nullified or impaired. A
careful study of the drafting history of the nullification or impairment
concept in the GATT has concluded that it "was not a definition at all,
but rather a grant of common-law jurisdiction to fashion a definition as
disputed cases arose."'' Particularly in non-violation cases, this concept
enables a case-by-case determination of acts which, even though they do
not infringe on particular GATT provisions, offend the GATT member-
ship. Practice reveals that non-violation nullification or impairment may
be found when a contracting party denies certain benefits to its trading
partner(s), even though the latter could have reasonably expected these
benefits."a This suggests a severe limitation on the possibilities of win-
ning non-violation cases brought to the GATT forum, however, because
these cases ultimately appeal to the GATT membership's sense of
fairness.
Only if there is a strong consensus will an organization like the
GATT be comfortable enough to declare non-violation practices of one
of its members unfair.42 In addition, one can hardly expect the GATT
membership to condemn the actions of one of its members, if other con-
tracting parties on different occasions have engaged or engage in similar
practices. If, moreover, the complaining party does not have "clean
hands" with respect to the disputed practices, it may well be estopped to
submitting a non-violation complaint under Article XXIII.43 Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, the vast majority of cases submitted to the GATT
membership under Article XXIII center on alleged violations of express
provisions of the General Agreement.'
It is obvious, then, that the GATT offers only limited opportunity to
complain successfully about trade restrictions which cannot be reduced
to violations of well-established rules. This is an important reason why
the GATT's dispute settlement mechanism has not been conducive to
enforcing the Agreement's guiding objective of liberalizing international
trade in the notorious "grey area" of trade restrictions which escape a
narrow interpretation of existing GATT rules (one only has to think of
facto international organization, see R. LAUWAARS, WISSELWERKINGEN 7 (Inaugural Address,
University of Amsterdam 1984).
40 Hudec, supra note 36, at 480.
41 Id at 489; E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at 27.
42 Hudec, supra note 36, at 502.
43 See id at 504.
44 It at 482; E. McGoVERN, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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Voluntary Restraint Arrangements ("VRAs") 45). The dispute settlement
process itself has also been criticized by observers for being ineffective in
enforcing the commitments of GAIT contracting parties. Regrettably,
the Tokyo Round did not yield concrete improvements in the GATT's
dispute settlement procedure.46
b. The extension of "unreasonableness"
Increased dissatisfaction with the GATT's enforcement mechanism
prompted Congress, in the Trade Act of 1974, to include the "unreasona-
bleness" criterion in Section 301, which enables the President to retaliate
against foreign trade restrictions, even in the absence of a GATT finding
that United States benefits are being nullified or impaired. The following
statement taken from the Trade Act's legislative history, explaining the
inclusion of the unreasonableness criterion in Section 301, shows Con-
gress' bellicose mood in 1974:
(The Senate Finance) Committee felt it was necessary to make it clear that
the President could act to protect U.S. economic interests whether or not
such action was consistent with the articles of an outmoded international
agreement (Le., the GATT-author's note) initiated by the Executive 25
years ago and never approved by the Congress.4 7
Later on, when the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 came up for
Congressional approval, the legislature's antagonism regarding the
GATT had largely disappeared (Congress accepted the GATT by then as
a fait accompl). Yet the GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms (as
elaborated in the various Tokyo Codes) still received a critical reception
which prompted Congress to realffrm and strengthen the role of Section
301 as a means to enforcing vigorously the benefits accruing to the
United States under the General Agreement and its progeny, negotiated
during the Tokyo Round.4 8 Moreover, despite Congress' softening atti-
tude towards the GAIT, Congress retained the unreasonableness crite-
rion in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and in the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984.
45 See infra text accompanying notes 192-93.
46 The wisdom of divorcing the Code's dispute settlement procedures from the mechanism pro-
vided in the General Agreement and of fragmenting the Code's procedures is questionable. Besides,
distinctions between the various dispute settlement procedures may be rather fluid in practice. See
Hudec, supra note 35, at 184. The GATT's dispute settlement machinery is still cited as its most
serious weakness. Tyler, Why GA77 lacks international clout, Financial Times (London), June 13,
1984, at 6.
47 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1974). For more than two decades, Congress
barely tolerated the GATT, challenging the Executive's authority to negotiate the General Agree-
ment. See F. MEYER, INTERNA7iONAL TRADE PoLicY 80 (1978); Jackson, supra note 13, at 265-
69.
48 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1979).
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Returning to an earlier observation, Section 301 continues to em-
power the Executive to pass independent judgment on the propriety and
expedience of retaliatory action without regard to international (L e.,
GATT) norms and procedures. As could be expected, adoption of Sec-
tion 301 initially provoked bitter criticism from United States trading
partners (notably the European Economic Community) who suspected
that the United States would henceforth bypass the GATT by unilater-
ally imposing its own conception of fairness in international trade. Pro-
visions in the Trade Act of 1974 (as subsequently amended) allowing
private complainants to trigger investigations by the United States gov-
ernment into foreign trade restrictions heightened the suspicions of the
international trading community.
Looking back on the first ten years of Section 301's existence, how-
ever, these misgivings have not materialized. Not once did the Executive
impose retaliatory restrictions following a private complaint under Sec-
tion 301. 49 Moreover, probably to the dismay of the business commu-
nity, the Executive has abided by the often lengthy course of GATT
dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed, government-to-government ne-
gotiations are the common form of relief following an investigation pur-
suant to Section 301,1 0 because other than the negotiations involved in
dispute settlement proceedings, there has rarely been relief (e.g. retalia-
tory restrictions).
2. Other Extensions: Services and Investments
So far the noteworthy extension of the Executive's authority under
Section 301 has not so much been the potential disrespect of GATT, as
49 The President twice rested on independent decision to "retaliate" on Section 252 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 252, predecessor to Section 301. The first case concerned the
introduction by the EEC of a variable levy on poultry imports as part its common agricultural
policy. See generally Lowenfeld, 'Doing unto Others...' the Chicken War Ten Years After, 4 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 599 (1972/73). In 1974, the President invoked Section 252 again to "retaliate"
against Canadian escape clause restrictions on United States cattle imports. See generally Hudec,
supra note 36, at 535-39.
These two cases, however, were not concerned with claims of nullification or impairment within
the meaning of GATT, art. XXIII (L e., "unfairness"). Both the European Community and Canada
had acted in accordance with GATT procedures. In the "Chicken War," the United States sought
to reestablish a balance of concessions with the European Community pursuant to GATT, art.
XXVIII, para. 3(a). In the "Cattle War," the United States sought to reestablish a balance of con-
cessions with Canada pursuant to GATT, art. XIX, para. 2(a).
In section 232 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress enacted legislation denying tax
deductions for certain foreign advertising expenses. This provision was inspired by a Section 301
complaint about similar legislation in Canada, discouraging Canadian advertising on United States
border Television stations. The border broadcasting complaint is discussed in Fisher & Steinhardt,
supra note 28, at 643-52. See also text accompanying notes 393-403.
50 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 608.
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much as the applicability of Section 301 to trade in services and United
States investments abroad."1 It would be beyond the scope of this article
to deal with these issues in any detail52, yet one or two observations are
relevant to our discussion.
The GATT, of course, is product-oriented. United States proposals
for a new 'General Agreement on Trade in Services and Investments'
have been kept at bay by a number of trading partners. The developing
countries, for instance, are reluctant to tackle new issues such as services
in GATT, because of the possibility that these issues would deflect atten-
tion from the outstanding problems of protectionism in the product-
sector.53
Several national and EEC officials have voiced their concern to this
author that by pressing complaints under Section 301 against foreign ser-
vice-related practices, the United States runs ahead of, if not prejudices,
international consensus-building in this area. Yet one could also wel-
come complaints under section 301 for bringing out the issues demand-
ing resolution in a new international agreement. Besides, even if the
United States would take retaliatory action protesting foreign service-re-
lated practices, its underlying assessment of fairness certainly would not
be binding on the drafters of such an agreement. If anything, the con-
cern of these European officials reminds one of the early, and thus far
largely unsubstantiated, misgivings regarding the application of Section
301 to trade in goods.
While the GATT does not pertain to investments specifically, its
provisions do affect so-called investment performance requirements, to
the extent they are trade-related. 4 Consider, for example, local content
regulations, which prescribe to foreign investors the use of domestic fac-
tors of production regardless of their comparative advantage (e.g., availa-
bility, quality or cost).55 Only recently, a GATT panel condemned
51 The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 explicitly made foreign practices affecting United States
investments abroad actionable under Section 301, to the extent these investments have implications
for trade in goods or services. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(1), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
§ 304(f)(1), H.RL 3398, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). In addition, the 1984 Act reinforced the appli-
cability of Section 301 to service-related complaints. Id
52 See generally Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 636-87.
53 GA7T Chief Calls on U.S. Not to Abandon Multilateral System, Financial Times (London),
Nov. 27, 1984, at 6. The United States did persuade the Contracting Parties during their fortieth
session in November 1984 to discuss the possibility of multilateral action on trade in services in late
1985. GA7T Members to Consider Action on Trade in Services, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1984, at 2.
54 See generally Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related Performance Requirements under the
GA 7T-MTN System and U.S. Law, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 129 (1982).
55 Local content rules have also been proposed to restrict the imports of foreign products. On
November 3, 1983, for example, the United States House of Representatives passed its version of the
Fair Practices and Procedures in Automotive Products Act of 1983, establishing minimum domestic
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certain trade-related requirements set forth by Canada's Foreign Invest-
ment Review Agency, which regulates and monitors foreign invest-
ments.5 6  The GATT panel was instituted by the GATT Contracting
Parties at the request of the United States government; a complaint
which, incidentally, was not triggered by a Section 301 complaint.
3. Future Extension: Sectoral Reciprocity?
After the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Section
301 for some time became the focal point of debate in the United States
on the need for "reciprocity" in international trade relations.5 7 The no-
tion of reciprocity advocated in this debate is fundamentally different
from the idea of reciprocity envisaged in the General Agreement.
The GATT views reciprocity principally as the measure to gauge
the equivalence of tariff concessions negotiated 58 or renegotiated 9 by its
contracting parties. As such, the idea of reciprocity has been vulnerable
to several criticisms: notably for being imprecise (how can tariff conces-
sions be compared?), inadequate with respect to "low-tariff" countries
(because reciprocity gives a premium to "high-tariff" countries which
have more to bargain with), inappropriate with respect to developing
countries (which should not be forced to pay in kind for concessions
granted to them by "rich", industrialized countries°), and cumbersome
in the process of negotiating concessions (despite the difficulties in mea-
suring reciprocity, each government will ultimately have to persuade its
content requirements applicable to all motor vehicle manufacturers who sell more than 100,000
motor vehicles in the United States each year. H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Senate
did not complete action on this bill during the 98th Congress. Accordingly, similar legislation would
have to be reintroduced after the 99th Congress convenes on January 1, 1985.
56 GATT, 30th Supp. BISD 140 (1984). An academic debate pertaining to GATT-related issues
presented by the activities of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency preceded the panel's
decision. Compare the critical appraisal in Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 54, at 174-78 with the
more benevolent evaluation of Carasco, The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT): Incompatible?, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 441
(1983).
57 See generally Gadbaw, supra note 29.
58 GATT, art. XXVIII, para. 1.
59 GATE, art. XXVIII, para. 2.
60 By adding Part IV to the General Agreement, the GATT Contracting Parties softened the
application of the reciprocity principle with respect to concessions granted to developing countries.
Thus, GATT, art. XXXVI, para. 8 provides that "(t)he developed contracting parties do not expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and
other barriers to trade of less-developed contracting parties." This principle was confirmed by the
GATE Contracting Parties at the end of the Tokyo Round. See Differential and More Favourable
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Decision of Nov. 28,
1979), GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 203, 204, para. 5 (1980). The GATT Ministerial Declaration of
November 1982 urged the Contracting Parties "to implement more effectively" Part IV and the 1979
Decision on differential and more favorable treatment of developing countries. Supra note 37, at 13.
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constituents that it did receive reciprocal, Le., the most advantageous,
concessions at the bargaining table without "giving away" too much).
6 1
Nevertheless, this idea of reciprocity also limits the extent to which
contracting parties may retaliate against one another in those cases
where the GATT membership decides that benefits accruing under the
General Agreement have been nullified or impaired. 62  Article XXIII
only allows "compensatory" increases in trade barriers; retaliation
should not have a "punitive" character.6  Again, the GATT seeks to
maintain an equilibrium of concessions among its contracting parties.
In contrast, proposals for "reciprocity" legislation which have
emerged in the United States focus on the equivalence of remaining im-
port restrictions and their trade impact.64 Various notions of reciprocity
have been advanced by Congressmen at the instigation of pressure
groups. Bills were designed to achieve reciprocity (Le., "substantially
equivalent competitive opportunities") in specific products or sectors.6
Observers rightly pointed out, however, that product-by-product or
sectoral reciprocity runs counter to basic GATT principles, if only be-
cause under certain circumstances countries have a right to protect in-
dustries against import competition.66 For this reason alone, no exporter
can lay claim to market access in a foreign country equivalent to that
accorded to United States products in the exporter's home market.
With respect to Section 301, caution seems to have prevailed in the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. As an alternative to the notion of "sub-
stantially equivalent competitive opportunities", Congress finally intro-
duced the standard of "fair and equitable market opportunity" in Section
61 J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 241-43. Some even argue that floating exchange rates have
largely obviated the economic rationale for reciprocity because governments can let floating ex-
change rates equilibrate payment and trade flows. They view linkage of import liberalization with
assurances of additional export opportunities mainly as a means to generate domestic support for
trade concessions and to hold off protectionist pressures. Petersmann, supra note 13, at 428-29.
62 See K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 352 (1970); J. JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 170.
63 Hudec, supra note 36, at 468.
64 Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 694.
65 See, eg., the initial draft of the Wine Equity Act, set forth in H.R. 3795, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). One of the purposes of this Act was "to achieve access to foreign markets for United States
wine substantially equivalent to the market access afforded to foreign wine by the United States." Id.
at § 2(b)(2). As finally adopted in the Trade and TariffAct of 1984, the purpose of the Wine Equity
Act was toned down "to achieve greater access to foreign markets for United States wine and grape
products through the reduction or elimination of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to (or other
distortions of) trade in wine." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 903(b)(3).
66 Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 735. Consider GATT, art. XIX (escape clause) which makes pro-
visions for temporary relief (Le., safeguard measures taking the form of import restrictions) in case a
domestic industry is injured by an unforeseeable increase in imports.
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301 .67 Thus a sector-by-sector comparison of market access in foreign
countries compared to the United States could be avoided. It should be
noted, that the Reagan Administration thus far has strongly opposed a
sector-by-sector comparison. 68  Even so, country-by-country appraisals
of "fair and equitable market opportunities" create the risk of fragment-
ing the multilateral trading framework into bilateral ententes. Thus
these appraisals can undermine the GATT's basic principle of uncondi-
tional Most-Favored-Nation ("MFN") treatment. They tie in, however,
with a more general trend in GATT towards deviations from the uncon-
ditional MFN principle.69
Passage of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 indicates that pressures
to import sectoral reciprocity standards in Section 301 have abated.
Abatement does not mean that the idea of sectoral reciprocity has disap-
peared from the legislature's agenda. Rather than using Section 301 as a
balancing mechanism and depending on Executive decision-making,
Congress may take matters into its own hands. It may seize upon partic-
ular sectors and pass legislation to secure reciprocity in these areas.
A conspicuous initiative in this respect was the Telecommunications
Trade Act of 1984, which Senator Danforth proposed. Senator Dan-
forth's bill was designed to open up foreign markets to United States
telecommunications products.7 ° It effectively required the President to
withdraw United States tariff concessions on imported telecommunica-
tions products, if within three years after the enactment of the bill the
President had been unable to reach agreement with United States trading
partners on reduction of their import barriers to United States telecom-
munications products.71 Congress presumably would have had power of
67 Congress cited denial of "fair and equitable market opportunities" to United States industries
as an example of "unreasonableness" in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Supra text accompanying
note 31. The senate, which originally proposed the "fair and equitable" language, refrained from
giving a further definition, "since it remains within the President's discretion to determine when
circumstances exist which require action under this provision." S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 46 (1983).
Note that the achievement of "substantially equivalent competitive opportunities" in foreign
markets still is one of the purposes of the title in the 1984 Act dealing with the liberalization of
international trade. Id, section 302(1). Consequently, this reciprocity notion, instead of being the
standard for retaliatory action, has become one of the negotiating objectives for the Executive.
68 See Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 740.
69 Consider, for example, the reciprocity notions introduced in various Tokyo Codes. See infra
notes 207 (reflecting on the Subsidies Code) and 236 (reflecting on the Standards Code).
70 S. 2618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). A stated objective of the bill was to "provide competitive
opportunities for United States exports of telecommunications products.., which are substantially
equivalent to the competitive opportunities provided by the United States ... ." Id at § 181(a)(1).
Since this bill was not enacted during the 98th Congress, it will have to be reintroduced when the
99th Congress convenes.
71 Id at section 183(b). The withdrawal of United States tariff concessions on telecommunica-
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approval over any such agreement.72
Through such legislative techniques, Congress can severely restrict
Executive discretion in the trade policy area. This ability of Congress
may stimulate the Executive to act more aggressively pursuant to Section
301, in order to steer clear of Congressional interventions.
4. Summary
While in theory the Executive is empowered to disregard GATT
norms and procedures in deciding on retaliation against foreign trade
restrictions, the first decade of experience with Section 301 shows that, in
fact, the Executive respects the outcome of GATT's dispute settlement
processes. One could even argue that the United States has restored a
certain measure of confidence in the GATT's dispute settlement mecha-
nisms by funnelling a number of sensitive issues through Article XXIII,
rather than taking unilateral action. It remains to be seen, though,
whether the forces currently at work in the reciprocity debate will affect
the heretofore prudent posture of the United States government. This
aside, it is noteworthy that Section 301 admits complaints about barriers
interfering with United States trade in goods (e.g., GATT-oriented com-
plaints) as well as trade in services and United States foreign investments.
Against this background, the position of a private complainant
under Section 301 can be put into better perspective. With a broad un-
derstanding of the foreign practices Section 301 was designed to redress,
it is now apposite to turn to the procedural aspects of Section 301.
B. Origin and Development of a Private Complaint Procedure
The private remedy created by Section 301 originates from the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. On Congressional initiative, this Act for
the first time instructed the Executive to hold public hearings, at the re-
quest of private parties, regarding foreign import restrictions. Signifi-
cantly, however, no such hearings were ever held. Again under
Congressional pressure, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 introduced
the skeleton of a private complaint procedure. Yet the business commu-
tions imports, for most products, would increase the rate from an average of 5 per cent ad valorem to
35 per cent ad valorem (and up to 65 and 85 per cent ad valorem for certain optical fiber products).
!ML at section 202(a). Given the volume of affected trade, estimated to amount to several billion
dollars, the ramifications of such a withdrawal would be tremendous. Consider, for example, com-
pensatory demands or withdrawals of concessions by affected GATT Contracting Parties pursuant
to art. xxvIII (concerning tariff negotiations). The reciprocity notion of the bill, resulting in bilat-
eral negotiations, would further erode the GATT's unconditional most favored nation (hereinafter
referred to as "MFN") principle (Le., art. I).
72 See Trade Act of 1974, §§ 102 and 151.
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nity gave the administration of this procedure by the Executive mixed
reviews; as a result, so too did Congress. Only the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, in amending Section 301, established a full-fledged private
complaint procedure. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, finally, reaf-
firmed the role of private petitioners, without altering their procedural
position.
1. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962
The draft of the Trade Expansion Act, which the Kennedy Admin-
istration submitted to Congress, contained no proviso regulating citizens'
complaints of unfair trade practices. Once again, however, Congress
gave broad authority to the President to suspend United States benefits in
response to acts by foreign countries which would "defeat the purposes"
of the Act.73 Interestingly enough, the Kennedy Administration ap-
peared more concerned about tariffs than about non-tariff barriers
("NTBs"), which now, however, constitute the bulk of complaints filed
under Section 301. 71
During the course of Congressional hearings, the House Committee
on Ways and Means became increasingly apprehensive about NTBs.
Thomas B. Curtis, a Republican representative from Missouri, in partic-
ular, made a number of pertinent inquiries regarding non-tariff trade re-
strictions. At that time, the Kennedy Administration had just negotiated
the Short Term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles, obliging mostly devel-
oping countries (and some developed countries such as Japan) to limit
their surging exports in order to protect the textile industries in import-
ing countries such as the United States.75 Mr. Curtis inquired how the
United States textile industry obtained this relief, while many other in-
dustries also pleading special circumstances received no such protection.
He further asked whether those who disagreed with the negotiation of
the Cotton Textiles Agreement had had an adequate opportunity to pres-
ent their case:
At least I am talking of a government by laws, not by men. Who deter-
mined these things and how were the procedures followed where the textile
industry even got a day in court, if we can call this a court?
73 See section 242 of the Kennedy Administration's proposals, the text of which is reprinted in
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings on HR. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1962) (hereinafter cited as "1962 House Hearings").
74 "(L)et us not miss the point. The major barrier to trade expansion... is not the complex of
nontariff restrictions. Rather it is, and increasingly will be, the tariffs." Remarks by Secretary of
Commerce Luther H. Hodgson, id at 3777. See also the Presidential report reprinted in id at 3856.
75 This arrangement preceded the various Mulifibre Arrangements. See generally van Dartel,
The Conduct of the EECs Textile Trade Policy and the Application of Article 115 EEC, in PROTEC-
TIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 99, 100-07 (Vblker ed. 1983).
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How does anyone get this (special kind of protection-author's note)? Now
the accusations have been made that it is political pressure. I don't shirk
away from such an expression because I think political pressure can be very
proper and healthy. But I think it is very important that we set up proper
channels for the exertion of political pressure. That is what the Congress is
about, among other things. We receive and through our procedures absorb,
political pressures and translate them into action. The reason I think the
Constitution wisely vested the power over foreign trade in this body is be-
cause of the procedural aspects.
7 6
Mr. Curtis then moved to the subject of NTBs which, rather than
tariffs, seemed to him to be the major issue in complaints about unfair
governmental trade practices. He opined that the Executive's handling
of NTBs so far resembled "a sort of catch-as-catch-can operation".7 7
The Congressman next outlined some of his ideas for improvement:
Mainly I would like to see the setup in the traditional American way of
doing things of witnesses confronting each other, so that it is not this busi-
ness in camera, one side stating its case and then another side stating it, but
like we do here in this committee or any congressional committee.
7 8
I would like to see in this act a few definitions of what we regard, at any
rate, (as being) fair trade. . . (I)t might be well for us to spell them out so
that we know the direction toward which we are trying to go, and indeed
the private sector can understand what our standards are.7 9
In the bill which the House Ways and Means Committee reported
and which incorporated its draft of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the
Committee inserted a provision which required the Executive to hold
public hearings on foreign unfair trade practices at the request of "any
interested person".80 The bill also required that the Executive promul-
gate regulations concerning the conduct of such hearings, for the admin-
istration of which a newly established "interagency trade organization"
was responsible.8 1
Mr. Curtis reiterated his position that adequate procedures could
contribute to the enforcement of international trade agreements in subse-
quent hearings before the Senate Finance Committee:
At present there is no established body before which American business and
labor can present allegations of unfair trade practices which are in violation
of international commercial agreements. This bill establishes such proce-
dures. The Interagency Trade Organization is created as a forum where
76 1962 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 3855.
77 Id at 3857.
78 Id. at 3858.
79 Id at 3863.
80 H.R. 11970, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 252(c) (1962).
81 Id.
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interested persons can establish the truth of alleged unfair foreign trade
restrictions in violation of trade agreements. If the Executive carries out
the intent of the Congress, when a violation of a trade agreement is estab-
lished he may withdraw concessions. This can become an important part of
our foreign trade policies and practices. It should be pointed out that the
Interagency Trade Organization is not set up to hear only the complaints of
our domestic industry and labor. It will be available as well for our import-
ers to register complaints of alleged unfair practices by our domestic indus-
try against foreign imports.82 The importance of this device should not be
played down. It can be an effective force in the effort to establish the type of
fair trade practices in international commerce which are essential to the stim-
ulation of increased foreign trade.83 (emphasis supplied)
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as it was finally enacted, did re-
tain the provision regarding public hearings which the House Ways and
Means Committee proposed.84 Congress charged the Trade Policy Com-
mittee, as the interagency trade organization was subsequently called,
with the more encompassing task of providing overall trade policy gui-
dance to the President.85 Another newly created organization, the Spe-
cial Trade Representative ("STR"), chaired the committee. The STR
became the President's chief negotiator of international trade agreements
(replacing the State Department) and further consisted of the Secretaries
of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Interior and De-
fense.86 This organizational format represented the nucleus of what was
to become the administration of Section 301.
In theory at least, Representative Curtis' views had prevailed.
2. The Trade Act of 1974
Efforts to pass a new trade act in 1970, which stemmed in part from
a desire to renew the Executive's authority to negotiate trade agreements,
failed because of opposition in the Senate87. After the 1972 presidential
elections, the Nixon Administration started work on what was called the
Trade Reform Act of 1973. The Administration's proposals for a new
Section 301 included several changes in the President's authority to retal-
iate against foreign unfair trade actions, but the Administration adopted
82 This suggestion, worthy though it might be, proved to be a pipe-dream.
83 Trade Expansion Act Hearings on HR. 11970 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1451 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearings].
84 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 252(d), reprinted in J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 833 (1977).
85 Graham, The Reorganization of Trade Policymaking: Prospects and Problems, 13 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 221, 224 (1980).
86 Id
87 See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 84, at 154-62 (discussing the legislative background of
the Trade Act of 1974).
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verbatim from the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 the clause providing for
private involvement through public hearings.88
This provision, however, had never lead to public hearings, nor to
any visible action by the Executive.89 The off-handed way in which the
Nixon Administration reverted to an inoperative clause roused the busi-
ness community. A large residue of distrust with Executive discretion
manifested itself in proposed amendments to ensure that notice and pub-
lic hearings be mandatory prior to any Executive action under Section
301.90 Congress took this private discontent to heart, as the following
passage taken from a Senate Finance Committee report shows:
In order to make section 301 a more effective tool against foreign practices
and policies adversely affecting the U.S. economy, the Committee also pro-
vided a complaint procedure whereby interested parties could petition the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to conduct a review, with
public hearings of such alleged practices and policies. The Special Repre-
sentative would be required to report to Congress on a semi-annual basis
concerning the status of the reviews undertaken pursuant to this section.
91
The Senate did object, however, to proposals from the House, which
provided for Congressional authority to override every action taken by
the President pursuant to Section 301. In the Senate's view, Congress
should have the authority to veto Presidential measures only in those
cases where the President decided to retaliate across-the-board (Le.,
against countries other than those whose restrictions were the cause of
retaliation). The House agreed with this view in the end.92 The provi-
sions of Section 301 relating to private complaints, as finally adopted in
the Trade Act of 1974 during the Ford Administration, set forth an ele-
mentary procedure along the lines which the Senate Finance Committee
suggested.
In the years between the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 and
the entry into force of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 on January 1,
88 HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., PREPARED STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION WrNESS AT PUBLIC HEARINGS BEGINNING ON MAY 9, 1973, RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL ENTITLED THE "TRADE REFORM AcT OF 1973" (H.R. 6767)
155-57 (1973) (testimony of Special Trade Representative William D. Eberle).
89 Interviews with Thomas B. Curtis (May 24-25, 1980). Only in the first few years after the
enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 did the President issue annual reports, but no Con-
gressional committee instituted hearings to follow up on these reports according to Mr. Curtis.
90 See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COmm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., Lr-
ING OF AMENDMENTS PROPOSED TO H.R. 6767, THE PROPOSED TRADE REFORM AcT OF 1973 18-
19 (Comm. Print 1973).
91 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974).
92 See CONF. REP. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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1980, twenty-one complaints were filed under Section 301. 9' Approxi-
mately fifty percent of these complaints concerned agricultural products
(such as eggs, citrus, wheat and canned fruit), the remainder being al-
most equally divided between intermediate or end products (notably
home appliances, steel, tobacco and leather) and services (four cases in-
volving insurance, the other one involving advertising). Import restric-
tions, discriminatory practices, and foreign subsidies displacing United
States exports in third world countries raised objections from United
States complainants. The European Community (in particular its Com-
mon Agricultural Policy) and Japan were most often the object of the
complaints. The seven other complaints stemmed from practices of Can-
ada, Argentina, Guatemala, Korea, Taiwan and the Soviet Union. As of
September 1984, most cases were resolved, though several early petitions
are still pending.94 In at least two instances, however, the President for-
mally determined that a foreign practice was unfair according to Section
301, without deciding to retaliate."
The Executive decision-making progress under Section 301 during
the first years of its existence did not follow a clear pattern. The brief bi-
annual reports to Congress hardly explained the differences in timing (or,
in delays) and in approach (bi-lateral discussions as opposed to formal
dispute settlement proceedings). One administrative agency, in carrying
out an evaluation, said rather critically:
The STR proceeding, if it can be called that, is hardly a remedy in any
traditional sense. The STR is only required to "conduct a review" (the
statutory phrase) of the complaint and report summaries of proceedings
every 6 months. Remarkably few complaints have been filed under Section
301, considering the number of complaints exporters expressed to the Com-
mission while it studied nontariff barriers in 1974. Still, the Commission
93 Based on a table of cases, dated Sept. 6, 1984, prepared by the office of the United States
Trade Representative for its public reading file.
94 E.g., the complaint filed in 1975 by Great Plains Wheat, Inc. alleging that EEC restitutions on
wheat exports displace United States wheat exports to Brazil. See generally Echols, Section 301:
Access to Foreign Markets from an Agricultural Perspective, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 4, 14-15 (1980/91).
At the time of this writing, a 1983 panel decision is still under consideration by the signatories to the
Subsidies Code.
95 In his first affirmative decision, following a complaint brought by the American Institute of
Marine Underwriters, the President determined that the U.S.S.R. unreasonably required that marine
insurance on all trade between the United States and the U.S.S.R. be placed with a Soviet state
insurance monopoly. 43 Fed. Reg. 25,212 (1978). The President took another affirmative decision
in the border broadcasting case brought by United States broadcaster against Canada. 49 Fed. Reg.
51,173 (1980). Again, he did not impose retaliatory restrictions himself, but in this case proposed
that Congress enact legislation similar to the Canadian law which was the object of the complaint.
Congress finally passed this "mirror-legislation" in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. See supra note
49.
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concluded that "the process has worked to some extent."
96
Private industry reacted less benevolently. Already in 1976, one indus-
try-spokesman reminded Congress that subjecting Executive action to
specific time limits rendered Section 301 virtually meaningless.97
3. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
During the 1979 hearings on legislation implementing the various
agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round, most witnesses stressed the
need for time limits in Section 301 proceedings. Other suggestions in-
cluded a more active role for United States government agencies by re-
quiring them to report violations of trade agreements to the private
sector.98 More than ever, industry and labor insisted on the necessity of
adequate procedures: "If the procedures do not result in swift action, a
great many Americans will learn that a right delayed is no right at all."99
Both Congress and the Carter Administration proved amenable to
change. Although other political actors contributed to change, the Sen-
ate was mainly responsible for tightening Section 301. The Senate felt
that if the Tokyo Codes were to survive their negotiation, the business
community's role in enforcing these agreements ought to be fortified."°
While Congress newly incorporated several procedural guarantees into
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, perhaps its most important change
was the introduction of specific time limits.
a. Time limits
Congress imposed time constraints on each phase of the 301 pro-
ceedings. Disposition of a complaint about alleged export subsidization
by a foreign signatory to the Subsidies Code, which might have the effect
of diverting United States exports from foreign country markets or of
reducing domestic sales of a petitioner, may illustrate the timetable im-
posed by Congress on the Executive:
96 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., 96TH CONG., lST SESS., MTN STUDIES No. 6, PART 1 50-51
(Comm. Print 1979).
97 Oversight Hearings on U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Before the Senate Finance Committee, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1976).
98 See generally SUBcOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS RECEIVED FROM PUBLIC WrrNESSES ON
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS' IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 118 (Comm. Print 1979).
99 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Hearings on S. 13 76 Before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Trade of the Senate Finance Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1979) (statement by Ray
Denison, Associate Director, Department of Legislation, A.F.L.-C.I.O.).
100 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 232-44 (1979).
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Day 1: Petitioner files with the Office of the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR"). An official at USTR chairs
the so-called Section 301 Committee, consisting of
representatives of various departments (notably State,
Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Justice, Treasury,
Interior, Transportation, Defense and Energy) and
agencies (notably the Council of Economic Advisers,
Office of Management and Budget, the National Security
Council and the International Trade Commission).10 1
Some departments and agencies are permanently
represented on the Section 301 Committee, others only in
cases which are of particular concern to them. In this
way, the Section 301 process also gives weight to views
and interests which are unrelated to trade.
Different hierarchical levels exist in the decision-making
process of the Section 301 Committee. Complaints are
first investigated at the staff level by the Trade Policy Staff
Committee. If no consensus can be reached here, or if
sensitive issues (or important trading partners) are
involved, the matter will be dealt with at the Assistant
Secretary Level (in the Trade Policy Review Group) or at
Cabinet Level (in the Trade Policy Committee, the
progeny of the "interagency trade organization"
established by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962).1°2
The Section 301 Committee is run on a majority-vote
basis, which may on occasion give non-trade related
interests a decisive vote. 103
1-45 days: USTR determines whether to initiate an investigation; if
affirmative
45-75 days: USTR shall organize a public hearing at the request of
complainant (this period may be extended if agreed to or
requested by complainant).
45-260 days: USTR shall request consultations with the foreign
(7 months) government concerned (this request may be delayed for
up to 90 days"o);
101 3 C.F.R. § 181 (1984).
102 See supra text accompanying note 85.
103 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 652 (who criticize the "inordinate influence of no-trade-
related sections of the government made possible by this voting system).
104 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(1), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(e). If such
consultations are delayed, each time limitation shall be extended for the period of such delay. Id.
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USTR shall, if consultations are not satisfactory, invoke
the formal dispute settlement proceedings provided for in
article 13 of the Subsidies Code, and shall on the basis of
these proceedings make a recommendation to the
President as to what action, if any, he should take under
Section 301. There is no provision extending this time
limit if the international dispute settlement procedure has
not been concluded (this statutory time limit is particular
to complaints under the Subsidies Code). Before making
his recommendation, the USTR shall at the request of any
interested person (including, ag., importers and consumer
organizations affected by possible retaliation) organize
hearings and obtain advice from the appropriate private
sector.
This time limit varies for different categories of
complaints.
Non-export-subsidy issues covered by the Subsidies Code
should be resolved within eight months after USTR has
initiated an investigation.
With respect to complaints involving other Tokyo Codes
and the GAIT itself, USTR is to issue his
recommendation to the Executive within thirty days after
the dispute settlement procedure of the Code concerned
has been completed. Because these procedures are not
subject to strict time limits, one cannot predict when the
USTR will in fact present his conclusions to the
President.
In all other cases USTR is required to submit his
recommendation within twelve months after an
investigation has been initiated.
260-281 The President decides on what action, if any, he will take.
days: Not infrequently, the President favours continued
consultations with the foreign government concerned,
consultations which are then free of time constraints.
The time limits imposed on the Executive in different Section 301 actions
may be conveniently arranged in a table.
679
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This table suggests that one cannot predict at what point in time the
USTR will present its recommendations to the President, in the event the
petition involves the GATT itself, or Tokyo agreements other than the
Subsidies Code.
As a preliminary remark, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is am-
biguous as to whether disposition of complaints involving the General
Agreement is subject to the time limit reserved for non-Subsidy Codes or
to the 12+ months period. According to the text of the statute, it seems
that GATT complaints are covered by the 12+ months period. 10 6 The
USTR, however, took the view that the time-limit pertaining to non-Sub-
sidy Codes comprises GATT-complaints. t07 Congress ultimately ac-
cepted this interpretation. 08
Because the time constraints which Congress imposed on Section
301 proceedings are of such importance, another table below indicates
the time limits (if any) pertaining to dispute settlement pursuant to the
Codes. Generally speaking, in the event a complaint is raised under one
of the Codes, dispute settlement takes the following course. First, the
applicant signatory must engage in consultations with the respondent
country. Second, if these consultations do not resolve the dispute, any
party to the dispute may request the Code's supervisory Committee
(which represents the signatories) to help facilitate a solution. These
conciliation efforts always precede a panel investigation. The Standards
Code and the Customs Valuation Code provide for another intermediary
step at which time either party can request technical review of the issues
by an expert body.
Only if these conciliation efforts fail can either party request a panel
investigation, to which it is entitled under the Codes (except for the Im-
port Licensing Code which follows general GATT practice). The super-
visory Committee shall take "appropriate" action with respect to panel
reports, including recommendations to the respondent country to elimi-
nate the disputed practice. Significantly, if the (respondent) party finds
itself unable to implement the Committee's recommendations, several
Codes instruct the Committee to consider what "further action" may be
106 See 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(C) and (D) (1982). Item C only refers to trade agreements ap-
proved pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
107 Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, MANUAL FOR THE PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAW VII-9 (Federal Bar Association 1984). Apparently the argument was that
since the 1979 Act adopted the Tokyo Understanding on GATT dispute settlement proceedings
(supra note 37), complaints involving the General Agreement should also be covered by the time
limit regarding the non-Subsidy Tokyo Codes.
108 See H.R. Rap. No. 383, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1983).
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appropriate.10 9 None of these Codes subjects the further actions to a
time limit.
It appears that the USTR generally is not under any time constraint
to submit a recommendation to the President in case the complaint in-
volves non-Subsidy Codes, because the non-Subsidy Codes do not fix a
particular period within which the dispute settlement procedure is
deemed to have been concluded. The same holds true for complaints
involving the General Agreement since the dispute settlement process of
Article XXIII of the GATT is not subject to effective time limits either
(In table 2, look at the process of dispute settlement under the Import
Licensing Code, which follows customary dispute resolution under Arti-
cle XXIII).
In conclusion, the time limits which Congress imposed on the
USTR in connection with GATT-related complaints vary. Few operate
independently from the progress of international proceedings; most do
not. The Section 301 time limits which are.dependent on the outcome of
international proceedings do not appear to constrain the actions of the
USTR.
b. Other procedural guarantees
In addition to the introduction of time limits, the 1979 amendments
required both the USTR and the President to publish reasoned determi-
nations in the Federal Register (the United States Government's "official
gazette").110 Because this requirement includes Executive decisions not
to pursue a private complaint, the business community should gain a
better understanding of the operation and interpretation of international
trade rules. Furthermore, the USTR must actively assist petitioners in
their efforts to substantiate complaints about foreign government activi-
ties which they claim to be unfair." In this way, the USTR actually
may avoid trade conflicts by helping complainants to correctly interpret
foreign regulations and international rules. At the same time, this re-
quirement offsets to a certain extent possible Executive inclinations to
avoid investigating inconvenient complaints (e.g., complaints carrying lit-
tle political clout domestically, or complaints raising foreign policy con-
cerns internationally). Congress further counteracted such Executive
hesitations by requiring the USTR to start international consultations
109 See Standards Code, art. 14.20; Government Procurement Code, art. VII.12; Customs Valua-
tion Code, art. 20.8.
110 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
111 19 U.S.C. § 2415, amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(g). USTR does not permit
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with the foreign government concerned, once it decides to initiate an
investigation.
112
While limiting Executive discretion under Section 301 in various
ways, Congress refrained from subjugating Executive determinations to
legislative or judicial review. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 deleted
the provision in the Trade Act of 1974 which subjected certain Presiden-
tial actions under Section 301 to Congressional veto. 113 Even if Congress
had retained authority to overturn Executive determinations pursuant to
Section 301, it is doubtful whether nowadays this legislative veto would
be held constitutional in view of a recent Supreme Court decision.
1 14
Moreover, the Trade Agreements Act did not explicitly provide for judi-
cial review of any Executive determination under Section 301. This lack
of provision has certainly diminished the prospects for a judicial exami-
nation of Executive action or inaction.'
15
c. Summary of case law
From January 1, 1980 through August 31, 1984, twenty-six cases
were filed under Section 301.116 Accordingly, the reinforcement of the
procedural position of private petitioners in the 1979 Act did not result
in an avalanche of 301 complaints, as some foreign observers had ex-
pected. During this period, the majority of complaints concerned manu-
factured products (such as steel, footwear, machinery), though
agricultural products still figured prominently (soybean oil, sugar, rice,
etc.). Three service-related complaints were submitted (involving courier
services, film distribution and satellite launchings). The bulk of the peti-
tions objected to foreign subsidies, which petitioners claimed either dis-
placed United States exports or affected their home market position.
Other complaints notably involved restrictions on United States exports.
One recent complaint for the first time relied on the Standards Code.
Again, the Section 301 proceedings incriminated the European Eco-
112 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 119.
113 See Trade Act of 1974, § 302.
114 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Of course, Congress
could have made provision for a "joint resolution" in the event it wanted to override the President's
determination (not) to take action. In section 248 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress did
indeed substitute the "joint resolution" for the "legislative veto" to express its disapproval of Execu-
tive action under the escape clause, in order to remedy the possible unconstitutionality of the latter.
115 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 578, argue that the President's decision not to take
retaliatory action is not subject to judicial review. The question remains whether the decision of the
USTR to initiate investigation under Section 301 or to terminate an investigation is judicially
reviewable.
116 Based on a table of cases, dated Sept. 6, 1984, prepared by the Office of the United States
Trade Representative for the public reading file.
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nomic Community most frequently; in eleven cases, complainants
targeted the entire EEC or individual Member States. Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Korea and Taiwan each were the object of at least two investiga-
tions. Austria, Japan, Portugal, Spain and Sweden took responsibility for
one complaint each. As of September 1984, fourteen cases were still
pending. The remaining twelve complaints were resolved, withdrawn, or
terminated in their investigation by the Executive for lack of merit.117 In
none of these cases did the President formally determine that a foreign
practice was unfair and propose retaliatory action pursuant to Section
301.118
4. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
The procedural position of private petitioners under Section 301 re-
mained virtually unchanged in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. The
Act did not introduce judicial review of any Executive decision in Section
301 proceedings. In fact, Congress allowed the USTR more freedom in
disposing of private complaints. As mentioned earlier, the USTR can
now delay a request for consultations with the foreign government impli-
cated in a Section 301 complaint for up to 90 days after it has decided to
initiate an investigation. 19 Moreover, House proposals to shorten the
time limits imposed on the USTR, in making recommendations to the
President on what action he should take under Section 301, failed to
pass. With respect to GATT (including Code-related) complaints, these
proposals would have severed any link between the progress of interna-
tional proceedings and the time at which the USTR was supposed to
submit its recommendation to the President. In all cases involving trade
agreements, the USTR would have had to draw conclusions within eight
months after the initiation of a case. Quite remarkably, the USTR would
have had to depend on the consent of the petitioner for an extention of
this time limit.
120
117 In one case the President formally determined that the targeted country (Taiwan) did not
unfairly restrict United States exports (of footwear). 48 Fed. Reg. 56,561 (1983).
118 In the case brought in 1981 by the specialty steel industry against subsidized imports into the
United States, the President did appear to agree with petitioners that the disputed practices were
unfair within the meaning of Section 301. 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982). Yet, import restrictions were
imposed pursuant to Section 201, the escape clause. See infra text accompanying notes 223-40.
119 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(e). Congress was per-
suaded by the administration's testimony that the requirement of simultaneous initiation and re-
quests for consultations had caused problems in a number of cases in which private petitions did not
provide an adequate basis for proceedings internationally. S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1983). In his semiannual report to Congress on the administration of Section 301, the USTR will
have to explain the reasons for delaying the requests for consultations. Id
120 H.R. REP. No. 383, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983).
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As a further development, Congress provided the USTR with ex-
plicit authority to self-initiate investigations.121 Congress included this
provision because of its concern that in the past United States exporters
with meritorious complaints of foreign unfair trade practices had re-
frained from filing Section 301 petitions because of possible retaliation.122
Apparently, Congress sought to interpose the USTR as a buffer between
the private complainant with grievances and the foreign government in-
dignant at being called upon to account for its practices. It is questiona-
ble, however, whether this device can live up to its expectations. The
more specific the complaint, the more obvious its origin will be to the
foreign government. Furthermore, the USTR (an Executive office) al-
ready had authority to investigate complaints of unfair trade practices on
its own motion by virtue of the President's powers to act under Section
301.23 By taking that avenue, the USTR is not subject to the time limits
which Congress imposed on its formal self-initiating authority, limits
identical to the time constraints imposed on the disposition of a private
petition. 124
The 1984 Act may hold a surprise for the future, however. In addi-
tion to providing investigative authority to the USTR, Congress, rather
unexpectedly, granted the USTR independent retaliatory authority. This
authority is limited to cases involving export performance requirements,
which foreign governments prescribe to United States corporations as a
condition to permitting local investments.1 25 Growing concern in Con-
gress over such requirements, some of which related to Mexico,
prompted this grant of authority. The grant of authority coincided with
labor pressures to restrict off-shore sourcing.126 Yet it remains to be seen
whether the USTR will in fact exercise this unique retaliatory authority
independent of the inter-agency process which ordinarily governs Section
301 cases.
127
121 19 U.s.C. § 2412(c), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(d)(1).
122 S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1983). The report also cited complainants' occa-
sional lack of information as a legitimate reason for their reluctance to file a complaint. That refer-
ence is puzzling in view of the USTR's statutory obligation to assist potential petitioners in
substantiating their complaints. 19 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982).
123 See supra text accompanying note 27.
124 19 U.S.C. § 2414, amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(d)(2)(C).
125 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 307(b). Investment-related performance requirements are
discussed at supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
126 Interview with Claud L. Gingrich, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (Nov. 1, 1984).
127 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
C. Admissibility Requirements Pertaining to Private Complaints
Under Section 301
The statute does not spell out in any detail the requirements a pri-
vate complainant must meet before his petition under Section 301 is ad-
missible (L e., before the USTR will initiate an investigation). Nor do the
regulations implementing Section 301, which the USTR has promul-
gated, set out these requirements clearly.128 Apart from demonstrating
the "unfairness" of the foreign governmental practice of which they com-
plain, petitioners (i) must have a "significant interest" in the elimination
of the disputed foreign practice, and (ii) in some cases must also demon-
strate that this practice "burdens United States commerce". Even if peti-
tioners have met the appropriate requirements, however, the USTR may
still refuse to initiate an investigation if the petition presents a "wrong
case".
1. Significant Private Interest
The statute allows "any interested person" to complain of foreign
unfair trade practices.129 According to the implementing regulations, in-
terested parties include:
(a) an individual producer, commercial importer, or exporter of a product
which is affected by the allegedly unfair foreign practice, or
(b) collective interests, such as a trade association, or a labour organiza-
tion (a unionized or non-unionized group of workers) which, unlike
parties mentioned under (a), must be representative of an industry en-
gaged in the manufacture, production or wholesale distribution in the
United States of a product affected by the allegedly unfair foreign
practice, or
(c) any person representing a significant economic interest affected by the
allegedly unfair foreign practice. 130
Furthermore, the regulations specify that the interested parties men-
tioned here must have a significant interest.13 1 This requirement suggests
that a private petitioner should have more than a cursory interest in the
elimination of the foreign practice about which he is complaining. In-
deed, the regulations require elsewhere that the interested parties provide
the USTR with information showing the volume of trade involved and
the impact of the foreign practice on petitioners. 132 Yet nowhere do the
regulations specify the necessary extent of such impact. It is generally
128 15 C.F.R. § 2006 (1984).
129 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982).
130 15 C.F.R. § 2006.0(b) (1984).
131 Il
132 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1(1) (1984).
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assumed that the requirement of "significant interest" does not imply a
detailed showing of injury to a particular industry, comparable to the
injury-threshold requirement contained in the escape clause, or an-
tidumping and countervailing duty statutes.
133
What does the "significant interest" requirement stand for then?
Perhaps it is a reflection of the procedural adage, '!point d'intdit, point
d'action," (an adage known in common law jurisdictions as "interest to
sue"). Although one should be careful in transferring notions taken from
judicial procedure to a highly discretionary administrative proceeding,
recalling the definition of "interest to sue" in judicial proceedings involv-
ing complaints about governmental actions is useful when interpreting
the "significant interest" language in Section 301.
Briefly, a plaintiff may be assumed to have an interest to sue if a
claim meets several conditions. First of all, a plaintiff's claim should not
be clearly baseless. No judicial resources ought to be spent on frivolous
claims. Furthermore, the plaintiff should not raise merely theoretical is-
sues, the resolution of which will not produce any legal effect. That is
different from saying that his claim should be enforceable, for the plain-
tiff may have an interest in obtaining a declaratory judgment to prevent
recurrences of the actions or measures presented for review to the courts.
In addition, the issue should be ripe for adjudication. Thus, draft regula-
tions, or regulations which are still subject to administrative appeal, can-
not be reviewed by a court (unless they threaten to cause irreparable
damage to the plaintiff). Next, judicial review should be appropriate. If
another remedy is available to the plaintiff, which is less onerous to the
defendant or better suited to deal with his claim, the plaintiff should pur-
sue that remedy. Finally, the plaintiff's claim should not result in an
abuse of procedure. Typically, it would be an abuse of procedure to in-
yoke a remedy for a different purpose than for which the remedy was
granted. 134
If one substitutes "USTR" for "courts" and if one considers com-
plaints about practices of foreign governments, certain interesting paral-
lels may be drawn.
The Section 301 regulations suggest and practice confirms that the
USTR will not initiate an investigation if the complaint does not appear
to raise meritorious issues. Petitioners must indicate how their com-
plaint relates to the practices which Section 301 condemns. Thus, they
must demonstrate why the disputed practice conflicts with a trade agree-
133 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 631.
134 P. VAN DISK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF
AN INTEREST TO SUE 21-25 (1980).
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ment, or how the practice otherwise denies benefits to which the United
States is entitled under a trade agreement (e.g., the GATT).135
Furthermore, the USTR is not likely to entertain complaints which
simply seek to assert theoretical principles of international trade law. In
fact, as will be discussed below, the USTR may refuse to investigate a
complaint which demands a correct interpretation of GATT commit-
ments undertaken by a foreign government (Le., a "declaratory judg-
ment"), if the USTR deems the complaint to raise a "wrong case".
136
So far, the USTR has not investigated complaints about inoperative
regulations of a foreign government which might affect a petitioner. In
addition, the USTR will likely inquire whether the petitioner has ex-
hausted local remedies in the implicated foreign country, when these
remedies can be considered effective.' 37 Making these inquiries avoids
imposing a needless burden on diplomatic exchange between the United
States government and the foreign country concerned.
The President's decision in the specialty steel case, analyzed below,
suggests that in evaluating a Section 301 complaint, the Executive is not
averse to considering whether other United States remedies are more ap-
propriate (and less offensive to the foreign government concerned).
138
Such considerations seem pertinent particularly with respect to com-
plaints about foreign government practices which affect domestic sales of
a petitioner in the United States, because in those instances petitioners
generally have available other remedies such as escape clause, antidump-
ing or countervailing duty actions.
Lastly, no complaints readily come to mind of abuse of the Section
301 procedure. An example of an abuse might be a United States labor
organization bringing a politically-inspired complaint about arguably un-
fair trade practices of a foreign government because, for example, the
foreign government refused to recognize union rights. The Executive
does consider, however, non-trade related issues in Section 301 proceed-
ings and might conceivably admit a complaint of this kind.
1 39
135 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1(f) (1984).
136 See infra text accompanying notes 161-83.
137 Interview with Jeanne S. Archibald (Chairman of the Section 301 Committee), supra note
105. See also S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983) (where the Senate Finance Committee
insists, in connection with 301-complaints about inadequate protection of United States intellectual
property rights by foreign governments, that a key factor in the USTR's determination of whether to
initiate an investigation should be "a consideration of the appropriate legal action available to, or
taken by, the aggrieved United States party to defend its rights in the subject country").
138 See infra text accompanying notes 223-40. In this case, however, the complaint was admitted
under Section 301 before the President decided that a different course of action was more
appropriate.
139 See supra text accompanying note 103. Consider, for example, United States withdrawal of
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In sum, with some imagination and due reserve it is possible to in-
terpret the "significant interest" requirement in Section 301 as being
analogous to the concept of "interest to sue" in judicial proceedings in-
volving governmental actions. Yet "significant interest" may not be the
only admissibility requirement. In some cases, petitioners also need to
demonstrate that the disputed practice has a broad-ranging impact, ex-
tending beyond their own interests.
2. Burden on United States Commerce
The regulations implementing Section 301 suggest that a petitioner
invariably must show, in addition to having a significant interest in the
elimination of the disputed foreign practice, that this practice burdens
United States commerce. 14 Some commentators have justified this re-
quirement by comparing Section 301 to import relief remedies estab-
lished by United States trade law, which do not allow de minimis
allegations,14 1 or by pointing to GATT customs, which allegedly frown
upon complaints about practices having only a negligible impact on the
trade of the complaining country.14 2
Contrary to the Trade Act of 1974, however, the amended version
of Section 301 in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 exclusively refers to
a burden on United States commerce in connection with complaints
which do not allege violations of a trade agreement, but which invoke the
"unreasonableness" standard. 43 Consequently, the statute does not
seem to bar an investigation of complaints involving GATT commit-
ments, in the event a petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the dis-
puted practice adversely affects United States commerce as a whole. The
statute ought to be literally interpreted. The burden on United States
commerce requirement only applies to complaints of "unreasonable"
MFN-treatment from Poland in 1982 following the crack-down on the Solidarity movement. When
Poland challenged the United States before Gatt, the United States attempted to justify its actions
exclusively in trade terms (eg., by arguing that Poland had been unable to fulfill its import commit-
ments under GAT, which was strongly contested by the Polish government). GATT AcTivrnEs
IN 1983 62-63 (June 1984). See also GAIT Ministerial Declaration, para. 7(iii), supra note 37, at 11
(providing that the Contracting Parties should abstain from taking restrictive trade measures for
reasons of a non-economic character).
140 See 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1(f) (1984). Thus a petitioner is required to provide "specific informa-
tion showing the volume of trade involved and the impact on petitioner and on U.S. commerce"
(emphasis supplied). Id.
141 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 602 n.160.
142 See Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government
Trade Actions: When, Why and How, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 391 (1981).
143 This was confirmed in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(1)(B)(ii),
amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(a).
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practices; that is, practices which cannot be challenged under GAIT
law.
A comparison with import relief statutes is misplaced in determin-
ing the admissibility of a Section 301 complaint. The objective of the
traditional trade remedies, which the import relief statutes provide, is to
determine whether petitioners are entitled to protection on their domes-
tic market through the imposition of trade restrictions on particular
kinds of injurious imports." In contrast, the unique fumction of Section
301 is to help remove foreign trade barriers which unfairly curtail United
States exports. That objective is rarely achieved through the imposition
of retaliatory trade restrictions by the United States.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily true that GAIT dispute settle-
ment procedures only allow complaints about unfair practices which sub-
stantially impair the trade of a contracting party. Indeed, requiring
petitioners to prove in every case, before the USTR will investigate a
complaint, that the foreign practice is not only of significant interest to
them but also burdens United States commerce in a wider sense, would
largely defeat the purpose of Section 301 to vigorously enforce United
States rights under the GATT.
a Example: complaint about discriminatory
government procurement
Suppose a medium-sized United States manufacturer enters a bid for
a government purchasing contract in a signatory country to the Govern-
ment Procurement Code. The contract's value barely exceeds 150,000
Special Drawing Rights (roughly $150,000), 1a1 the threshold amount for
the application of the Code.146 After the responsible foreign government
agency grants the contract and discloses details of the bidding process,
the United States manufacturer concludes that he has been discriminated
144 Recently, a number of authors have argued that domestic investigations into the propriety of
import restricting measures should only be concerned with evaluating the level of injury suffered by
domestic producers. Analyzing whether injurious imports are fairly or unfairly traded is an unnec-
essary, if not irrelevant, exercise in their view. Accordingly, distinctions between escape clause in-
vestigations (into fair but injurious imports) and antidumping or countervailing duty investigations
(into unfair and injurious imports) would disappear. The "Injury-Only" School is discussed in G.C.
HUFBAUER & J. ERa, Suasmms IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 19-21 (1984).
As long as these distinctions are maintained, different injury standards apply. Thus, the United
States escape clause contains a more exacting ("serious") injury requirement than the countervailing
duty and antidumping law, which sets forth a lower ("material") injury threshhold. Compare 19
U.S.C. § 2251 (1982) (escape clause) with 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982) (countervailing duty law) and 19
U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (antidumping law).
145 On Nov. 27, 1984, one SDR equalled $0.99. Financieele Dagblad, Nov. 29, 1984, at 8.
146 Government Procurement Code, art. I(l)(b).
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against. Though the manufacturer's bid met the published specifications
and was offered at the lowest price of all entries, the foreign government
agency awarded the contract to a domestic manufacturer. The United
States manufacturer turns to the USTR and submits a complaint under
Section 301 because of this plausible violation of the Government Pro-
curement Code.1 47
The United States manufacturer would be hard-pressed trying to
demonstrate that the refusal of the foreign government contract burdens
United States commerce, other than by frustrating its own interest
(which in monetary terms may be limited to the profit margin on a
$150,000 contract). Perhaps it was the only United States manufacturer
entering a bid; and even if there were other United States entries, its bid
presumably was the only one qualifying for the contract. In that event,
the foreign government's refusal to award the contract to other United
States bidders would have been entirely consistent with the Code.
Admitting and pursuing this complaint before the GATT would be
in accordance with the Government Procurement Code. The dispute set-
tlement provisions of the Code do not set minimum requirements as to
the volume of trade involved before complaints about Code violations are
admitted.14 The Code signatories may take the trade volume affected by
the disputed practice into account, if at all, during the last stage of the
procedure. Should the party held to be violating the Code not accept the
recommendations of the supervisory Committee (representing the Code
signatories), the Committee may authorize the complaining party to sus-
pend the application of the Code in whole or in part to the implicated
party, if the Committee considers that "the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action".149
b. Extrapolation
The above example illustrates that a contracting party can success-
fully complain about transgressions of a GATT norm, even though their
trade impact is limited. Generally speaking, the applicant party's show-
ing that the disputed practice constitutes a violation of an explicit provi-
147 Id at art. V(14)(f). Note that in the final analysis the government's purchasing authorities are
not tied to objective criteria such as the tender's price, but have discretion to award a contract to the
tender which they determine to be "the most advantageous" in light of the evaluation criteria they
have developed (and published). In subsequent dispute settlement proceedings, the Code's signato-
ries, therefore, are called upon to judge whether the disputed purchasing decision was or was not
"reasonable." Bourgeois, supra note 2, at 14.
148 See Government Procurement Code, art. VII(4), (6), and (7) (assuming, of course, that the
Code's threshhold value has been met).
149 Id at art. VII(14).
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sion of the General Agreement is considered to be a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment. Thus, the breach of a rule is presumed to
adversely affect the applicant party
15 0
Yet one should differentiate between various complaints of GATT
infringements. There are instances in which a determination of nullifica-
tion or impairment does depend on the effects of a disputed practice. For
example, export subsidies on agricultural products or domestic subsidies
can only be challenged under the rules of the Subsidies Code if their
impact on the applicant party is measurable."' Furthermore, when the
applicant party brings a complaint of non-violation nullification or im-
pairment, it must provide a detailed justification of its allegations, which
generally involves a showing that the disputed trade practice has a signif-
icant trade impact.
152
In all cases, once the Contracting Parties have determined that the
disputed practice denies GATT benefits to the applicant and the respon-
dent party fails to withdraw or amend the measure concerned, they will
take trade impact into account. Only if the circumstances are serious
enough-if the trade impact of the condemned practice is significant-
will the Contracting Parties authorize the applicant party to retaliate. 153
The possibility of retaliation by no means guides GATT dispute settle-
ment proceedings, however, because its effects are counter-productive to
the liberalization of international trade. Moreover, retaliation may not
impress the offending country at all, which is borne out by the one case in
GATT history in which the Contracting Parties did authorize
retaliation.
154
150 Paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Tokyo Understanding on GAIT dispute settlement proceed-
ings, supra note 37.
151 Export subsidies on agricultural products can only be challenged under the Subsidies Code if
they give the subsidizing country a "more than equitable share of world export trade." Subsidies
Code, art. 10(1). In order to challenge domestic subsidies granted by a signatory to the Code, the
applicant party has to demonstrate that they (threaten to) cause "injury to a domestic industry", or
"serious prejudice" to its own interests, or nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to it
under the General Agreement, "in particular where such subsidies would adversely affect the condi-
tions of normal competition." Id at art. 11(2).
152 Paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Tokyo Understanding on GATT dispute settlement proceed-
ings, supra note 37. The concept of non-violation nullification or impairment in the General Agree-
ment is discussed at supra text accompanying note 41. It is yet unclear what the practice will be
under those Tokyo Codes which do not follow the 1979 Understanding Regarding the Application of
GATT, art. XXIH, since no non-violation complaints have been brought under the Codes so far.
153 Id at 4.
154 Especially in those instances where smaller countries retaliate against big powers, it is doubt-
ful whether they can muster enough bargaining chips to persuade the offender to change its prac-
tices. One has to recognize that retaliation measures may easily burden the economy of the
retaliating country (e-g., import restrictions on products from the offending country can raise the
price of imports from other sources, if any, or create domestic shortages). This is illustrated by the
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The main objective of GATT dispute settlement is to eliminate "un-
fair" trade restrictions. The threat of retaliation rarely achieves this ob-
jective. Rather, the Contracting Parties strive to meet this objective
through mounting international pressure, starting with bilateral consul-
tations. That failing, multilateral conciliation efforts and adjudicatory
proceedings before a panel bring additional pressure to bear upon the
respondent party. If the litigating parties have not reached a satisfactory
solution by then, international pressure will culminate in the normative
stance adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties in the dispute. The
GATT's drafters already anticipated this process when they negotiated
the dispute settlement mechanism.
155
Against this background, the potential for retaliation should be of
no concern in examining the admissibility of Section 301 petitions which
involve GATT commitments. Otherwise, considerations come into play
which risk being irrelevant, such as the possible effects of retaliatory
measures on consumers and other sectors of the domestic economy. In-
stead, the test ought to be whether the petitioner is able to show that the
United States government has cause to appeal to the GATT's normative
authority. In other words, petitioner's allegations must amount to a
plausible claim of GATT-inconsistent behavior by the incriminated for-
eign government; a prerequisite which constitutes one of the elements of
an "interest to sue."'
156
Petitioners can substantiate a considerable number of Section 301
complaints involving GATT law without having to prove a broad-rang-
ing impact of the disputed practice on United States trade. Precedent
supports this proposition. In 1982, the USTR admitted a Section 301
complaint about a Canadian duty remission scheme. Only one manufac-
turer of front-end loaders filed this complaint, even though several other
manufacturers also had dealings with Canada. Petitioner rested its indi-
vidual complaint in part on GATT norms. The USTR initiated an inves-
tigation without referring to the possible effects of the Canadian practice
on petitioner, its United States competitors, or United States commerce
as a whole. 157
one case in which the GATr Contracting Parties authorized retaliation, to wit, permitting the
Netherlands to restrict United States shipments of wheat flour in response to United States dairy
quotas. GAIT, 1st supp. BISD 32 (1953). The Netherlands never enforced the quota, apparently
on account of it ineffectiveness in removing the United States import restrictions on dairy products.
Hudec, supra note 36, at 507.
155 Hudec, supra note 35, at 186.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
157 47 Fed. Reg. 51,029 (1982). See also the USTR's admission in 1979 of a complaint submitted
by one insurance company about the refusal of the Korean government to permit this particular
company to write insurance policies covering marine risks. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,146 (1979).
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Still, the USTR asserts that it has discretion to reject Section 301
petitions on policy grounds alone, irrespective of the merits of the peti-
tion.15 Undoubtedly, from the Executive's perspective, these policy
grounds can also be unconnected with considerations which would play a
role in appraising a petitioner's "interest to sue." Such considerations
include whether local remedies in the foreign country, if any, are effective
and should be exhausted, or whether other remedies of United States
domestic law are better suited to deal with the complaint. 159 In essence,
the USTR appears to claim that it has virtually unlimited discretion to
admit Section 301 petitions.
With respect to GATT-related petitions, however, this claim is not
justified. Congress explicitly established a presumption that the USTR
ought to investigate plausible complaints of GATT inconsistencies. 1"
All things considered, no decisive arguments seem to recant this Con-
gressional presumption.
3. Wrong Cases
A word of caution is in order if one proposes to facilitate private
access to Section 301. When the Tokyo Round negotiators reviewed the
GATT's dispute settlement machinery, one school of thought argued
that there was a danger in having panels rule routinely that governments
violate the GATT. If governments fell into the habit of not complying
with panel rulings, the coercive force of GATT norms and their interpre-
tations might suffer as a result. According to this view, therefore, gov-
ernments should restrain use of the panel procedure in order to avoid
"wrong cases" inviting non-compliance.1 61 By the same token, the argu-
ment could be made that the broad discretion asserted by the Executive
in admitting 301 petitions is justified. Following this view, the USTR
can easily avoid investigating an apparently valid, but controversial,
complaint, which might lead to embarrassments in GATT.
On close examination, however, concern about "wrong cases" does
158 Archibald, supra note 107, at VII-5.
159 See Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 578 ("the standards which guide the President's
decision (to enforce trade rights of petitioners) may have much more to do with the timing of the
petition, domestic publicity, relations with Congress, and foreign policy than with the merits of the
petition").
160 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1979) (while recognizing the Executive's
general discretion as to whether to initiate a 301-investigation, the Senate Finance Committee in-
sisted that regarding the Tokyo Codes "this discretion normally should be exercised by proceeding
to investigate and to pursue valid claims in appropriate international fora by section 301 as amended
by this bill").
161 Hudec, supra note 35, at 159.
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not warrant a grant of unlimited discretion to the Executive to decide
whether or not to investigate private complaints.
a. The concept
"Wrong cases" in the GATT are said to arise from several sources:
politically imperative violations in times of economic and political insta-
bility when governments are easily influenced by special interest groups,
complaints reaching beyond the panel's decision-making capacity, or vio-
lations of outdated rules. 1
62
If governments can find no other justification, they will be tempted
to argue that measures restricting imports are politically imperative. Yet
it is difficult to predict at the outset of an investigation how imperative
import restrictions really are. When an unfavourable GATT ruling is
imminent, compliance with the international norm often appears possible
after all. Furthermore, if a government feels unable to fully comply with
a GATT ruling, limited improvement in a post-decision compromise may
be possible.163 Also, the complaining government may refer to estab-
lished, yet unresolved, violations in later negotiations with the offending
government when the latter requests concessions.
In sum, there is no reason not to investigate private complaints
which seem to raise sensitive issues. The investigation frequently will
reveal how "political" the offensive restrictions are in fact. Besides, once
a violation has been established, the GATT membership and the com-
plaining government can take politics into account when they decide on
the propriety of retaliation.
Worry that "wrong cases" might overextend the GATT's decision-
making capacity underestimates the avoidance techniques which GATT
panels have developed. Practice shows that panels are likely to pressure
disputing parties to reach a settlement, especially when panels are faced
with difficult issues. 16' Or the panels may simply conclude that they can-
not decide the issue put before them. 165 Again, this concern does not
justify unqualified Executive discretion.
The question remains whether complaints about arguably outdated
or overbroad GATT rules vindicate extensive Executive discretion.
These complaints do not pose a problem so much for the GATT mem-
bership as they do for a national government entertaining the complaint.
Panels, for better or for worse, tend to reconcile GATT rules with the
162 Id. at 159-66.
163 Id. at 167.
164 Id at 188-89.
165 Id. at 189-92.
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current international consensus through "creative" interpretations, such
as limiting the rule's application, or avoiding explosive issues. 166 In con-
trast, these complaints can embarrass a national government.
By lodging a complaint against a foreign country which allegedly
violates a GATT rule, petitioners may object to foreign practices which
the United States engages in itself or which it condones. If the United
States were to bring these petitions before GATT, it would lose credibil-
ity, if not the case. 167 At the same time, the USTR may shrink from
calling attention to the rule's controversial application in refusing an in-
vestigation of these petitions under Section 301. Any public interpreta-
tion of the rule, such as qualifying it as being outmoded under Section
301, could easily immobilize the Executive's position in international
negotiations.
b. The A.LS.I. complaints
In December of 1982, the American Iron and Steel Industry
("A.I.S.I.") filed a typical "wrong case". The petition was directed
against Japan and complained of an agreement which Japan had con-
cluded with the European Community restraining its steel exports to the
Common Market. The A.I.S.I. alleged, inter alia, that this VRA di-
verted significant quantities of Japanese steel from the Common Market
to the United States, thereby injuring the United States steel industry.
According to the A.I.S.I., by entering into this agreement, Japan had
violated its commitments under the GATT (notably Article XI, prohibit-
ing quantitative export restrictions).'68
In 1976, the A.I.S.I. had lodged a similar complaint with the USTR,
the first petition under Section 301 which involved the United States do-
mestic market. 16 9 Following a lengthy 15-month investigation, the Presi-
dent decided not to take action. He reasoned that the VRA which Japan
had then negotiated with the Community did not appear to adversely
affect United States commerce. The President's decision did not address
the GATT-related arguments presented by the A.I.S.I. 170
The timing of the 1982 petition is noteworthy. It followed almost
immediately the negotiation of an agreement between the United States
and the Community. This agreement restrained the Community's steel
166 Icl at 192-97.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44 (reflecting on non-violation complaints).
168 See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,878 (1983) (notice of decision not to initiate an investigation).
169 41 Fed. Reg. 45,268 (1976) (notice of complaint).
170 43 Fed. Reg. 3,962 (1978) (notice of termination).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:651(1984)
exports to the United States.171 Having reduced the threat of European
steel imports, the United States steel industry sought to restrict access of
Japanese suppliers to the American market. Filing a Section 301 petition
to achieve this objective was rather ingenious because anti-dumping or
countervailing duty actions against Japanese steel producers traditionally
have not been very successful and an escape clause action, necessarily
involving all steel exporting countries, 172 would have jeopardized the
VRA the United States had negotiated with the Community (and its steel
producers) only several months before.
173
At first glance, it seems inconceivable that the A.I.S.I. could argue
that the VRA between Japan and the Community violated the GATT, in
the face of a similar arrangement between the Community and the
United States. Yet one can technically distinguish these two arrange-
ments because the later was the result of United States antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings. Although the General Agreement only
provides for the imposition of customs duties to offset the unfair price
advantage of subsidized or dumped imports, the Subsidies Code also al-
lows importing countries to take other measures (such as the negotiation
of export restraints) to counter the effects of foreign subsidies.1 74 The
distinction between these two agreements is tenuous, 175 however, and
171 The text of this arrangement is reprinted in 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 1 307) 13 (1982). See
infra note 226.
172 See infra text accompanying note 216.
173 The European Community conditioned its agreement to restrain steel exports to the United
States on the understanding that European steel producers would not be subject to, inter alia, further
United States countervailing duty, antidumping or escape clause actions. See art. 2(a)(2) of the
arrangement, supra note 171. This did not keep United States steel producers from filing an escape
clause action in January 1984. The Executive avoided the break-up of the arrangement with the
European Community by rejecting global import relief under Section 201. Instead, President Rea-
gan instructed the USTR to negotiate with "surge control" arrangements (Le., voluntary restraint
arrangements, hereinafter referred to as "VRAs") with unspecified countries, implicitly excluding
the European Community. 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
174 Subsidies Code, art. 4(5)(a).
175 The steel VRA negotiated between the United States and the European Community arguably
does not conform with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, since it did not arise on suspension of the
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. E. McGOVERN, supra note 1, at § 16.123 (1983
supplement). This arrangement also raises questions under the Subsidies Code, in that it seems to go
further than merely off-setting foreign subsidies, but rather is linked to the import penetration of
European steel. Art. 4(a) of the arrangement sets ceilings on carbon steel imports from the Euro-
pean Community, which are expressed in percentages of the projected United States apparent con-
sumption. Bronckers, Reconsidering the Non-Discrimination Principle as Applied to GA7T
Safeguard Measures, A Rejoinder, 9 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 113, 132-33 (1983/2). In
addition, art. 7 of the Dumping Code, corresponding to art. 4(5)(a) of the Subsidies Code, does not
contain language which would cover agreements restraining the quantity of allegedly dumped im-
ports. Thus, the steel agreement, to the extent it related to antidumping investigations, is of dubious
validity under the Dumping Code. See generally Benyon & Bourgeois, The European Community-
United States Steel Arrangement, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 305 (1984).
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would not have saved the Executive from embarrassment if it had
brought this case before the GATT.
Besides, on other occasions, the United States government itself has
negotiated VRAs outside antidumping or countervailing duty proceed-
ings. Sometimes these arrangements were negotiated pursuant to the es-
cape clause procedure (e.g., as part of the 1983 specialty steel program
discussed below176). At other times, the Executive elicited export re-
straints in complete disregard of national escape clause investigations
(e.g., the restraints it negotiated with Japan in 1981 affecting the latter's
car exports to the United States'77). In both cases, the status of these
arrangements under the GATT is dubious.
Most often, countries do not notify VRAs to GATT. And even if
they do, VRAs appear to elude the grasp of the General Agreement.
Many hold the view that VRAs are not covered by GAIT, in particular
by Articles XI (containing the ban on quantitative restrictions) and XIX
(containing a qualified exception to Article XI with respect to safeguard
measures). If one takes into account the distinction under United States
law between Orderly Marketing Arrangements and Voluntary Export
Restraints, 178 the former arguably are excluded from GATT control be-
cause they constitute bilateral agreements, as opposed to unilateral im-
port restrictions, while the latter evade control because the export
reduction is "voluntarily" effected by the supplier country. 179 Indeed,
the ultimately abortive attempt to revise the GATT escape clause in the
Tokyo Round negotiations centered on the need to encompass and con-
fine the use of VRAs.
Against this background, one can appreciate the delicacy of
A.I.S.I.'s complaint. The Executive could not really pursue this petition
and challenge Japan before the GATT, without calling its own actions
into question. On the other hand, in rejecting the complaint on the
grounds that GATT does not exercise effective authority over VRAs, the
Executive might have lost leverage in the current negotiations on a re-
vised GATT escape clause (e.g., by admitting to inadequacies in the
GATT's policing powers regarding national safeguard measures).
Balancing these alternatives, it does not come as a surprise that the
176 See infra text accompanying notes 223-40. Since the specialty steel program combined unilat-
eral restrictions on imports from certain suppliers with VRAs negotiated with other suppliers, it
arguably is inconsistent with GATT, art. XIII. Bronckers, supra note 175, at 119 n.24, 120-21.
177 See Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust law: The Japanese
Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 757-70 (1982) (arguing that the
Executive's actions in this case are vulnerable to challenge under United States law).
178 See infra note 213.
179 See generally Bronckers, supra note 175, at 130.
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USTR refused to investigate A.I.S.I.'s 1982 complaint. 8 0 The reasoning
of its decision reflects the Executive's awkward position, however. Not
too convincingly and without further argument, the USTR first agreed
with petitioners that the VRA between Japan and the European Eco-
nomic Community was inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT. It
then continued:
However, the petition fails to present evidence to demonstrate that U.S.
benefits under the GATT have been nullified or impaired by reason of the
GATT-inconsistent measure. The petition does not include specific infor-
mation relating to the impact on petitioners and on U.S. commerce arising
from the alleged foreign practices."' 1
Admittedly, the petition did not give any indication as to the trade-
divertive effect of this VRA. Thus, the A.I.S.I. arguably failed to estab-
lish a significant interest (i.e., an "interest to sue") because it appeared to
raise a point of theoretical interest. 1 2 Yet one wonders how the Execu-
tive would have handled this complaint, if the A.I.S.I. had been able to
demonstrate diversion of Japanese steel exports to the United States. Ja-
pan did not put the United States government to the test, however, and
voluntarily kept its steel exports to the United States in check."8 '
In summary, much of the concern about "wrong cases" should not
detain admission of private complaints under Section 301. Many "wrong
cases" prove to be right after all. The Executive will screen these few
cases which are "wrong" indeed, as its disposition of the A.I.S.I. com-
plaints demonstrates. One may quibble about the methods used to reject
an occasional "wrong case". Yet, this should not detract from the pre-
sumption that the Executive ought to investigate every complaint
brought by a petitioner who has established an interest to sue, at least to
the extent the complaint relies on GATT commitments of a foreign
government.
180 Under the rudimentary 301-procedure contained in the Trade Act of 1974, the Executive had
no choice but to investigate the complaint brought by the A.I.S.I. in 1976. See Trade Act of 1974,
§ 301(d)(2).
181 48 Fed. Reg. 8,878 (1983).
182 See supra text accompanying note 134. Contrast the A.I.S.I. decision with the front-end
loader case, supra note 157. There, the USTR did initiate an investigation into a complaint which
was based, in part, on GATT norms, without assessing the effects of the disputed practice on peti-
tioner or United States commerce, or even determining that this practice was inconsistent with
GAIT.
183 See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,878-9 (1983) (following talks between the USTR and the Japanese govern-
ment, the latter "stated its intention not to cause such nullification or impairment through any
government action, including the establishment of conditions of export").
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D. International Investigation and Retaliation
Once the USTR admits a petition, Section 301 places certain respon-
sibilities on the United States government to take action on the interna-
tional plane. With respect to GATT-related complaints, the USTR must
request consultations with the incriminated foreign government on the
date on which the investigation was initiated, or at least within 90 days
after such initiation.' 84 If no resolution is reached during these consulta-
tions, the statute instructs the USTR to "promptly" request formal dis-
pute settlement proceedings.1 5 These statutory instructions can be a
powerful bargaining chip in the hands of a private petitioner who seeks
the elimination of a foreign unfair trade practice. Faced with the threat
of a Section 301 petition, a foreign government may prefer to quickly
seek an informal settlement, rather than appearing in the limelight of a
public proceeding.
In 1980, for instance, the United States Rice Millers' Association
("RMA") filed a petition under Section 301, alleging that the Japanese
government subsidized exports of rice, an act which displaced United
States rice exports in violation of GATT rules and of principles adopted
by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Before the
USTR had even decided on the admissibility of the complaint, bilateral
consultations with the Japanese government were successfully concluded,
and the RMA withdrew the petition.' 6  In 1984, the *D.MA scored a
similar success. In this instance, it had complained that Taiwan subsi-
dized rice exports. After the USTR had admitted its complaint in Octo-
ber 1983 and had held consultations with Taiwanese authorities, the
RMA withdrew its petition in March 1984, following an understanding
which limited the quantity of subsidized rice exports from Taiwan. 8 7
Of course, each case filed under Section 301 which involves GATT
law does not result in relief forthcoming at such short notice. It may
184 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(e). See supra text ac-
companying note 119.
185 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(e). Other than the
Subsidies Code, no Tokyo agreement indicates a consultation period; nor does the General Agree-
ment. See supra table 2 (following text accompanying note 109). In those cases, Congress envi-
sioned that the USTR would devote "a reasonable amount of time" to consultations and efforts at
conciliation before invoking dispute settlement proceedings. S. RaP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
239 (1979).
186 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 619-20.
187 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (1984). Taiwan, incidentally, is not a party to GATT. From the notice
of initiation, it appears the RMA had already filed a 301-complaint in July 1983, which it withdrew
in late August of that year "to provide an opportunity for a negotiated solution." 48 Fed. Reg.
56,289 (1983). The course of events in this case illustrates how private petitioners use the bargaining
power created by a Section 301-proceeding.
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take quite some time before the foreign government succumbs to the
pressures exercised by the United States government and, ultimately, by
the GATT membership (or, as the case may be, the signatories of a par-
ticular Code). In some cases, the foreign government may resist a negoti-
ated solution or may refuse to accept a panel-recommendation without
delay. 188 Petitioners' frustration over the foreign government's apparent
intransigence is apt to increase as time goes by. Because the Executive is
empowered to disregard the outcome of GATT proceedings, the affected
United States industry can be expected to demand unilateral retaliation
at some point. Congress, however, allowed the President considerable
freedom in determining whether retaliation would be "appropriate and
feasible" to eliminate foreign unfair trade practices.189 So far, the Presi-
dent has not exercised his retaliatory authority.190
Presidential inaction has provoked a variety of proposals which
would increase the likelihood of United States retaliation, either by limit-
ing Presidential discretion directly, or by transferring investigatory au-
thority from the USTR to another government agency. As early as 1962,
the Senate considered an amendment to Section 252 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act which would have compelled the President to act whenever
United States exporters were confronted with foreign barriers to trade.191
The Kennedy Administration strongly objected to this amendment, argu-
ing that such an automatic response "would serve only to promote eco-
nomic warfare". 9 2  The Administration apparently convinced the
Senate, for this amendment was not adopted.
In 1979, Senator Dole proposed to remove the responsibility of ad-
ministering Section 301 from the USTR, an Executive office, to the
United States International Trade Commission, an agency independent
from the Executive. Under this proposal, the President still had the au-
thority to review and to make decisions on the ITC's recommendations.
Congress would have had the power, however, to approve or disapprove
his decision; Congressional disapproval would have resulted in the ITC's
188 GATT Council and Tokyo Code Committee decisions are based on consensus rather than
majority rule. Archibald, supra note 107, at VII-8. As a result, the losing party can block the
adoption of a panel ruling or extract a qualification of the panel's holding in exchange for its consent
to adoption.
189 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a) (1982). Congress merely expressed its expectation that "swift and certain
retaliation" would follow in the event foreign trading partners of the United States "insist on main-
taining unfair advantages." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1974).
190 See generally supra text accompanying notes 47-50. But see text accompanying notes 393-403.
191 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 83, at 1128 (text) and 1855 (comments by sponsor, Senator
Prescott Bush).
192 Id. at 1893. (Senator Bush's rebuttal can be found at id. at 1903.)
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recommendations taking effect.193 The Carter Administration, sup-
ported by the House, firmly opposed this Amendment which was ulti-
mately withdrawn.
19 4
Most recently, proponents of the new reciprocity concept, which
compares the equivalence of remaining import restrictions,, 5 generally
share the belief that the United States should be more willing to unilater-
ally retaliate against foreign trade barriers.'96 Some of them go so far as
to argue that the policy of reducing trade barriers through multilateral
negotiation or dispute resolution should be abandoned. Henceforth, the
United States ought to pursue a "Tit for Tat" strategy regarding GATT
contracting parties.
19 7
In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress did not issue such far-
reaching directives for retaliatory action to the Executive. The President
retained his discretionary authority to take "appropriate and feasible"
action under Section 301. On the other hand, the new law does require
the USTR to prepare analyses of significant foreign trade barriers and to
estimate their trade impact."9 Interestingly, in each of these yearly re-
ports to Congress the USTR must articulate, where appropriate, its rea-
sons for not taking action under Section 301 or other authority to
eliminate the trade barriers which he has identified. 199 While not pre-
scribing any particular action, Congress expressed its intention that the
USTR vigorously proceed against unfair trade practices.2 "0 Yet it is sig-
nificant that the Senate Finance Committee stated in so many words that
the USTR ought to give priority to tackling those trade barriers "with
respect to which there is the greatest likelihood of achieving solutions,
particularly within accepted international procedures (emphasis
193 Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-12 (1979).
194 Based on an internal memorandum entitled "Conference Document, consultations on imple-
menting legislation for the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" prepared by the staffs
of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance (May 21, 1979).
195 See generally supra text accompanying notes 57-72.
196 See Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 735-36.
197 Goldstein & Krasner, Unfair Trade Practices: The Case for a Differential Response, 74 AM.
ECoN. REv. 282 (1984). Without hesitation, these authors assert that "Tit for Tat is not aimed at
starting a trade war. It is a program that should elicit cooperation and 'freer' trade... We cannot
defend liberalism unilaterally; without pressure, our trading partners will not act in accordance with
GATT norms" (emphasis in original). Id at 284-85.
198 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 181.
199 Id. at § 181(b)(2).
200 S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1983) C.. the USTR should consider vigorously
utilizing existing authorities and dispute settlement procedures to deal with the identified barriers
and distortions"). Presumably, Congress here referred in particular to the new independent investi-
gative authority of the USTR pursuant to Section 301. See id. at 47.
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supplied)".20 1
Proposals which would unequivocally order the Executive to retali-
ate in response to foreign unfair trade practices, irrespective of interna-
tional procedures, call for determined opposition.
Viewed in the context of a private Section 301 petition, retaliatory
action on behalf of one complainant almost invariably will affect other
sectors of economic activity. For instance, import restrictions affect both
individual importers as well as consumers domestically, such as process-
ing industries or citizens. Export controls by their very nature curtail
United States business activity. Export incentives such as subsidies, in-
tended to counter foreign subsidies which divert United States exports
from foreign country markets, not only tax United States citizens but
may upset other non-subsidizing governments, which will complain of
increasing distortions in international trade. These examples further il-
lustrate the danger of spiralling trade restrictions which retaliation cre-
ates. Moreover, independent United States action seeking to redress
unfair trade practices of GATT contracting parties may well backfire, by
undermining the confidence of United States trading partners in multilat-
eral resolution of the pressures and conflicts which international ex-
change engenders. Finally, foreign policy considerations are still
inextricably intertwined with international economic issues, and may on
occasion warrant the President not to retaliate even though petitioners
raised a valid complaint (and even if the GATT would have authorized
retaliation).
Weakening the President's authority to weigh these factors serves no
useful purpose. The President's broad authority inheres in a sound deci-
sion-making process which must balance a variety of competing interests,
both national as well as international. Yet private petitioners can and
should insist on adequate procedures to ensure a prompt and scrupulous
investigation of their complaints on the national and on the international
level. Section 301 is one mechanism to achieve a thorough investigation
of private grievances. It at last allows the business community to partici-
pate in the supervision of intergovernmental trade rules. Having been
removed for a long time from GATT operations affecting the market-
place, that opportunity for participation should in itself be a relief to the
business community.
E. Section 301 and the United States Domestic Market
In discussing the reach of Section 301, attention is often drawn to its
201 Id.
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use in combatting unfair trade practices which United States industries
encounter abroad.2 '2 By its terms, however, Section 301 does not ex-
clude complaints against imports into the United States which have an
unfair competitive advantage attributable to a foreign government (the
obvious example being government subsidies). Moreover, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 eliminated the requirement that the President
could move against foreign exports to the United States under Section
301 only after he had determined that anti-dumping or countervailing
duty action would be inadequate to deter such practices.20 3 The statute
therefore does not contain any impediment against Section 301 com-
plaints of unfair trade practices affecting domestic sales and investments
of United States industries.
Yet there are disadvantages for private petitioners in activating the
Section 301 procedure, if the injury caused by imports can be remedied
through an appeal to other provisions of United States trade law. A case
of subsidized imports into the United States illustrates this proposition.
After reviewing various remedies a United States petitioner might con-
sider applying for, this article will examine an actual complaint under
Section 301 about subsidized imports.
1. Subsidized Imports
Threatened by subsidized imports into the United States, the af-
fected industry would be advised to first look into the countervailing duty
statute.204 This law has been specifically designed to offset the price dif-
ference (Le., to raise the lower price) of imported products benefiting
from foreign subsidies. If the United States industry can demonstrate
that the allegedly subsidized industry charges lower prices for the im-
ported products in the United States than in its domestic market or in
foreign countries, it could also invoke the antidumping law (which is pro-
cedurally equivalent to the countervailing duty statute).20 5 Alternatively,
the industry could consider starting an escape clause procedure, request-
_202 See, e.g., Jacobs & Hove, Remedies for Unfair Import Competition in the United States, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (1980) ("The section 301 alternative is not useful to an American manu-
facturer in dealing directly with increased imports into the United States. It may be useful, however,
in opening the market in the foreign country").
203 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(c). In addition, the Treasury Department had to have determined
the existence of export subsidies and that the International Trade Commission, which subsidized the
imports, substantially reduced the sales opportunities of competitive United States products. Id
204 Tariff Act of 1930 tit. VII subtit. A, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671 (1982).
205 Tariff Act of 1930 tit. VII subtit. B, amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (1982). The important procedural difference between the antidumping law and counter-
vailing duty law is that the latter does not prescribe an injury test in all cases. See infra note 207.
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ing the Executive to impose temporary import restrictions as a safeguard
against further injury caused by increasing quantities of imports.
20 6
Starting an escape clause procedure may be convenient if the affected
industry has difficulty proving that competitively priced imports are, in
fact, subsidized or dumped.
The main advantages of these remedies lie in stricter time limits im-
posed on Executive action, and in the more trade-oriented approach the
Executive is required to take in considering these actions. The counter-
vailing duty and anti-dumping laws in particular leave the Executive lit-
tle choice but to intervene and offset foreign subsidies or price
discrimination, once it has established that the subsidized or dumped im-
ports cause or threaten to cause injury.2 °7
Under certain circumstances, though, Section 301 may have some
appeal to United States industries which claim to be injured by subsi-
dized imports on their domestic market. For one thing, Section 301 ap-
pears to have a lower admissibility-threshold, compared to the
countervailing duty, antidumping and escape clause remedy. In order to
successfully invoke Section 301, complainants have to qualify as "inter-
ested persons" who need not always show that the disputed practices
206 The general escape clause is embodied in Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-03, 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(1982). With regard to imports from communist countries, this Act sets forth a special escape clause
in section 406. 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982). Note that escape clause proceedings are not concerned
with "unfairness" in terms of trade of imported products.
The main criterion to establish whether import relief is warranted under the escape clause turns
on the (threat of) injury caused by imports to a United States industry. Under section 406, Imports
need only be "a significant cause of material injury" to a domestic industry, whereas section 201
requires that imports are "a substantial cause of serious injury." By invoking section 406, petitioners
can single out imports from particular communist countries, as opposed to a section 201 proceeding
where all exporting countries will be taken into account to determine whether there is indeed an
overall increase in imports causing serious injury to a domestic industry. Yet, section 406 has been
little used, and some petitioners threatened by imports from communist countries have found section
201 more effective in obtaining relief. Baker & Cunningham, Countertrade and Trade Law, 5 J.
COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 375, 379 (1983).
207 Once it has been determined that an imported product is subsidized and causes serious injury
to (eg., materially retards the establishment of) a United States industry, a countervailing duty equal
to the amount of the net subsidy "shall" be imposed. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). Not all countries
whose exports to the United States are deemed to be subsidized benefit from the injury test, however.
The injury requirement, introduced by the Trade Agreements Act, only applies to signatories of the
Subsidies Code or to countries that have assumed "equivalent obligations" vis-a-vis the United
States. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1) and (2) (1982). With regard to dutiable imports from other countries,
countervailing duties will be levied upon the mere finding of subsidization. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(3)
(1982). See generally Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, The GA7T Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored
Nation Principle, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59, 70-77 (1980) (arguing that the Subsidies Code
itself does not require unconditional MFN-treatment of GATT contracting parties who have not
acceded to the Code).
In contrast, the injury test is part and parcel of all antidumping proceedings. 19 U.S.C. § 1673
(1982).
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burden United States commerce as a whole.2"8 Especially in the event
that an individual petitioner feels harmed by export subsidies granted by
a signatory to the Subsidies Code, Section 301 offers the considerable
advantage that the individual petitioner is not obliged to demonstrate
industry-wide injury, Le., that these subsidies harm its domestic competi-
tors as well. 20 9 The countervailing duty and antidumping statutes and
the escape clause, in contrast, require petitioners to demonstrate that the
disputed imports cause, or threaten to cause, "serious" or "material" in-
jury to a particular and defined industry.210
In addition, under the countervailing duty and antidumping stat-
utes, petitioners must specify product-by-product and country-by-coun-
try the nature and extent of the subsidies or the dumping practices
distorting the terms of trade of products imported into the United States.
This requirement proves to be a tremendous hurdle in those sectors of
industry where trade-distortive practices abound under many different
guises (e.g., steel, textiles, agriculture).211 Section 301 arguably does not
require the same degree of specification.
Furthermore, both the countervailing duty and antidumping law
and the escape clause offer only a limited number of options to the Exec-
utive to counteract the disputed foreign practices. The countervailing
duty and antidumping statutes instruct the President to impose counter-
vailing duties on subsidized or dumped imports.2" 2 The escape clause, on
the other hand, allows the President to increase the customs duty per-
taining to the injurious products, directly or indirectly, through a tariff
208 See generally supra text accompanying notes 128-60.
209 The grant of export subsidies on manufactured products by a signatory party constitutes a per
se violation of Subsidies Code, art. 9.
210 See Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 631 (who point out that, compared with escape
clause actions, it is not a defense in Section 301 cases that factors other than the disputed foreign
practices are more significant causes of injury to United States petitioners).
211 See Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agree-
ments Act (Can) (Will) (Should) Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361,
1390-91 (1979).
212 19 U.S.C. § 16 71(e) (1982) (countervailing duty law); 19 U.S.C. § 1673(e) (1982) (antidump-
ing law). The Executive (Le., the Commerce Department) has discretion, however, to suspend the
countervailing duty or antidumping investigation (and thereby avoid the imposition of duties) in case
an agreement can be reached with the governments accused of subsidization, or with the exporting
companies accused of importing subsidized or dumped products into the United States, which will
negate the effect of the subsidy or dumping practices with respect to United States imports. These
agreements may result in a price increase or a volume reduction of allegedly subsidized or dumped
imports, or a complete elimination of imports from the countries concerned. See generally, Hoimer
& Bello, U.S. Import Law and Policy Series. Suspension and Settlement Agreements in Unfair Trade
Cases, 18 INT'L LAW. 683 (1984). Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 604 curtails the authority of the
Executive to enter into quantitative restraint agreements under the antidumping or countervailing
duty laws.
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quota;213 to modify or impose quantitative restrictions, unilaterally or
through negotiation; 214 or to take any combination of such actions.21 5 It
is generally assumed, moreover, that an escape clause restriction must be
of non-discriminatory application, also striking at countries which are
not responsible for the injury inflicted on the United States industry con-
cerned.21 6 Countervailing duty and antidumping measures strike only at
the "guilty" countries (they are selective).
In comparison, Congress did not limit the President's options if the
President decides to take action against foreign unfair practices under
Section 301.217 Thus, Congress authorized the President not only to re-
strict imports of the subsidized products triggering the Section 301 com-
plaint, but also to restrict imports of other products originating in the
foreign country concerned. This latter action, however, would clearly
violate the GATT218. In addition, the President is free to retaliate by
restricting services and investments originating in the subsidizing coun-
213 If a tariff quota is imposed, the tariff increases will only be levied on products imported after a
certain quota of these products (subject to regular tariffs) has been filled. For an example, see the
tariff quotas imposed by President Reagan in 1983 on imports of heavyweight motorcycles following
an escape clause investigation. 48 Fed. Reg. 17,179 (1983).
214 Negotiated quantitative restrictions are referred to in the statute as "orderly marketing ar-
rangements" (hereinafter referred to as "OMAs"). Under United States law, OMAs are to be distin-
guished from Voluntary Export Restraints (hereinafter referred to as "YERs") which the Executive
negotiates outside the escape clause, often arguing that the latter constitute unilateral measures
which have been voluntarily imposed by the exporting country (or industry) concerned. Thus the
Executive may avoid judicial scrutiny of VERs pursuant to the holding in Consumers Union v.
Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that a number of VERs negotiated by the Executive with
United States and Japanese steel producers could not be challenged by Consumers Union because, in
the court's view, these arrangements were not enforceable. Whatever their legal basis in United
States law, these voluntary restraint arrangements (ie., VRAs) enjoy a controversial status in the
GATT framework. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
215 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982).
216 This non-discrimination requirement is deduced from GATT, art. XIX. In practice, however,
United States escape clause actions (as well as similar actions taken by other GATT Contracting
Parties) have effectively discriminated against different exporting countries, underscoring the ambi-
guities surrounding a non-discriminatory interpretation of the GAT's escape clause. Indeed, the
GATT Contracting Parties for some time have been considering proposals to sanction discrimina-
tory safeguard measures. See generally M. BRONCKERS, Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilat-
eral Trade Relations in IssuEs OF PRoTECTIONISM IN GATT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
UNrrED STATES LAW (1985).
217 Section 301 instructs the President to take "all appropriate and feasible action within his
power" to obtain the elimination of foreign unfair trade practices. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a), amended by
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(a). For a representative list of the variety of conceivable options
available to the President, see Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 28, at 608 (suggesting countermea-
sures in the case involving Canada's requirements with respect to foreign investors, discussed at
supra text accompanying note 56).
218 Both the General Agreement as well as the Subsidies Code instruct that countervailing meas-
ures only strike at subsidized imports. GAIT, art. VI; Subsidies Code, art. 4.2.
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
try.2 19 Since the GAIT does not cover services and investments, the
GATT membership could not scrutinize these actions (though service-
and investment restrictions might run counter to bilateral FCN-or in-
vestment treaties which the United States has concluded with the coun-
try accused of subsidization). Furthermore, retaliatory action under this
provision can, but does not have to, be country-specific.
220
Finally, a United States industry planning to take action against
subsidized imports must make a choice as to which remedy it wants to
pursue. The USTR will refuse to initiate, or will terminate any Section
301 investigation if the petitioner is requesting a remedy to the same
practice under another provision of law.221 For example, the USTR ter-
minated an investigation involving allegations of Canadian financing sub-
sidies on the exports of subway cars, when these same allegations became
the subject of a countervailing duty investigation.222
A recent case illustrates the various considerations which may lead
a United States industry to select Section 301 as the remedy to counter-
act subsidized imports into the United States. The case also shows the
considerations which may prompt the Executive to pursue such a com-
plaint under a typical import relief statute, rather than under Section
301.
2. The 1983 Specialty Steel Program
In December 1981, the United States specialty steel industry, to-
gether with the United Steelworkers of America, filed a complaint under
Section 301, alleging that Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom (all GATT contracting parties) subsidized
their specialty steel industries.223 Several factors may have contributed
to petitioner's choice of Section 301 over the countervailing duty law.
The industry may have had difficulties itemizing the various subsi-
dies allegedly granted in different countries, allocating these subsidies to
products being imported into the United States, and measuring their ef-
219 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(2)(B), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(a). In the past,
however, the general view among United States policymakers has been that the "punishment should
fit the crime," and that if the foreign unfair practice affects United States products, retaliation should
also be in the product area. Coffield, supra note 142, at 395.
220 Section 301 explicitly provides that "(a)ction under this section may be taken on a nondis-
criminatory basis or solely against the foreign country or instrumentality involved." 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a)(2)(A), amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 304(a).
221 Archibald, supra note 107, at VII-16.
222 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (1982). The USTR reasoned that, as a matter of policy, "redundant
remedies and the waste of limited government resources" ought to be avoided. Id.
223 The USTR subsequently excluded Brazil from the 301-investigation. See 47 Fed. Reg. 10,107
and 35,387 (1982).
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fects with any precision on the prices of specialty steel imported into the
United States; an exercise demanded by the countervailing duty law.
224
At that time, moreover, the industry could not be sure that the ITC, in
measuring injury, would cumulate imports from all allegedly subsidizing
countries. Because countervailing duty investigations are country-spe-
cific, there was a possibility that the ITC would not find injury with re-
spect to imports from those countries which represented a relatively
small percentage of total market penetration; or even that the ITC would
not find injury with respect to any country taken individually.225
Interestingly, in drafting their Section 301 petition, complainants
did not rely exclusively on the GATT Subsidies Code. They invoked the
"unreasonableness" standard as well. One can appreciate the industry's
approach, realizing that the boundary lines of countervailable domestic
subsidization are largely uncharted, notwithstanding international efforts
to draw these lines. That is not so much a problem of definition, as a
function of fundamentally different socio-economic policies. GATT con-
tracting parties have divergent perspectives as to how their individual
economies ought to be structured. They do not share a common concept
of the market economy (not even the relatively close-knit group of indus-
trialized countries such as the United States, the European Community
Member States, Japan and Canada), although the GATT's basic premise
is to free market forces in international trade from government interfer-
ence.226 Thus, government subsidization to help adjust ailing industries
to changing market conditions is common in the Community, whereas
many government representatives, industry officials and academics in the
United States still view government subsidization suspiciously.2 2 7
224 Interestingly, in the ensuing months, the United States specialty steel industry also filed anti-
dumping actions against imports of stainless steel from France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
as well as a countervailing duty action against certain specialty steel imports from Spain. Specialty
Steel Industry Brings Action Against French Goods, Seeks Import Action, INT'L TRADE REP. (U.S.
Import Weekly) (BNA) No. 7, at A-160 (1982); ITC Issues Affirmative Final Rulings on European
Stainless Steel Products, INT'L TRADE REP. (U.S. Import Weekly) (BNA) No. 8, at A-369 (1983).
225 Under the old law, the International Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as "ITC")
Commissioners each had discretion to cumulate. Section 612(a) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
now requires that the ITC shall cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or
more countries of like products subject to investigation, if these compete with each other, and with
like products of the domestic industry in the United States market.
226 It is this premise which sets GATT apart from other international organizations dealing with
international trade. See Wolf, Tower of Babel. Conflicting Ideologies of Adjustment, 2 WoRLD
ECON. 481 (1979).
227 Accordingly, "condemning" certain domestic subsidies as being countervailable is a delicate
exercise in GATT. While the Subsidies Code accepts that domestic subsidies, in general, are legiti-
mate unless they are found to injure foreign competitors, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 con-
demns a number of domestic subsidies without qualification. Compare Subsidies Code, art. I 1 with
19 U.S.C. § 1677(a)(5)(B) (1982). This discrepancy already led to a bitter dispute between the Euro-
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a. The risks of Section 301
In view of the ongoing debate in GATT and other international
fora, such as the OECD, on the elusive demarcation between permissible
and countervailable subsidization, the specialty steel complaint did not
put the Executive in a very comfortable position. The United States gov-
ernment would have been hard-pressed to persuade its co-signatories that
the disputed subsidies violated the Subsidies Code.228 Unlike export sub-
sidization, the Code does not contain a straightforward prohibition on
many of the subsidies in issue here, such as preferential loans, "recapitali-
zation" of financial losses, tax exemptions etc. 229 The Code's signatories
merely agreed that they would "seek to avoid" injury to each other's
industries by granting these types of domestic subsidies to their national
industry.230
Accordingly, there was a risk that the Code signatories would not
favorably receive United States actions on behalf of the specialty steel
industry. Moreover, a formal determination of the Code signatories that
the disputed subsidy programs were not inconsistent with Code obliga-
tions of the exporting countries could have created additional problems
for the United States government extending beyond the specialty steel
case. Although this interpretation has not gone unchallenged, one school
of thought holds that any multilateral determination of Code commit-
ments is also binding on the signatories with respect to subsequent unilat-
eral countervailing duty investigations.2 3 1 In this view, a determination
pean Community and the United States, following the barrage of countervailing duty actions
brought by the United States steel industry in 1981 against carbon steel imports from European
Community Member States and a number of other countries. See Dominick, Countervailing State
Aids to Steek A Case for International Consensus, 21 COMMON MKT. L. Rxv. 355 (1984); Barshef-
sky, Mattice & Martin, Government Equity Participation in State-Owned Enterprises: An Analysis of
the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty Cases, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1101 (1983).
228 Because the specialty steel industry did not rely on the countervailing duty statute to attack
the foreign "subsidy" programs, GATT rules required that the United States seek a multilateral
consensus on the prohibition of the foreign subsidies (often referred to as "track 2" of the Subsidies
Code). Interestingly, GAT rules did allow the executive to reach a unilateral determination on the
counteravailability of similar subsidy programs in the carbon steel cases, since they were brought
under the countervailing duty statute (often referred to as "track 1" of the Subsidies Code). Com-
pare Subsidies Code, arts. 1 and 2 ("track 1") with Subsidies Code, arts. 12 and 13 ("track 2").
Whether the substance of a unilateral determination conforms with GAIT norms is, of course, a
different question. See also infra text accompanying note 231.
229 Compare Subsidies Code, arts. 9 and 10 (export subsidies) with Subsidies Code, art. 11 (other
subsidies). The domestic "subsidies" which were attacked in the 301 petition are summarized in 47
Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982).
230 Subsidies Code, art. 11.2.
231 In other words, determination made in "track 2" procedures would apply throughout the
Code; that is the same for "track 2" procedures. See generally Benyon & Bourgeois, supra note 175,
at 327.
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of the Code signatories in the specialty steel case, that the disputed sub-
sidy programs did not violate the Subsidies Code, would have pre-
empted the United States on subsequent occasions to unilaterally impose
countervailing duties on imports benefiting from similar subsidies.
Given the risks of taking the specialty steel case to GATT, the Exec-
utive's alternative under Section 301 would have been to unilaterally con-
demn the foreign subsidy programs as being unfair (iLe., "unreasonable")
and retaliate. This course of action would have entailed the danger of a
head-on collision with many United States trading partners, threatening
the fragile consensus reached in the Subsidies Code. Following a nearly
year-long investigation by the USTR, President Reagan in a remarkable
decision sought to minimize international uproar while appeasing the do-
mestic industry at the same time.
b. The switch to the escape clause
The President adopted the USTR's recommendation to suspend the
Section 301 proceedings, while requesting the ITC to conduct an expe-
dited escape clause investigation. 3 2 He reasoned that the actions
brought by the specialty steel industry under Section 301, as well as
under the countervailing and antidumping duty statute, did not cover all
important, or potentially important, sources of specialty steel imports.
Furthermore, he argued that:
dealing with the specific subsidy problem itself probably would not have a
great impact on the world steel trading environment in which our industry
must compete. Subsidies are only one of a wide range of trade restrictive
and trade distortive practices that many of our trading partners engage in
to protect their industries and to stimulate exports. If we are ever to put an
end to constant trade disputes in steel, we must stop dealing with discrete
import and export issues in isolation and instead begin a coordinated ap-
proach to the problem. By combining the Section 201 and Section 301 ap-
proaches, the United States hopes to stabilize the immediate import
situation and to reverse the global trend toward greater excess capacity,
increased subsidization, and closed markets.23 3
Subsequently the ITC did indeed determine that imports of certain
specialty steel products injured United States producers, and recom-
mended that the President grant relief to the domestic industry. On July
5, 1983, President Reagan announced a comprehensive import relief pro-
gram for the specialty steel industry, 31 which consisted of tariff increases
on some products, and quotas on others (should the exporting countries
232 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982). The Section 301 proceeding was suspended in order to enable the
President to take emergency protective measures if need be during the escape clause proceedings. Id.
233 Id. at 51,718.
234 48 Fed. Reg. 31,177 (1983).
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of these products not agree to voluntarily reduce their exports to the
United States235).
A detailed critique of this decision falls beyond the scope of this
article, though the President's reasoning certainly invites criticism. One
might query, for example, how the United States government envisaged
reversing the global trend toward closed markets by imposing import re-
strictions itself.2 36 What is interesting for our discussion is that even
though the President explicitly agreed with petitioner's contention that
the disputed foreign subsidy practices were inconsistent with provisions
of the Subsidies Code, the Executive chose not to handle the specialty
steel industry's complaint through direct confrontation with United
States trading partners. Confrontation would have resulted from impos-
ing import restrictions as a unilateral retaliatory measure under Section
301.237 Instead, the United States government fell back on a classic trade
remedy-the escape clause-an action which, though disagreeable to its
trading partners, certainly was not as controversial as retaliation under
Section 301 would have been. 38
In hindsight, one wonders why the industry did not invoke the es-
cape clause from the beginning. There may have been legal obstacles.239
Perhaps post-election rhetoric, that the laissez-faire attitude of the Rea-
235 The European Community, which refused to voluntarily reduce specialty steel exports to the
United States, was then faced with unilateral United States import restrictions, and ultimately retali-
ated against the United States under GATT, art. XIX by increasing tariffs on some and imposing
quantitative restrictions on other United States imports. See 27 O.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 40) 1
(1984). The Commission gave an account of the Community's dispute with the United States in its
answer to Parliamentary question no. 1799/83, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 141) 27 (1984).
236 Aarts, Beperkende Maatregelen op het Gebied van Japan, Textiel en Stoal, in EEG-HAN-
DELSPOLITIEK EN BESCHERMENDE MAATREGELEN TEGEN DE INVOER UiT DERDE LANDEN 27
(1984). The timing of the specialty steel program was awkward as well, coming barely a month after
the Williamsburg summit, where seven Heads of State of major industrial countries (including Presi-
dent Reagan) resolved to stand firm against protectionist pressures. 5-1983 EUR. COMM. BULL.
§§ 3.4.1-3.4.3. For criticism in the United States, see Boyer, Protectionism, Reagan-Style7 The Steel
Quotas, FORTUNE, at 55 (Aug. 8, 1983).
237 48 Fed. Reg. 31,177 (1983).
238 In the general uproar that followed the announcements of the steel program, this nuance may
have been lost on EEC observers. Thus, a ranking Commission official recently maintained, in
denouncing the President's actions, that the program's import relief measures were based on Section
301. Aarts, supra note 236, at 27 and 39.
239 Only in February 1980, less than two years before the specialty steel industry filed its com-
plaint with the USTR under Section 301, did President Carter terminate restrictions on specialty
steel imports, which were granted as escape clause relief to the United States industry pursuant to
Section 201 in 1976. USTR Recommends Section 201 Study of Specialty Steel Industry by ITC,
INT'L TRADE REP. (U.S. Import Weekly) (BNA) No. 7, at A-107, 108 (1982). The ITC will not
initiate a 201-investigation regarding a product which has already received import relief pursuant to
the escape clause, unless two years have lapsed since the last day on which such import relief was
granted. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(') (1982).
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gan Administration would discourage use of the escape clause (implying
restrictions on fair trade), also deterred the specialty steel industry.2' Be
that as it may, the resolution of this complaint does suggest that the Ex-
ecutive is reluctant to take offensive action against GATT contracting
parties in order to protect the United States domestic market, if tradi-
tional--defensive--remedies are available to petitioners.
III. EEC COMPLAINT PROCEDURE EMBODIED IN THE NEW TRADE
POLICY INSTRUMENT
When considering trade policy measures from an EEC perspective,
one should keep in mind that the Community institutions have had ex-
clusive authority in commercial policy since January 1, 1970.241 Accord-
ingly, the Member States no longer have the power to take trade
measures individually, at least not without Community authorization.242
Thus, if a Dutch industry feels aggrieved by a foreign trade practice and
approaches the Dutch government, the latter may take up these griev-
ances informally with the foreign government concerned, but it cannot
bring this matter before the GATT nor can it impose national trade re-
strictions. Instead, the Netherlands would have to appeal to the Com-
munity institutions in Brussels, requesting the Community to initiate
appropriate dispute settlement proceedings and, eventually, to take retal-
iatory action.243
Initially, the European Community was rather hostile towards the
Section 301 procedure. Doubts were raised in European circles whether
the United States Executive would be more inclined to deviate from
240 See deKieffer, Status of Import Relief Under Section 301, 103 and 201 and 406, in THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979-FOUR YEARs LATER 391, 403-04 (Practicing Law Inst. No. 425
1983).
241 The European Court of Justice derived the exclusiveness of the Community's competence in
international trade policy as of Jan. 1, 1970 from EEC Treaty, art. 113. Donckerwolke v. Procureur
de La R6publique, 1976 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1921 (recital 32). For a recent analysis, see Bour-
geois, The Common Commercial Policy-Scope and Nature of the Powers in PROTECTIONISM AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1 (V6lker ed. 1983).
242 Because the Community's common commercial policy is not fully developed yet, there are
still instances where Member States can maintain or impose national trade measures in accordance
with Community law (l.&, subject to Community authorization). In practice, though, it is not al-
ways easy to distinguish between lawful and unlawful national measures affecting international
trade. This is aptly illustrated by the intricate relationship of the Community (and the Member
States) with Japan. See generally Bronckers, supra note 24.
243 On the Community's capacity to press international claims, including claims on behalf of
Community citizens, see Stein, Towards a European Foreign Policy?-European Foreign Affairs Sys-
tems from the Perspective of the United States Constitution in METHODS, TooLs AND POTENTIAL
FOR EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
235-38 (Cappelletti ed. 1985).
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GATT rules now that Congress had explicitly authorized the Executive
to ignore them. From a procedural point of view, the Community was
suspicious of the more active role Section 301 created for private com-
plainants in supervising the observance of intergovernmental commit-
ments. Many feared that the United States Executive's discretion in
resolving international trade disputes pursuant to Section 301 would be
restricted similar to that in United States countervailing duty and anti-
dumping law. These suspicions parallel the widely-held view in the
Community that private litigation can easily disrupt international trade
relations. International norms, it is often argued in the EEC, are
designed to guide consultations among the public authorities by delineat-
ing governmental responsibilities.244
Contrasts in legal culture may explain the divergent attitudes in Eu-
rope and the United States.24 5 This is illustrated by the differences be-
tween Community and United States antidumping and countervailing
duty law. In the EEC, the administering authority will consider, besides
price discrimination or subsidization which allegedly causes significant
injury to a private petitioner, whether an antidumping or countervailing
duty levy on underpriced imports would not only be in the petitioner's
interest, but in the interest of the Community as well.24 6 Such a condi-
tion, which gives the administrators of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty law wide discretionary powers, is unknown in United States
law.
24 7
Still, the EEC Council finally adopted a new trade policy instrument
in September of 1984, which established a procedure for private petition-
ers to complain of foreign unfair trade practices.248 Although the proce-
dure was modelled after Section 301, there are important distinctions
between Section 301 and the new EEC instrument.
For one thing, the EEC instrument does not reflect the shift in em-
244 See J. STEENBERGEN, G. DE CLERQ & R. FOQUC CHANGE AND ADJUSTMENT-EXTERNAL
RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 13-14 (1983); Kuyper,
Some Reflections on the Legal Position of the Private Complainant in Various Procedures Relating to
Commercial Policy, 9 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 115, 125 (1983) ("In no case should the
Commission or the Council be brought in a position where it has to take substantive action on the
international level because private complainants can legally force the Commission or the Council to
do so").
245 Id. at 149.
246 J. STEENBERGEN, G. DE CLERQ & R. FOQUA, supra note 244. See also 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 201) 1 (1984) (Reg 2176/84, art. 12(1)).
247 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (antidumping law) and 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1984) (countervailing
duty law). The Executive's lack of discretion in administering these statutes has not remained with-
out criticism in the United States. See generally Ehrenhaft, supra note 211.
248 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 1 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84).
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phasis from inward-looking protective measures to export promotion,
which has come to be identified with Section 301. Regulation 2641/84
primarily seeks to protect the Common Market against foreign unfair
trade practices. Securing access to export markets for Community indus-
tries clearly has been a secondary objective in drafting the regulation. In
addition, the drafters of the instrument's procedure were more concerned
with internal decision-making processes (Le., the Commission's struggle
with the Council for independent authority in the trade policy area), than
with the position of private complainants. Indeed, government authori-
ties in the EEC do not rely as much on the business community for the
enforcement of intergovernmental commitments as does the United
States Congress.
This chapter of the article first traces the drafting history of the new
EEC instrument. The first subchapter will draw particular attention to
the target of the new instrument-its definition of unfair trade prac-
tices-and its linkage to a number of measures designed to liberalize in-
tra-community trade. The second subchapter will discuss the
Commission's move to assert decision-making authority in trade policy
matters via the new instrument. In the final analysis, the Commission
only gained a partial, though notable, victory over the Council. The
third subchapter addresses the instrument's procedure from the perspec-
tive of a private complainant.
A. Drafting History of the New Instrument
In tracing the drafting history of the Community's new trade policy
instrument, one can point to a number of mileposts. The influential
Welsh report led the European Parliament at the end of 1981 to adopt a
resolution, which invited the Commission to extend its protection of
Community industry against foreign unfair trade practices beyond an-
tidumping and countervailing duty measures. France took up this
theme, but the Commission's first response was more reserved. Then, in
early 1983, the Commission made an about-face and released its proposal
for a new trade policy instrument. The proposal proved to be controver-
sial. Three Member States vehemently opposed adoption of the instru-
ment in anticipation of a rash of protectionist actions by the Community.
The Council as a whole found the decision-making mechanism proposed
by the Commission (commonly referred to as "the guillotine") difficult to
accept. Finally, after deliberating for more than a year, the Council
agreed in principle on a modified version of the instrument in April of
1984. Due to the fact that the instrument was part of a package deal, it
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took close to another six months before the instrument entered into
force.
1. The Welsh Report
The call for a new trade policy instrument sounded clearly for the
first time in 1980. In June of that year, the Committee on External Eco-
nomic Relations of the European Parliament held hearings on the Com-
munity's antidumping activities. During these hearings, which not only
touched upon the Community's antidumping policy, the Committee's
rapporteur Mr. Welsh questioned the viability of GATT norms at a time
of economic recession:
The GATT is a series of agreements which was developed in the post-war
years when the world was going through a period of unparallelled trade
expansion and the entire thrust of the GATT is geared to take care of a
period when trade is expanding very fast and it is to try, I suppose, in a
sense to act as a referee in a football match to stop the attack of one side
committing too many fouls and scoring an awful lot of goals. In other
words, it is a system that is geared to attack. Unfortunately, for all sorts of
reasons, the world is now going through some sort of trade recession. Cer-
tainly the growth rates that we have now, in Western Europe and I think in
the United States, simply cannot be compared with what was going on
before. So, in a sense, trade as opposed to being an offensive matter, has now
become a defensive matter and in applying GATT and antidumping to those
new circumstances; what are we doing? We are actually using an offensive
code for a defensive set of circumstances and it may be that some of the
problems and some of the twists and turns we get into are simply a result of
that. In a sense the rules have not changed quite as fast as the situation has.
(emphasis supplied).2 49
The wisdom of this observation is debatable, if only because the
GATT itself was negotiated in response to the "beggar thy neighbour"
policies prevailing during the depression era of the 1930s. Time and
again, the GATT contracting parties have reaffirmed their belief that
protectionist measures aggravate the effects of an economic down-turn.
Thus, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration resolved to create a "renewed
consensus" in support of the GATT system so as to restore confidence in
the liberalization and expansion of world trade.2 50 Yet the statement
quoted above does reflect commonly held views in the Community (and,
one should add in all fairness, elsewhere).
Following these proceedings, Mr. Welsh was asked to draw up a
249 Parliamentary Comm. on External Economic Relations, Report of the Proceedings in Public
Concerning the Community's Anti-dumping Activities 68-69 (P.E. 67.730 1980) (these proceedings
are annexed to 1981-1982 EuR. PARL. Doc. (No. 422) 1 (1981)).
250 GATT, 29th Supp. BISD 9, 10 (1983).
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report on the Community's antidumping activities. In the report, Mr.
Welsh argued that antidumping measures are inadequate to protect
Community industry from the consequences of unfair trade, a concept
which in his view "is quite foreign to GATT".251 This statement clearly
is ill-founded.
Through the GATT's dispute settlement mechanism, the con-
tracting parties can complain of any practice which they consider unfair
by alleging nullification or impariment of the benefits they expect from
GATT. As was shown above, the concept of "unfairness" in GATT is
very broad and extends beyond violations of explicit commitments.
252
What Mr. Welsh probably objected to is that the GATT has only singled
out two kinds of unfair trade practices against which the contracting par-
ties may retaliate unilaterally: dumping and subsidization. In all other
cases, unfairness first must be established by the GATT membership
before a complaining party will be authorized to retaliate. For good rea-
sons, the GATT membership as a whole rarely authorizes retaliatory
measures. Instead, GATT individual members tend to rely on the nor-
mative force of a multilateral ruling that a certain practice is indeed un-
fair, and expect the party concerned to eliminate this practice on its own
motion. This process can be time-consuming, but proves to be effective
in many cases. The only alternative currently conceivable, a vicious cir-
cle of unilateral protectionist and retaliatory restrictions, certainly is not
preferable.
Mr. Welsh went on to propose that the "Commission's Commercial
Defence Service" should cover all aspects of unfair trading practices and
should not confine itself to breaches of GATT codes.253 Mr. Welsh's
proposal reminds one of the Congressional canon in Section 301 that the
Executive is not bound by GATT norms.254 Both the United States Con-
gress as well as the European Parliament do not feel constrained by
GATT rules when it comes to deciding on the unfairness of foreign ac-
tions it seems. Unilateral determinations of unfairness suffice in their
view. The difference is that Mr. Welsh's Committee was more concerned
with the effects of foreign unfair trade practices on the Community's do-
mestic market, whereas Congress focused on foreign barriers restricting
United States exports.
In its subsequent resolution on the Community's antidumping activ-
ities, the European Parliament inserted two paragraphs on "commercial
251 1981-1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 422) 16 (1981).
252 See supra text accompanying note 40.
253 1981-1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 422) 17 (1981).
254 See supra text accompanying note 40.
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defense". Apart from admonishing the Commission not to confine its
defensive activities to dumping and subsidization, it recommended that
the Division of the Commission which administers the Community's
trade policy instruments should be specifically charged with the responsi-
bility of advising complainants who cannot establish dumping practices
and to assist them by whatever means might be appropriate.25
2. The French Memorandum
On April 27, 1982, France submitted a memorandum on the rein-
forcement of the Community's trade policy instruments to the other EEC
Member States and the Commission. This memorandum specified earlier
French proposals for a "relance europiinne" in the context of the com-
mon commercial policy.2" 6 France sought to develop an external com-
plement for the "reconquest" of the Community's internal market. In its
view, on the one hand the Community should fine-tune statistical surveil-
lance of imported products, while on the other hand the Community
ought to respond more effectively to foreign unfair trade practices.
The French government explicitly referred to Section 301, which it
considered useful to condemn unfair trade practices escaping the GATT
regime. Because its memorandum did not define such practices, some
observers feared that France attempted to introduce protectionist ele-
ments in the Community's trade policy machinery. France's disposition
to protect the Common Market against foreign competition fuelled these
suspicions.2"7 Admittedly though, the memorandum did point to foreign
practices restricting Community exports as well.
When the European Council convened in Brussels in June of 1982,
the Heads of State appeared to echo the French concerns. The Council
considered that it was of the highest importance to defend vigorously the
legitimate trading interests of the Community. To this end, the Council
believed that the Community should act "with as much speed and effi-
ciency as its trading partners."258
The Commission, however, in its first reaction to the French memo-
255 See § 14 of the Resolution adopted on Dec. 16, 1981, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 11) 37
(1982).
256 See generally Het Franse Memorandum over de Gemeenschappelyke liandelspolitiek, 25
EuRoMARKT-NIEuWS 146-48 (1982).
257 See Frankrijk dringt bli EEG aan op scherpere invoercontrdle, Financieele Dagblad, Apr. 17-
19, 1982, at 5 (attributing the French proposals to increasing concern over Japanese and United
States imports interfering with efforts of the French government to stimulate domestic industry).
258 6-1982 EUR. COMM. BULL. § 1.5.2. Note that the European Council is an organ that is not
mentioned as such by the Community's treaties, and could be distinguished from the Council of
Ministers which is mentioned in the treaties. See generally Lauwaars, The European Council, 14
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 25 (1977).
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randum deemed a new trade policy instrument redundant. It argued that
the Member States could already bring complaints about foreign trade
actions to the Community institutions. As far as the effectiveness of the
Community's trade policy machinery was concerned, a procedure similar
to United States Section 301 would not add anything to Community
powers with respect to antidumping, escape clause actions or retaliation
according to the Commission. If anything, the Council's decision-mak-
ing process should be improved (generally speaking, the Council sets pol-
icy guidelines and takes final decisions on international trade matters,
whereas the Commission is in charge of their implementation). Signifi-
cantly, the Commission did not venture to give an opinion on the desira-
bility of a private complaint procedure in the EEC, though it
underscored this aspect in discussing Section 301.259
France was not satisfied with this lukewarm response. Without con-
sulting the Community authorities, it established an advisory committee
on international trade in August of 1982. The committee was charged
with investigating whether abnormal imports threatened to injure the na-
tional economy. Private parties could appear before this committee and
request an investigation.260 In its response to a Parliamentary question,
the Commission was careful to point out that the advice of this commit-
tee would be restricted to conditions on the French market, and in no
way could prejudice the outcome of appropriate Community investiga-
tions. 261 Not much was heard from the French advisory committee since
then.
The declaration issued by the European Council at its meeting in
Copenhagen in December of 1982 did not specifically address Commu-
nity action against foreign unfair trade practices.2 62 The Council ap-
peared more concerned with the remaining barriers to intra-community
trade. In this connection, the question whether and how products
originating in foreign countries should be certified for free movement
within the Common Market became a stumbling block for proposals to
eliminate technical barriers to intra-community trade.26 3 Some Member
259 See generally Het Franse memorandum over de Gemeenschappelyke handelspolitiek; de eerste
rectie van de Commissie, 25 EUROMARKT-NIEUWS 204 (1982).
260 Id. at 206-07.
261 Response to Parliamentary question no. 1469/82, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 80) 6 (1983).
262 12-1982 EUR. COMM. BULL. § 1.2.2 et seq. The press did report though, that the participants
in the Council's meeting were most concerned about the rising tide of imports into the Community
and considered negotiating a variety of VRAs, notably with the United States and Japan, to stem the
inflow of foreign products (particularly high-technology products). EEC leaders seek trade pacts
aimed at cutting unemployment, Financial Times (London), Dec. 4, 1982, at 1.
263 See paragraph 4 of the Commission memorandum to the Council on "re-activating the Euro-
pean internal market," which it submitted in preparation of the Copenhagen meeting. EUR. COMM.
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
States were concerned, for example, that uniform type-approval proce-
dures with respect to the importation of cars into the Community could
easily undermine national restrictive measures on Japanese car im-
ports.2 64 According to such uniform procedures, Japanese cars, which
for instance Dutch customs officials certified for entry into the Commu-
nity, could be transported and sold in other Member States as EEC
products.
26
Then, in February of 1983, the Commission surprised outsiders by
submitting a draft regulation to the Council of Ministers for the creation
of a new trade policy instrument. 66
3. The Commission Proposal
In presenting its proposal to the Council, the Commission sought to
distance itself from United States Section 301. It objected in particular
to the broad definition of unfair trade practices in the latter, in particular
CoMM. (82) 735 final (1982). The Commission submitted a draft directive to the Council concerning
"EEC certification" of industrial products originating in third countries in 1980. 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 54) 5 (1980).
264 See generally Bronckers, supra note 24 (discussing the legality of these national restrictions
under Community law).
265 See EEC Treaty, art. 10. For Example, France would have to accord the same treatment to
cars imported from Japan as to cars imported from Germany. Yet one should be careful to distin-
guish between the certification of third country products for entry into the Community and the
internal harmonization of technical standards. Article 10 of the EEC Treaty may not apply to the
latter. To express this differently, agreement among Member States that type-approval in one Mem-
ber State will be valid throughout the Community does not necessarily imply that a third country
product which meets this type-approval standard is entitled to entry and free circulation within the
Community. GATT law exempts from the MFN-principle intra-community trade concessions
granted by Member States to each other's products. See GATT, art. XXIV.
However, this distinction between third country certification and internal harmonization is sus-
pect. Ifa third country product meets the applicable Community standard, the refusal to grant this
product EEC type-approval easily leads to the presumption of a disguised restriction on trade. As
such, this refusal would be inconsistent with the Standards Code. See Standards Code, arts. 5 and 7.
Therefore, third country certification and internal harmonization of technical standards would seem
to be linked. Nevertheless, some Community Member States persist in making the distinction. They
refer, for example, to the implicit reciprocal character of the Code's obligations. See Standards
Code, art. 15(6). Thus, they would not grant Code treatment to countries (including GAT Con-
tracting Parties) who have not acceded to the Code. See Decision 80/45/EEC, art. 3, supra note 1
(providing for restrictive interpretations of Code norms in case of non-reciprocity).
Should a Japanese car (or another third country product) receive EEC-certification upon impor-
tation in one Member State, as a rule, it could be freely exported to other Member States in accord-
ance with the EEC Treaty's principle of free movement of goods with the Community. EEC Treaty,
arts. 30-36. Any one of these other Member States might still try to block intra-Community traffic
of third country products, however, by requesting the Commission to authorize exceptions to the
free movement principle pursuant toe EEC treaty, art. 115 (appealing to differences in international
trade policy measures which still exist because the EEC's common commercial policy is not fully
uniform yet). See generally Bronckers, supra note 24, at 71-74.
266 The text of the Commission proposal is published in 26 O.. EuR. COMM. (No. C 83) 6 (1983).
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the "unreasonableness" criterion of Section 30 1.267
Given its awareness of the defects of the approach adopted by some of the
Community's partners, the Commission felt that a clear definition was re-
quired of the "unfair" practices against which it seeks powers to act. It
took as a starting point the concept that, in order to be described as "un-
fair", a practice must either be incompatible with the commitments of the
nonmember country concerned vis-a-vis the Community or, more gener-
ally, be condemned by international law or the rules regarding commercial
policy commonly accepted by the Community's principal partners.268
As examples of the practices covered by its definition of unfairness,
the Commission cited export restrictions contrary to the GATT, or im-
port restrictions incompatible with the GATT.26 9 Yet the reference to
practices which were deemed incompatible with trade policy rules "com-
monly accepted by the Community's principal partners" raised doubts as
to whether the Commission did intend to stay within the GATT frame-
work.270 The Commission failed to allay these concerns by omitting ex-
amples of practices falling into this class of unfairness. Nor did the
Commission indicate whether it would admit complaints about foreign
restrictions on EEC services or investments.
A number of Member States (notably Denmark, Germany and the
Netherlands) did not take kindly to the new instrument proposed by the
Commission. They associated the new instrument with French insistence
on broad-ranging protection of the Common Market against allegedly
unfair imports.2 71 Indeed, despite its balanccd explanatory statement
which also focused on foreign restrictions affecting EEC exports, the
Commission drafted the instrument along the lines of the Community's
antidumping and countervailing duty regulation. Thus, the structure of
the instrument revealed that the Commission was most concerned with
defensive measures.272
Right from the start, during its Brussels meeting in March 1983, the
European Council established a link between measures designed to
strengthen the internal market and adoption of the new trade policy in-
strument.273 France in particular let it be known that it would not ap-
prove of a package of outstanding directives liberalizing intra-community
267 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
268 EUR. COMM. CoM. (83) 87 def., at 2 (1983). See also art. 2(2) of the Commission proposal,
supra note 266.
269 EUR. COMM. COM. (83) 87 def., at 2 (1983).
270 Het Commissie-voorstel voor een nieuw handelspolitiek instrument, 26 EUROMARKT-NIEUWS
82, 84 (1983).
271 Agence Europe, Apr. 5-6, 1983, at 1.
272 See infra text accompanying note 339.
273 Agence Europe, Mar. 23, 1983, at 5.
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trade (including the issuance of "EEC-certificates" to products originat-
ing in non-member countries), if the new instrument would not be
adopted at the same time. Thus, France seemed to play its cards well, in
that one might have expected the liberal traders in the Community (e.g.,
the Dutch) to give up resistance to the new instrument in exchange for
better trading opportunities within the Community (seventy percent of
Dutch exports are sold in the Common Market 274).
The linkage between the new instrument and the re-enforcement of
the Community's internal market did not remain uncontested. In a reso-
lution welcoming the Commission draft, the European Parliament criti-
cized this linkage. It stressed that the measures needed to strengthen the
EEC's internal market should not be linked with the adoption of the
proposed regulation. 75 Interestingly, the Parliament opined that the new
instrument ought to apply to services as well.276
Criticisms notwithstanding, the connection between instrument and
internal market became a fixture of the ensuing negotiations. Finally, on
April 9, 1984, the Council adopted the trade policy instrument in princi-
ple. Yet its linkage with intra-Community measures gave an unexpected
twist to the instrument's entry into force.
4. Adoption and Aftermath
Although the Council changed the definition of "unfairness", it did
little to clarify the scope of the instrument. The relevant text now reads:
For the purposes of this Regulation, illicit commercial practices shall be
any international trade practices attributable to third countries which are
incompatible with international law or with the generally accepted rules
(emphasis supplied).2 77
First, it is difficult to see in what respect "the generally accepted
rules" differ from international law. Suppose "the generally accepted
rules" refer to unwritten rules accepted by all trading nations. If unwrit-
274 EEG-HANDELSPOLrrIEK EN BESCHERMENDE MAATREGELEN TEGEN DE INVOER urr
DERDE LANDEN 35 (Gosses' contribution to discussion) (1984). In this connection, one should
recognize that a variety of national standards (eg., safety and health regulations) are exempted from
the ban on intra-Community trade restrictions in EEC Treaty, art. 36. In order to harmonize these
standards, the Council may issue directives pursuant to EEC Treaty, arts. 100 and 235. Directives
are instructions to the Member States to amend their laws within a certain time period. They are
binding as to the result to be achieved, but leave the authorities the choice of form and method.
EEC Treaty, art. 189.
275 See § 6 of the resolution, reprinted in 26 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. C 205) 9 (1983).
276 Id. at § 4.
277 27 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. 1 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 2(1)). On this notion of "gener-
ally accepted rules," see also Bourgeois & Laurent, Le "Nouvel Instrument de Politique Commer-
dale": Un Pas en Avant Vers L'elimination des Obstacles aux Echanges Internationaux, 21 REvuE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DRorr EUROPEEN 41, 52-54 (1985).
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ten rules are generally accepted, however, they can become part of cus-
tomary international law and the extension suggested by the Council's
text disappears.278 If, on the other hand, the rules alluded to by the
Council, in written or unwritten form, do not have to be accepted by all
trading nations, then it becomes difficult to discern a meaningful distinc-
tion between the language drafted by the Commission-"rules regarding
commercial policy commonly accepted by the Community's principal
partners" and the Council's formula. Apparently, the objective of both
clauses is to apply, if necessary, the fair-trading principles contained in
GATT and other international agreements to countries who are not
party to these agreements (e.g., most Communist countries). That, how-
ever, may amount to a violation of the generally accepted rule pacta ter-
tiis nec nocent, nec prosunt (those who are not party to an agreement
cannot be bound by its provisions).
There is one important difference, however, between Section 301
and the new EEC instrument. Congress authorized the President to dis-
regard international (GATT) commitments in taking retaliatory ac-
tion 9 In contrast, both the Commission draft as well as the regulation
adopted by the Council specify that any trade policy measure taken in
response to unfair foreign trade practices shall be compatible with "ex-
isting international obligations and procedures."28
Nevertheless, the scope of the new instrument will remain somewhat
obscure until it has been actually applied or until the Commission has
received authority from the Council to issue implementing regulations.
Records of the Council's deliberations are not made public, nor does the
Council publish explanatory statements accompanying the regulations it
adopts. What is clear, however, is that the instrument has maintained a
strong bent towards defensive action-protecting the Common Market
against what is considered to be unfair import competition.281 Further-
more, it appears that the Council did not intend to cover foreign prac-
278 See generally G. VAN HoOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-116
(1983) (tracing different phases in the creation of customary international law).
279 See supra text accompanying note 47.
280 See art. 11(2) of the Commission proposal, supra note 266; 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 252)
5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 10(3)). The Regulation adopted by the Council clarifies that the Com-
munity will resort to conciliation or dispute settlement procedures, if international commitments so
required, before considering retaliatory action. Such action in itself should conform to the outcome
of international consultations or proceedings. The Council thus followed the recommendations of
the advisory Economic and Social Committee. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 211) 26 (1983).
281 E.g., Brussel mag harder optreden tegen oneerlijke concurrentie, Financieele Dagblad, Apr. 11,
1984, at 5.
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
tices affecting EEC services and investments.2 82
As mentioned above, in April of 1984 the Council only adopted the
new instrument in principle. The instrument's fate was still coupled,
though inversely, with the fortunes of fifteen directives on technical bar-
riers to intra-community trade. Having secured approval of the instru-
ment, some Member States (notably France) removed the political
blockage on Community-wide harmonization of standards relating to
such products as gas cylinders, electrically operated lifts, building equip-
ment and lawn mowers (automotive products were not included in this
package of fifteen directives, nor was the proposed directive regarding
"EEC certification" of third country products).213 The linkage strategy,
however, now worked against the instrument's entry into force, at the
instigation of Germany in particular.
The three liberal Member States could be expected to favorably con-
sider the more encompassing trade-off which was originally envisaged.
This trade-off involved accepting the instrument in return for far-reach-
ing harmonization of EEC standards, and for consensus on uniform cer-
tification of foreign country products. Yet the limited exchange
ultimately proposed by France and other member states agreeing with
France's position seemed hardly worth the price. The fifteen directives,
which in the end had been attached to the instrument, were relatively
insignificant. What happened next is interesting.
Denmark expressed reservations on a number of the fifteen direc-
tives. It objected, for instance, to harmonization of standards applicable
to construction site equipment for reasons related to the noise levels pro-
duced by these products.28 4 The arguments Denmark raised were not
without merit, but they were of such a technical nature that it seemed
incongruous to hold off adoption of the other directives, and the trade
policy instrument for that matter. Germany, however, strongly opposed
splitting up the package.285 The Council yielded to this opposition, which
delayed the instrument's entry into force until September 22, 1984.286
282 This can be inferred from the definition of the "Community industry" which may invoke the
new instrument. See infra text accompanying note 327.
283 Agence Europe, May 8, 1984, at 7.
284 The way the EEC directives on the maximum noise level of the products were construed (by
measuring the noise produced by the machines), left open the possibility that Danish noise limits,
which are measured in the workplace, would be exceeded by these machines. Yet, if the machines
would originate in EEC Member States and would comply with newly harmonized noise standards,
they should be freely imported into Denmark without any adaptation for usage. Agence Europe,
July 18, 1984, at 9.
285 Agence Europe, May 16, 1984, at 6; Agence Europe, July 18, 1984, at 9. (Italy and Holland
apparently also favored a comprehensive agreement at some point.)
286 Reg. 2641/84 was adopted by the Council on Sept. 17, 1984, when Denmark lifted its block
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5. Summary
Reviewing the drafting history of the new trade policy instrument, it
appears that the Community has not succumbed to pressures which
would have moved the Common Market outside the GATT framework.
Despite strong sentiments expressed in the Welsh report that GATT
norms have not kept up with changing economic circumstances, Regula-
tion 2641/84 subjects any Community measure directed against foreign
unfair trade practices to international (GATT) commitments and
procedures.
Yet it is too early to gauge the impact of the new instrument on the
Community's trade policy, given the ambiguous definition of "unfair-
ness", particularly the interpretation of "the generally accepted rules".
The French origin and subsequent discussions do suggest that the instru-
ment's primary use is thought to be the protection of the Common Mar-
ket, rather than the promotion of EEC exports. As this article will
demonstrate below, the procedure set forth in the instrument confirms
this impression.
Other differences exist between the Community's instrument and
United States Section 301. Both are designed to respond more effectively
to foreign unfair trade practices, but they emphasize different means. In
the United States, Congress steadily developed procedural guarantees en-
abling the business community to trigger Executive action, and, if need
be, unilateral retaliation. In the European Community, drafters expected
more from a transfer in internal decision-making authority to galvanize
the Community's vigilance, than from introducing a private complaint
procedure.
B. Decision-making Authority Under the New Instrument
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty confers decision-making authority in
international trade policy matters on the Council. While the Commis-
sion has the exclusive right of initiative to submit proposals to the Coun-
cil and to implement the common commercial policy, the Council
decides on the course of action which the Community will take in this
area. Thus, if the Commission recommends that the Community partici-
pate in or conclude a trade agreement, the Council must authorize the
on the fifteen harmonization directives. Community acts to strengthen policy in unfair trading prac-
tice, Financial Times (London), Sept. 18, 1984, at 1. According to art. 14, the instrument entered
into force on the third day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Commu-
nities on Sept. 20, 1984. The text of the fifteen directives, as finally adopted, is published in 27 OJ.
ETR. COMM. (No. L 252) 1 (1984).
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necessary negotiations.2" 7 Should these negotiations result in agreement
with the Community's trading partner(s), it is the Council which will
conclude the agreement.288 Likewise, if the Community considers taking
unilateral action, such as retaliation, against its trading partners on the
basis of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, the Council will decide upon the
proposal of the Commission.289 Significantly, the Council's unanimous
decision is necessary to deviate from the Commission's proposal.29
In practice, the Community's policies in international trade are
forged through a delicate interplay between the Member States, the
Council and the Commission. Thus, it is often disputed whether issues
touching on international trade do fall within the Community's exclusive
competence. To a different degree, the Member States jealously guard
their sovereign authority and may argue that certain measures remain, in
part, within their jurisdiction. For example, the political compromise
regarding the conclusion of the GATT Standards Code reflects this senti-
ment. Both the Council and the Member States signed the Code because
some Member States took the position that standards exceeded the field
of trade policy by also involving health and safety considerations, which
are of national concern.29'
Even if it is uncontested that a certain subject squarely falls within
the ambit of Article 113, the Member States still exert influence on the
Community's decision-making processes. For example, once the Council
has decided to authorize the Commission to negotiate a Community
trade agreement, the Member States continue to be involved.
First of all, when the Commission conducts negotiations on a Com-
munity trade agreement, the so-called "113-Committee" composed of
representatives of the Member States closely supervises the Commis-
sion. 92 Should some Member States be dissatisfied with the conduct or
the outcome of the negotiations, they do have a second chance to influ-
ence the Community's posture when the agreement comes up for conclu-
sion by the Council. Although the Treaty provides in Article 114 that
the Council shall act by a qualified majority, the Council customarily
seeks a consensus among Member States before it takes a decision. The
287 EEC Treaty, art. 113(3).
288 EEC Treaty, art. 114.
289 EEC Treaty, art. 113(2).
290 EEC Treaty, art. 149.
291 On the Community's signing of the Standards Code, see Bourgeois, supra note 2, at 20-22.
292 EEC Treaty, art. 113(3). See generally Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo
Round: LegalAspects of Changing Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267, 282 (1982) (reflecting on
the Committee's role during the Tokyo Round negotiations). This study also crisply summarizes the
ordinary negotiating process of a trade agreement by the Community. Id. at 279.
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protracted debate necessitated by this approach tends to paralyze the
Council's decision-making capacity, not only with respect to the conclu-
sion of agreements, but also with regard to unilateral action.2 93 Presum-
ably, the Council's faltering management of international trade relations
prompted the Commission to change its mind in early 1983, when it em-
braced the concept of a new trade policy instrument.
1. The Commission Proposal
In its version of the new instrument, the Commission in essence pro-
posed that the Council delegate substantial authority over commercial
policy. This authority extended beyond the power to respond and retali-
ate against foreign unfair trade practices. The draft regulation intro-
duced a distinction between:
(a) responding to any unfair commercial practice attributable to a third
country and removing the injury resulting therefrom; and
(b) ensuring full exercise of the Community's rights pertaining to the
fields covered by the commercial policy.
294
According to its proposal, the Commission would be authorized to
take any measure pursuant to (a) or (b) after consultations with the
Member States. If a Member State opposed such a measure, it could
refer the Commission's decision to the Council within five days. The
Commission's decision would then be suspended until the Council had
made up its mind.29 5 Yet following the Commission's notification of its
decision to the Member States, the Council would have only thirty days
to react. If within that relatively short period the Council failed to coun-
termand the Commission's decision, the latter would stand.29 6 This deci-
sion-making machinery was aptly referred to as the "guillotine".2 9 7
The memorandum accompanying the draft regulation reveals the
sweep of delegated authority the Commission was actually seeking.
Probably because of its far-reaching objective to strengthen the common
commercial policy altogether, the Commission did not distinguish clearly
between the exercise of the Community's international rights in response
293 Commission president Thorn recently highlighted once more the Council's practice to substi-
tute consensus in place of a majority vote as a major reason for the Community's decision-making
paralysis. Thorn, Address to International Bar Association Seminar (January 1984), 12 INT'L BUS.
LAW. 315, 316 (1984).
294 Arts. 1 and 2(1) of the Commission proposal, supra note 267.
295 Suspension would not apply to measures taken by the Commission in emergency situations
where delay might result in injury which would be difficult to remedy. Arts. 12 and 13(2) of the
Commission proposal, supra note 267. The Council eliminated the notion of emergency measures in
the final regulation. See infra text accompanying note 317.
296 Art. 13 of the Commission proposal, supra note 267.
297 EUR. COMM. COM. (83) 87 def., at 4 (1983).
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to unfair trade practices and the exercise of other Community rights in
the trade policy area. Thus, the Commission indicated that clause (b)
included recourse to GATT dispute settlement procedures.29 It would
seem to follow that clause (a) was only meant to refer to internal Com-
munity investigations of complaints about foreign unfair trade practices.
This reading, however, obliterates the phrase "and removing the injury
resulting therefrom" in clause (a).
Other examples of Community rights which the Commission in-
tended to exercise pursuant to clause (b) created ambiguities. In a mem-
orandum accompanying its draft, the Commission mentioned:
requests for compensation pursuant to Article XIX (the GATT safeguard
clause), eta for which no specific Community procedure exists at present.
(emphasis supplied)299
This open-ended formula arguably covered the exercise of most, if not
all, rights accruing to the Community under the GATT." ° One might
observe that the Commission only claimed limited delegated authority, in
that it merely sought to exercise rights for which no specific Community
procedure existed other than the general decision-making procedure of
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. In this view, the Commission would not
have had authority to impose safeguard measures pursuant to Article
XIX, for instance, because the Community's common import regimes set
forth escape clause mechanisms.30 1 Yet the limitation suggested by the
Commission was by no means waterproof, if only because according to
its proposal the new instrument would have operated "by way of comple-
ment" to the other rules in the commercial field.302
Such a comprehensive delegation of authority to the Commission
was unacceptable to the Member States. Opposition came from unex-
pected quarters, however. To some extent, the Commission may have
miscalculated its bases for support. The position of the Dutch govern-
298 Id at 2.
299 Id.
300 Although the Community officially is not party to the GATT, the Contracting Parties do
recognize the replacement of the individual Member States by the Community within GATT, which,
according to the European Court of Justice, occurred at the entry into force of the Common Cus-
toms Tariff (July 1, 1984). The Court construed full Community substitution for the first time in
Douaneagent der N.V. Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. de Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen,
1975 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1439 (recital 21) (1975). This judgement was repeated in Ammilnistra-
zione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societi Petrolifera Italiana SpA et alii, 1983 Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 801 (recital 19) (1983).
301 E-g., 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1 (1982) (Reg. 288/82, arts. 15 and 16). See generally
van Dartel, De Algeme Invoerverordeningen van de EEG, 32 SociAL-ECONOMIsCHE WETGEViNG
406 (1984); V6lker, The Major Instruments of the Common Commercial Policy, in PROTECTIONISM
AND THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrry 17, 39-48 (V61ker ed. 1983).
302 Art. 14 of the Commission proposal, supra note 266.
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ment is a case in point. Traditionally, the Netherlands favors effective
Community policies, and is generally prepared to delegate authority to
the Commission in order to achieve this objective. Yet reservations to-
wards the new instrument created a dilemma for the Dutch authorities.
Fearing that the Commission might bow to protectionist pressures in ap-
plying the new instrument, the Netherlands felt obliged to resist broad
delegation of decision-making authority to the Commission. 3
Faced with considerable resistance from many Member States, the
Commission tried to save the "guillotine" machinery from destruction.
In October of 1983, it proposed, among other things, to extend the period
in which the Council could reconsider decisions of the Commission at
the request of a Member State from thirty to sixty days. Furthermore,
the Commission expressed a willingness to abide by the prevailing opin-
ion in the Council in exercising its delegated authority.304 These and
other basically cosmetic changes to the "guillotine" machinery did not
pacify the opposition, however.
2. The Council Regulation
The Council maintained the bifurcation in the instrument's scope
which the Commission had originally proposed. Yet it firmly segregated
the Community's response to unfair trade practices in clause (a) from a
full exercise of the Community's rights pertaining to trade policy in
clause (b). The Council refused to delegate authority to the Commission
with regard to clause (b).305 In this respect the Commission failed in its
innovative efforts, because the Council essentially stuck to the procedures
of Article 113 of the EECC Treaty. Other than the Council's unenforce-
able determination to exercise the rights of the Community within thirty
days after a relevant proposal from the Commission, the new instrument
does not add much to existing practice.30 6
The Commission was more successful in obtaining authority to deal
with foreign unfair trade practices. First, the Commission now is for-
mally charged with investigating complaints about foreign unfair trade
practices.30 7 If at the end of this investigation the Commission feels that
it is not in the Community's interest to pursue the complaint, it may
303 See generally the debate between Wellenstein and De Grooth in EEG-HANDELSPOLrnEK EN
BESCHERMENDE MAATREGELEN TEGEN DE INVOER urr DERDE LANDEN 12-13 (1984).
304 EUR. COM. SEC., (83) 1547 final (1983). These proposals were discussed in Het Voorgestelde
Nieuwe Handelspoltieke Instrument, 26 EUROMARKT-NIEUWS 245, 246 (1983).
305 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 11(3)).
306 Id. The Council's determination to take a speedy decision is unenforceable because there is no
remedy or sanction (eg., "guillotine") if the Council fails to do so.
307 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 6).
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terminate the proceedings.30 8 Should the Commission determine, how-
ever, that the foreign practice complained of is both unfair and injurious,
the Commission is authorized to initiate international dispute settlement
proceedings.0 9 In other words, the Commission is entitled to exercise a
procedural right of the Community in response to unfair trade practices.
The "guillotine" was preserved for the decisions concluding the in-
ternal investigation of the Commission with regard to termination or
continuance on the international plane. A Member State can object to
the Commission's disposition of a complaint and refer the matter to the
Council. If the Council fails to overrule the Commission's decision
within thirty days after the matter was presented to it, the decision of the
Commission stands.310 Lastly, upon the proposal of the Commission, the
Council will decide at the end of international consultations or dispute
settlement proceedings whether and which retaliatory measures are
due.311 Thus, the Council retained the substantive rights of the Commu-
nity relating to foreign unfair trade practices.
To some, it may seem that the new instrument therefore does not
really affect the balance of powers between the Commission and the
Council in international trade policy.312 This view, however, underesti-
mates the importance of the Commission's investigative authority and its
authority to initiate international dispute settlement proceedings.
As we have seen, the GATT Contracting Parties rarely authorize
retaliation.313 Since the Community professes to observe its international
obligations in applying the new instrument, one may expect that the
Council will not have much occasion to exercise its retaliatory authority
vis-A-vis GATT contracting parties, which are the Community's most
important trading partners. Experience with Section 301 underscores
that, at least within the context of GATT, diplomatic strategy and inter-
national pressure are more effective in resolving complaints of unfair
trade practices. 4 Hence, it is of great significance that the Commission
has assumed authority under the new instrument to marshal the Com-
munity's negotiating resources in pursuing these complaints.
The Commission also won a victory on another issue which, though
not necessarily related, became enmeshed in the discussions regarding
the instrument's decision-making machinery. Practice so far had been
308 27 OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 9(1)).
309 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 10(l)(a) and 1 1(2)(a)).
310 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 9(1), 10(2), 11(2)(a) and 12).
311 27 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 11(2)(b) and 19(1) and (3)).
312 See Een nieuw handelspolitiek instrument, 27 EUROMARKT-NIEUWS 126, 128 (1984).
313 See supra text accompanying note 154.
314 See supra text accompanying note 155.
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that the Commission on its own motion accepted export restraint com-
mitments from countries who feared protectionist measures from the
Community. The Court of Justice seemed to have endorsed this prac-
tice.315 During the Council meeting in April of 1984, however, the three
liberal Member States (Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands) at-
tempted to condition acceptance of VRAs on Council approval, in con-
formity with the procedures relating to the exercise of Community rights
as stated in clause (b). According to press reports, the attempt was un-
successful because the other Member States outvoted the three liberal
Member States.3 16
This victory is even more remarkable given that the Council at the
same time denied explicit authority to the Commission to take protective
measures on its own initiative. Pursuant to its proposal for the new in-
strument, the Commission would have been empowered to take protec-
tive measures in "critical circumstances" which justified "immediate
action to safeguard Community interests". 317 The Council deleted this
provision in Regulation 2641/84.
C. Disposition of Private Complaints Under the New Instrument
At the time of its negotiation, the instrument was seen primarily as a
vehicle to delegate authority from the Council to the Commission in
trade policy matters. Therefore, this aspect became the focal point of
much of the debate on the instrument's significance. Skirmishes did oc-
cur in the background, however, with respect to the establishment of a
private complaint procedure.
As late as the Council meeting in April of 1984, Germany and Den-
mark refused to grant private firms the right to bring complaints directly
before the Commission. Instead, they proposed that private petitioners
first appeal to their national authorities. Only with the approval of the
national government could a private complaint be brought before the
Commission in their view.318 The Council overruled these proposals.
The advisory Economic and Social Committee, composed of repre-
sentatives of various private interest groups (e.g., trade, industry, agricul-
ture, labour3 9) supported the Commission proposal for a private
315 Diirbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt, 1981 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095, 1118 (recitals 39-40)
(1981). See Sack, The Commission's Powers under the Safeguard Clauses of the Common Organiza-
tion of Agricultural Markets, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 757, 763-64 (1983).
316 Agence Europe, Apr. 11, 1984, at 5.
317 Art. 12 of the Commission proposal, supra note 266.
318 Agence Europe, Apr. 11, 1984, at 5.
319 See EEC Treaty, art. 193.
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
complaint procedure.32 Yet in some Member States (notably Germany
and the Netherlands), private industry appeared to be divided on the im-
portance of an independent and formalized right to complain of foreign
unfair trade practices. One might have expected the business community
to applaud the instrument's introduction of procedural safeguards re-
garding private petitioners without qualification. After all, it was the
lack of such procedural safeguards which moved United States business
interests to first support and then insist on reinforcement of Section 301.
In these EEC Member States, however, industries with an interest
in liberal trade-exporters and importers-tended to oppose the
instrument.321
In light of its French parentage, the instrument was reputed to be
protectionist in outlook. Rather than risking foreign retaliation in re-
sponse to Community restrictions imposed under the new instrument,
liberal traders apparently preferred to forego a private right to complain
of foreign unfair trade practices. The instrument's potential to help elim-
inate foreign barriers to Community exports rarely was fully recognized.
Those industry representatives who did recognize this potential wel-
comed the instrument's adoption, though they warned against its protec-
tionist tendencies.322
In analyzing the instrument from the perspective of private petition-
ers, one first must recognize that they can only invoke the instrument to
complain of foreign "illicit" trade practices. Thus, petitioners cannot
request that the Community fully exercises its rights in the common
commercial policy area regarding "fair" trade restrictions.323 In this re-
spect, the new instrument already appears more restrictive towards pri-
vate complainants than Section 301.32
Consider the example of a foreign country which considers increas-
ing its import duty on widgets in conformity with Article XXVIII of the
GATT regarding the renegotiation of tariff concessions. In that event,
the Community's widget-producing industry could not invoke the new
320 The observations of the Economic and Social Committee on the Commission proposal are
reprinted in 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 211) 26 (1983). In this connection, see particularly its
comments on art. 3(4) of the Commission proposal.
321 Groothandel vreest EEG-protectionisme, Financieele Dagblad, Apr. 7, 1983, at 1.
322 E.g., Chorus, EEG Handelspolitiek en Protectionisme: een Visie vanuit het Dedrijsleven, in
EEG-HmNDELSPOLrr1EK EN BESCHERMENDE MAATREGELEN TEGEN DE INVOER urT DERDE
LANDEN 7, 9-10 (1984).
323 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. I and 3(1)).
324 Under Section 301, private petitioners may request that the President enforce the rights of the
United States under any trade agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 2412 and 2411(a)(1) (1982). To date, how-
ever, no 301 petition has been filed which requests action solely on this basis. Archibald, supra note
107, at VII-10.
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instrument to ward off the threat of increased duties to its market posi-
tion in that country. Conceivably though, if following a petition by the
industry, the Community would intervene and hold out the prospect of
stiff compensation demands, the foreign country concerned might change
its mind.
There seems to be no good reason to limit private access under the
instrument to "illicit" trade practices, since both fair and unfair trade
restrictions injure Community industry, and both type of restrictions
may be removed by applying international pressure. Indeed, the instru-
ment could have served as a vehicle to formalize Community investiga-
tions into foreign trade restrictions generally. Case-by-case
investigations of foreign trade restrictions, supported by private petitions
containing in-depth analyses of market conditions, might contribute to
the elimination of trade barriers. The momentum created by concerted
efforts of interested parties and public authorities according to set proce-
dures should not be underrated. Yet as long as the Council does not
delegate some authority to the Commission to exercise the Community's
rights in the trade policy area, other than the procedural right to respond
to unfair trade practices, a comprehensive and vigorous attack from the
Community on world trade barriers remains largely illusory.
Returning to the private complaint procedure established by Regu-
lation 2641/84 (the "Regulation"), it is useful to recall the terms of refer-
ence of Section 301. Indeed, other than a citation to Section 301, the
public record offers little, if any guidance to the disposition of private
complaints under the new instrument. Judged by the text of the Regula-
tion alone, private petitioners have few guarantees and numerous handi-
caps in pressing complaints about foreign unfair trade practices.
1. Admissibility Requirements
Natural or legal persons (including an association which does not
have legal personality) acting on behalf of a Community industry can
lodge a complaint with the Commission.325 Only producers of industrial
or agricultural products or manufacturers and processors of products
which are the subject of unfair practices may raise complaints. 326 Ac-
cordingly, the Council did not adopt proposals to allow trading concerns
to invoke the new instrument.327 Because the petitioning industry is to
325 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 3(1)).
326 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 2(4)).
327 I The Economic and Social Committee, in its comments on the Commission proposal, had
proposed that trading concerns also be permitted to invoke the new instrument. 26 OJ. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 211) 24 (1983).
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be engaged in the production of goods, the new instrument probably does
not admit complaints about foreign restrictions on Community services
and investments.
a Community Industry
The Regulation spells out in considerable detail what is meant by
the term "Community industry".32 As a result, complaints of regional
industries, which represent only part of the Community industry, may
also be admitted under certain circumstances. Thus, producers in a re-
gion of the Community are deemed to represent a Community industry if
their combined output constitutes the "major proportion" of the produc-
tion of the product concerned in the Member State(s) in which this re-
gion is located, provided that:
(i) where the illicit practice concerns imports into the Community, their
effect is concentrated in that Member State or those Member States, or
(ii) where the illicit practice concerns Community exports to a third coun-
try, a significant proportion of the output of those producers is ex-
ported to the third country concerned.329
While this definition of "Community industry" is more encompass-
ing than the one proposed by the Commission33 , it is still quite restric-
tive. Consider the example cited above of a violation of the Government
Procurement Code within a Community context. 331 The Commission
would not admit a complaint of a Dutch company whose bid for a for-
eign government's purchasing contract was denied in contravention of
the Government Procurement Code. Even if one of the European as-
sociations, such as UNICE, representing various Community industries,
would entertain the complaint of the Dutch company, the Commission
would probably still have to refuse to investigate this matter.
b. Injury
The Regulation establishes that a petitioner should not act only on
behalf of a Community industry in order for the complaint to be admissi-
ble. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the allegedly unlawful
328 27 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 2(4)).
329 Id.
330 Art. 2(2) of the Commission proposal provided: "The term 'Community industry' shall be
taken to mean the Community producers as a whole, of products identical or similar to the product
which is the subject of unfair practices or of products competing directly with that product, or those
producers whose combined output constitutes a major proportion of total Community production of
the products in question." See supra note 266. Thus, on the one hand, the Commission did not
appear to accept processors of the litigious products as petitioners under the new instrument, while
on the other hand, it seemed unwilling to entertain complaints of regional industries. Id
331 See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
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practice injures or threatens to cause injury to a Community industry.3 32
This stringent injury requirement represents a serious hurdle for private
petitioners.
Many petitioners who may have valid complaints about foreign un-
fair trade practices cannot gain admission under the instrument. The
Dutch company, for instance, which claimed infringement of the Gov-
ernment Procurement Code, by definition could not show injuries to its
European competitors.333 Again, it is submitted that such a restricting
injury requirement at the stage of admitting complaints is inappropriate.
It unduly restrains the use of the instrument to combat foreign unfair
trade practices.
For a variety of reasons, however, the Commission felt compelled to
limit access of private petitioners under the new instrument, by insisting
on a Community-wide representation and injury requirement. In this
way, the Commission sought to minimize concerns of those Member
States which objected to the instrument's protectionist potential. Fur-
thermore, the Commission wanted to avoid opening a costly investiga-
tion where there is no prima facie general material interest at stake. In
addition, the Commission apparently sought consistency with other
Community trade laws.334 These considerations are vulnerable to
challenge.
a. The admission of a complaint does not necessarily result in pro-
tectionist action. By admitting a complaint, the Commission can only
institute international consultations or dispute settlement proceedings,
and submit proposals for action to the Council. Accordingly, there is no
reason to refuse admission a priori to petitioners who do not meet the
stringent Community-wide injury requirement, out of concern for protec-
tionist measures. A stringent injury requirement would only be appro-
priate when the Council is to decide on the feasibility of retaliatory
protectionist measures when the Council is to determine whether "action
is necessary in the interests of the Community.
335
b. Another argument proposes that stringent admissibility require-
ments are justified in order to prevent the Community from spending
resources on relatively insignificant complaints. This argument, how-
ever, undermines the foundations of legal certainty in international trade
332 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 3(2) and 8). The Commission
proposal, in arts. 2(3) and 3(1), contained a similar requirement. See supra note 266.
333 See supra text accompanying note 147.
334 Interview with Dr. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Head of the Trade Policy Instruments Division,
Commission of the European Communities (Sept. 18, 1984).
335 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 10(1)).
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relations. In addition, the admissibility requirements currently drafted in
Regulation 2641/84 do not meet this objective.
Because for all practical purposes private complainants depend on
their national government in the event they are confronted with foreign
unfair trade practices,336 government intervention should not be solely
contingent upon the monetary or political interests involved. Issues of
principal importance can, of course, be raised by "small" cases. If one
neglects to pursue these issues in relatively insignificant cases, the diffi-
culties in resolving the same issues are compounded in major disputes
when political considerations may obscure the rule of law. In other
words, building precedents through relatively uncontroversial cases may
well help reinforce the international trading regime. Furthermore, refus-
ing admission to businesses merely because of their size or the interests
they represent is unsound policy, when national and Community author-
ities encourage these same businesses to venture outside their national
jurisdictions and participate in international trade.
Moreover, if indeed the instrument's admissibility requirements
have been designed, among other things, to avoid overtaxing the Com-
munity's resources by limiting access exclusively to petitioners who can
demonstrate a "Community-wide" impact of foreign unfair trade prac-
tices, the present requirements fail to meet this objective. Or to be more
precise, the present notion of "Community-wide" injury yields incongru-
ous results. Presumably this notion corresponds with a minimum-
threshold of injury, in order to avoid the investigation of de minimis
complaints. Only if a certain number of jobs, a certain level of produc-
tion-capacity, a certain amount of investments etc., is adversely affected
by an unfair foreign practice is the Commission instructed to intervene.
The Regulation itself, however, already allows for considerable discrep-
ancies between the requisite level of injury.
Recall, for instance, that if an illicit foreign practice injures a major-
ity of exporting producers in a certain region of the Common Market,
the effects of which are concentrated in that region, then the exporting
procedures qualify as petitioners under the instrument.3 37 Clearly,
whether the region in issue is a single, small Member State like Ireland,
or the territory of France and Germany combined, can make a world of
difference in terms of jobs, investments, production-capacity, etc. Yet
the Regulation appears to admit petitioners representing the industry in a
small Member State, to the extent that the impact of the disputed foreign
practice is concentrated in that Member State. Conversely, an industry
336 See supra text accompanying notes 1-25.
337 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 2(4)(b)(ii)).
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in a large Member State, representing the same number of jobs and level
of production-capacity, would not be admitted as complainant if it could
not show that a majority of that Member State's producers were affected
by the foreign practice, despite the fact that the complaining industry
might be the only exporter to the foreign country concerned.
Even if one is willing to accept these divergences for political rea-
sons, incongruities remain. Consider the example of corporation A
which is the only producer in the Community of widgets because, for
instance, it is the patent holder for widgets. If this corporation en-
counters trade restrictions in country Z, its complaint under the new in-
strument would be admissible, assuming that no other producers in the
Community manufacture identical or similar products. Now consider
the position of another corporation B in the same Member State of a
similar size, having made comparable investments in gadgets. Other cor-
porations in this Member State manufacture gadgets, yet only B exports
these gadgets to country Z. Were B to encounter trade restrictions in Z,
however, it could not successfully lodge a complaint under the new
instrument!
The outcome is even more peculiar if one considers the possibility
that one and the same corporation C is the only producer of widgets, yet
one of several producers of gadgets in a Member State. Now suppose
that C is the only corporation in this Member State which exports wid-
gets and gadgets to country Z and that Z restricts these exports unfairly.
C's complaint about the restriction on widgets would be admissible, but a
complaint about the restriction on gadgets would not be admissible under
the new instrument.
Retaliation is a different matter. Conceivably, it is not in the inter-
est of the Community to take retaliatory measures against country Z in
response to the latter's restrictions on products originating in one corpo-
ration of one Member State, even if the Community would be authorized
to retaliate by the GATT contracting parties. Yet there is no sound pol-
icy reason to distinguish between A's complaint (or C's widget com-
plaint) and B's complaint (or C's gadget complaint) when it comes to
investigating these complaints. Both complainants ought to be able to
invoke the normative authority of international (GATT) commitments
through government intervention if a violation of these commitments is
at stake.
c. The instrument's structure clearly reflects the drafters' quest for
consistency with other Community trade laws. In many respects, the
instrument is patterned after the Community's antidumping and counter-
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vailing duty law.33 8 Among political circles there was concern that the
new instrument might create a spill-over effect on other trade policy in-
struments. If the new instrument would have relaxed the admissibility
(injury) requirements, some feared that industry groups would have in-
sisted on loosening the admissibility requirements in the Community's
antidumping and countervailing duty law as well.33 9
This analogy is misplaced. The object of an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty investigation is to determine whether countervailing mea-
sure should be imposed in order to eliminate the injury caused to a
Community industry by dumped or subsidized imports. GATT permits
a unilateral response to these particular forms of unfair trade, if certain
conditions (notably an injury requirement) are met. Because import re-
stricting measures invariably hurt other sectors of the economy, these
restraints also make good sense from a domestic policy viewpoint of the
applicant State.
Yet other than dumping or certain kinds of subsidization, the
GATT does not identify unfair trade practices against which contracting
parties may retaliate unilaterally. The only lawful recourse available to
injured contracting parties in these circumstances is to appeal to the
GATT Contracting Parties (or, as the case may be, Code signatories) and
to request that the disputed practices are held to nullify or impair bene-
fits accruing to the applicant State. If these practices are condemned, the
GAIT membership will rarely authorize retaliation. Instead, con-
tracting parties generally rely on the normative force of such a ruling and
expect that the party held to violate its GATT commitments will comply
of its own accord.3 "
Consequently, the policy underlying restraints on the investigation
of countervailing measures against dumped or subsidized imports cannot
be transposed to investigations of other unfair trade practices. Investiga-
tions of other unfair trade practices do not necessarily lead to unilateral
import restrictions which would affect domestic consumers of these prod-
ucts. Rather, the objective of these investigations is to eliminate the dis-
puted practices through the pressure of international scrutiny. Again,
only in the extraordinary event that the GATT membership authorizes
338 Thus the definition of "Community industry" in the new instrument emulates the definition in
the antidumping and countervailing duty law. 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984) (compare
Reg. 2461/84, art. 2(4) with Reg. 2176/84, art. 4(5)). Also striking are the similarities in the injury
criteria of the instrument and the antidumping and countervailing duty law. 27 O.J. EuR. CoMm.
(No. L 201) 1 (1984) (compare Reg. 2461/84, art. 8 with Reg. 2176/84, art. 4(1), (2) and (3)).
339 Telephone interview with Dr. Jacques HJ. Bourgeois, Head of the Trade Policy Instruments
Division, Commission of the European Communities (Sept. 20, 1984).
340 See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
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the Community to retaliate following a complaint under the new instru-
ment, would it be appropriate to insist on a stringent injury requirement
before the Community actually exercises this authority. As a condition
to investigating private complaints under the new instrument, however,
such restrictive admissibility requirements are ill-considered.
c. Judicial review
Barring special circumstances, the Commission shall decide whether
to open a so-called "Community examination procedure" within 45 days
after the date a complaint has been filed.341 During this 45-day period,
the Commission reviews the admissibility of a private complaint, in con-
sultation with an "Advisory Committee" composed of representatives of
the Member States and chaired by a Commission representative.342 The
opinion of the Advisory Committee does not bind the Commission.
Neither does the Regulation contain a procedure through which at the
request of a Member State, the Council could overturn the Commission's
decision (not) to open an examination procedure.
Should the Commission decide not to admit a private complaint, it
is questionable whether the petitioner could successfully apply for judi-
cial review of this decision. Two avenues are available to submit the de-
cision to the Court of Justice for review.
The petitioner could invoke Article 175 of the EEC Treaty, claiming
that the Commission's failure to act infringes its obligations under the
Treaty. Although these obligations can be broadly interpreted and in-
dlude binding rules of international law343, this action is likely to fail.
Neither the Treaty itself, nor international law impose an obligation on
the Community authorities to intervene with a foreign government on
behalf of a private petitioner.
Secondly, the petitioner might consider invoking Article 173 of the
EEC Treaty, claiming that the Commission's decision not to admit his
complaint is inconsistent with Regulation 2641/84. According to Article
173, however, natural or legal persons can only institute proceedings
against decisions addressed to them, or which are of direct and individual
concern to them. Whether the Court will review an often informal notifi-
cation from the Commission to complainants that it will not initiate an
investigation, is a question which in the context of the antidumping and
341 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 6(8)). In special circumstances,
this period may be extended to sixty days. Id.
342 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 3(5) and 5).
343 H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES §§ 33 and 332 (3d
ed. 1983).
Foreign Unfair Trade Practices
6:651(1984)
countervailing duty law remained undecided for some time. Only re-
cently, the Court gave an affirmative answer.3" It derived the right to
judicial review from the complainant's procedural position in the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty law. Thus the Court emphasized that
the relevant regulation recognized the existence of a legitimate interest of
Community producers in the institution of countervailing and antidump-
ing duties and in the respect of certain procedural rights.345
Arguably, petitioners under the new instrument have a comparable
procedural position and should therefore qualify under Article 173 in the
event that they want to challenge the Commission's refusal to admit their
complaints. Community producers have a legitimate interest in the in-
vestigation of complaints about unfair foreign trade practices, and they
enjoy certain procedural rights.34 6 Still, there are differences between in-
vestigating antidumping or countervailing duty complaints and com-
plaints about other unfair foreign trade practices.
National antidumping and countervailing duty laws implement
GATT-defined notions of unfairness. In other words, the unfairness of
the disputed foreign practices according to GATT principles is not in
issue here. Suppose, in contrast, that the Commission rejects a contro-
versial complaint under the new instrument, arguing that petitioners did
not present sufficient evidence that the foreign government violated its
GATT commitments. To review this determination, the Court would
have to interpret the GATT, which so far it has refused to do at the
request of private petitioners.347 Although it is not inconceivable nor
inappropriate that the Court do so, this is an additional hurdle which
private petitioners under the new instrument would have to take.
344 Fediol v. Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913, annotated by Lauwaars in 32
SociAAL-EcONOMISCHE WETGEVING 770 (1984). See generally Bellis, Judicial Review ofEECAnti-
Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Determinations After FEDIOL The Emergence of a New Admissability
Test, 21 COMMON Micr. L. REv. 539 (1984).
345 lId (recital 25). As examples of petitioners' rights under the antidumping and countervailing
duty law, the Court cited the right to complain, the right to have the complaint investigated by the
Commission with due care, and the right to receive information. Id (recital 28).
346 Eg., 27 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 252) 2 and 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 3(l) (the right to
complain), art. 6(4)(b) (the right to receive information), and art. 6(6) (the right to have the Com-
mission convene a meeting with opposing parties)).
347 See supra note 13. Note that on these occasions the Court was asked to give a preliminary
ruling pursuant to EEC Treaty, art. 177, where the issue was whether the GATT has "direct effect"
in the Community legal order. Since "direct effect" is a matter for national court proceedings, it is
conceivable that this requirement would not prevail in a direct action before the European Court
under EEC Treaty, art. 173. Accordingly, the Court may interpret the GAIT in a 173-proceeding.
See Schermers, Community Law and International Law, 12 COMMON Msr. L. REv. 77, 85-87
(1975).
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2. Community Examination Procedure
If a private petitioner has met the admissibility requirements (e.,
has demonstrated a Community industry which is injured due to an illicit
trade practice of a foreign country), he is not assured that the Commis-
sion will investigate his complaint. According to the Council's instruc-
tions, the Commission will only examine a complaint, if this is
"necessary in the Community interest". 4 Yet, as a matter of principle,
it would seem that an examination of an illicit and injurious foreign trade
practice is necessarily in the Community interest.
A grant of unlimited discretion to the Commission in connection
with the initiation of an (internal) investigation, would have negated the
procedural safeguards awarded to private petitioners in Regulation
2641/84. The drafting history of the instrument reveals that the Council
did not intend to grant such limitless discretion to the Commission.
Rather, the Council's objective in inserting the "Community interest" in
this early phase of the proceedings, was to prevent judicial review of a
Commission decision (not) to investigate a private complaint.34 9 To ex-
press this differently, it appears that the Council merely wanted to endow
the Commission with limited discretion sufficient to block judicial re-
view, but not so much as to leave the Commission complete liberty in
deciding whether or not to examine a private complaint. This half-
hearted attempt of the Council to stop the Court of Justice from exercis-
ing review at that stage of the administrative proceedings is, however,
likely to fail. 50
348 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 6(l)).
349 Hilf & Rolf, Das "Neue Instrument" der EG: Eine rechtsstaatliche Stdrkung der gemeinsamen
Handelspolitik?, 31 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WiRiscHAFr 297, 309 (1985). They indicate
that the Council inserted the "Community interest" requirement here as a response to the Court's
judgment in the Fediol case, supra note 344. In Fediol the Court reviewed a Commission decision
not to institute a countervailing duty investigation at the request of a group of Community producers
of soya meal (Fediol). Significantly, as opposed to the opening of an investigation pursuant to the
trade policy instrument, the Commission is not to take into account "Community interests" this
early in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding, but "shall immediately" initiate an in-
vestigation once a Community industry has shown sufficient cause. See 27 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L
201) 1 (1984) (Reg. 2176/84, art. 7(1)).
350 In Fediol the Court acknowledged that the Commission was granted "very wide" discretion-
ary powers to adopt countervailing duties (recital 26). Yet at the same time, the Court recognized
the "legitimate interests" of Community producers in the adoption of such anti-subsidy measures
(recital 25), and declared Fediol's appeal against the Commission's refusal to initiate an investigation
admissible.
By the same token, the Commission may have "some" discretion in investigating a private
complaint under the trade policy instrument, but this discretion does not deprive Community indus-
tries of a legitimate interest in such an investigation. Hence, Commission decisions on whether to
initiate an investigation under the new instrument are likely to be judicially reviewable, in light of
the Court's reasoning in Fediol.
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In the event the Commission decides to open an examination proce-
dure, it will publish this decision and a summary of the complaint in the
Official Journal of the European Communities. 351 The government au-
thorities of the countries concerned will be officially notified. Unlike the
USTR in a Section 301 proceeding, however, the Commission has discre-
tion whether or not to request consultations with the foreign authorities
at this stage.
As part of its investigations, the Commission will examine the extent
to which the foreign practice injures (or threatens to injure) petitioners.
The wording of the injury test is reminiscent of the one set forth in the
antidumping and countervailing duty law. 52 Yet it is unlikely that their
interpretation will be similar, particularly in respect of complaints under
the new instrument about barriers to Community exports.
If a Community industry calls attention to an existing barrier to
entry in a foreign country, many of the factors listed in the current injury
test will be hard to evaluate. Thus it would be guess-work to estimate the
sales potential, profitability, etc. of petitioners in the event that they
would be able to enter the foreign market. Speculation of this kind is the
livelihood of commercial analysts, but should not determine bureaucratic
decision-making on the propriety of government intervention. The Reg-
ulation appears to recognize this point, by making provision for com-
plaints which can merely allege a threat of injury. As one of the factors
which the Commission then is to take into account, the Regulation lists:
export capacity in the country of origin or export, which is already in exist-
ence or will be operational in the foreseeable future, and the likelihood that
the exports resulting from that capacity will be to the market where the
competition with Community products is taking place.
3 53
Indeed, if petitioners can reasonably argue that the foreign trade
barrier violates GATT commitments of the country concerned and that
this violation is of more than theoretical interest to them, the Commis-
sion should favourably consider pursuing the matter on the international
plane. To express this differently, the relevant test should be interest to
sue.3 5 4 This is a test which petitioners can be required to meet when they
formally file a complaint with the Commission. The forty-five days
which the Commission now has to decide on the admissibility of a com-
plaint should be adequate to determine whether petitioners have estab-
lished a private interest to sue.
351 27 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 252) 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 6(1)(a)).
352 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984) (compare Reg. 2461/84, art. 8(1) with Reg. 2176/
84, art. 4(2)).
353 27 O.L EUR. Comm. (No. L 252) 4 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 8(2)).
354 See supra text at note 152.
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A separate examination procedure duplicates the admissibility re-
view and needlessly delays Community action. The Regulation now en-
visages that the Commission will draw up a report on its findings within
a period of five to seven months after it has announced to further ex-
amine the complaint.35 This means that it may take up to nine months
after a complaint has been filed before the Commission considers
whether international consultations or dispute settlement proceedings
should be pursued.
In case the Commission does consider international action appropri-
ate, it must notify the Advisory Committee of its decision. 6 Opposition
of a Member State may further delay implementation of this decision by
another 40 days.357 In total, almost eleven months may lapse before a
private complainant receives the benefit of Community intervention on
the intergovernmental plane. This is a serious flaw in the procedure,
which probably has to be attributed to the unfortunate parallel between
the instrument and the Community's antidumping and countervailing
duty law.
358
Much will depend on the Commission's handling of private com-
plaints during the preliminary stages. The text of the Regulation does
not prevent the Commission from closing the examination procedure
soon after it has decided to admit a complaint. This, in fact, should be
encouraged.
3. International Investigation and Retaliation
The final stage of the complaint procedure may be disquieting to a
private petitioner. It is imbued with administrative discretion, and does
not subject the Community authorities to effective time limits.
a. Community interest
In case a complaint is directed aginst a GATT contracting party,
consultations and dispute settlement proceedings must precede any deci-
sion by the Council on Community retaliation. 3 9 This prerequisite is
commendable, in that it reinforces Community compliance with GATT
norms and procedures. The Regulation further instructs the Commis-
sion to initiate an international investigation (e.g., a GATT panel pro-
355 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 3 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 6 (9)).
356 27 O.J. Eui. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, arts. 10(1), 11(2)(a) and 12).
357 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 6 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 12).
358 From the perspective of a private petitioner, this parallel may give rise to one favorable cir-
cumstance, in that it has increased the chances for judicial review of the Commission's decision not
to admit a complaint in view of the Court's Fediol judgment, supra note 344.
359 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 10(2) (the "guillotine")).
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ceeding), only if it considers this to be in the Community interest.360
That condition is unfortunate, particularly if a petitioner has established
his interest to sue. This "Community interest" requirement is taken
from the anti-dumping and countervailing duty law.361 Weighing the
interests of the Community is appropriate, as a condition to the introduc-
tion of import restrictions protecting one sector of the Community's
economy to the detriment of others, such as consumers. In the context of
the instrument, however, the "Community interest" requirement ought
not to operate as a condition precedent to international investigations.
In the event a Community industry can show evidence that it is af-
fected by an unlawful foreign trade restriction, one may presume that it
is in the interest of the Community to investigate this complaint on the
international plane. In other words, once a petitioner has established his
interest to sue, the Commission ought to start international consultations
and, if need be, pursue the matter through international channels. Per-
haps one should not exclude the possibility of "wrong cases" filed under
the instrument which the Commission does not want to formally raise
before the GATT, even though the complaints have been declared admis-
sible.362 For these extraordinary cases, the "Community interest" re-
quirement could be retained. Yet as a rule, the Commission should
initiate an international investigation once a private interest to sue has
been established, unless such an investigation would run counter to the
Community's interest.
Should the Commission or the Council on appeal from a Member
State, decide to discontinue the investigation, the possibility of judicial
review cannot be ruled out. Admittedly, the Community authorities en-
joy substantial discretion at this point. This discretion allows them to
evaluate factors such as "Community interests" which can be unrelated
to the merits of the petition. Such discretion, however, does not neces-
sarily bar judicial review. Certainly this discretion would reduce the
margins of the Court's review in that the Court will only consider
whether the Community authorities have infringed basic principles of ad-
ministrative due process. 363 Even though these margins are small, the
360 27 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 10(1)).
361 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 6 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 12(1)).
362 The concept of "wrong cases" is described at supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
363 In the Fediol judgment, supra note 344, the Court related the scope of judicial review to the
nature of the powers reserved to the Community institutions on the subject (recital 29). Accord-
ingly, where the Community authorities enjoy substantial discretion, the scope of judicial review
diminishes correspondingly. The Court could still inquire, though, whether the Commission, in
discontinuing an investigation, had committed manifest errors of fact, had failed to take into account
essential matters, or had arrived at its decision through an abuse of power which would be reflected
in its reasoning (recital 30).
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exposure engendered by any kind of judicial review may well exert some
restraining influence on administrative behaviour.
b. Time limits
Regrettably the Regulation does not set any time limit on the con-
duct and conclusion of international investigations in the event that the
Commission does pursue the private complaint. This not only increases
the insecurity of petitioners as to the outcome of complaint proceedings,
but it also weakens the Commission's hand in international negotiations.
One may not favor a complete disregard of the progress of international
proceedings by setting unilateral time limits across-the-board. Yet the
Regulation could well have subjected the consultations which precede
formal dispute settlement action to time limits.3" This would have been
an incentive for the foreign country concerned to take these consultations
seriously, in order to avoid the exposure of formal dispute settlement
proceedings.
In addition, the Regulation is unclear as to when the Commission
should submit its proposals for Community action to the Council. The
Regulation states that the Commission should consult with the Advisory
Committee on the termination of an international dispute settlement pro-
cedure. In some cases, after the GATT Council has adopted a panel
report, the contracting parties are still encouraged to reach an amicable
solution and may continue to consult with each other for some time.
Again, the Commission's negotiating posture might be reinforced if these
"post-panel" consultations were to be subjected to time limits.
Furthermore, the Regulation does not impose a deadline on the
Commission to formulate its proposal for Community action to the
Council, once the international consultations or dispute settlement pro-
ceedings have been concluded. The Regulation merely states that the
Council shall act within thirty days after receiving the proposal from the
Commission."' There is no remedy or sanction such as the "guillotine"
if the Council fails to act within thirty days. Besides, nothing prevents
the Council from instructing the Commission to elaborate on its proposal
after further consultations with the foreign country concerned.
c. Retaliation
In view of the terms of Regulation 2641/84, a private complaint
against a GATT contracting party is unlikely to trigger Community re-
364 Recall that only the Subsidies Code subjects the consultations preceding dispute settlement
proceedings to a time limit of thirty days. See Subsidies Code, art. 13(1).
365 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 11(2)(b)).
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taliation. The Council will only impose retaliatory measures after it has
been authorized to do so by the GATT membership, and if it considers
that such action is necessary for the Community interest. 66 As noted
before, the GATT Contracting Parties only once authorized a con-
tracting party to retaliate against unfair trade practices. 67
One of the instrument's imponderables is the likelihood and reach of
retaliation against countries who are not parties to GATT. Significantly,
Regulation 2641/84 merely states that retaliatory measures have to be
compatible with existing international obligations and procedures. Con-
trary to its definition of unfairness, the Regulation does not add here that
retaliatory measures have to be compatible with "generally accepted
rules".3 68 Thus, it is unclear whether the Community would feel bound
to litigate its claims of unfairness before an ad hoc international tribunal
or even to engage in extensive consultations with a country which is not a
party to the GATT before resorting to retaliation.
To sum up, once petitioners' complaints are taken up internation-
ally, which is a discretionary decision in itself, petitioners can only wait
and see. They cannot predict by any reasonable margin when the Com-
munity (or the GAT membership) will take a position on their com-
plaint. Nor are they, unlike petitioners under Section 301, entitled to
receive reports on the progress of the international investigations.369
Even though the petitioner is expected to draft a complaint which sub-
stantiates its allegations of the illicitness of foreign trade practices, unlike
Section 301 the Regulation does not make provision for involving a peti-
tioner in countering the arguments and rebuttals of the foreign country
concerned.370 Presumably though, petitioners and the Commission will
work closely together in practice. After some experience with the new
instrument, it would be appropriate for the Commission to issue guide-
lines clarifying the extent of this cooperation.
4. The Instrument and the EEC Domestic Market
Much of the opposition to the new instrument centered on its pro-
tectionist bias. Yet those European industries which do seek protection
366 27 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 252) 5 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 10(3)).
367 See supra note 154.
368 27 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 252) 5 and 2 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, compare art. 10(3) with art.
2(I)). Interestingly, the Economic and Social Committee had advocated that the Community should
also seek settlements in trade disputes with countries which are not party to GATT. See point 5 of
the preamble to its comments on the Commission proposal, supra note 320.
369 See 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982).
370 Id
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against unfair imports into the Common Market are likely to be disap-
pointed if they look for import restrictions under the new instrument.
a. Foreign government practices
Assuming that a complaint under the new instrument involves a
GATT contracting party, the Council will only institute countermea-
sures with the approval of the GATT Contracting Parties, after the un-
fairness of the foreign practice has been established through multilateral
dispute settlement proceedings. Since the GATT membership rarely au-
thorizes countermeasures, the protection offered by the instrument to the
Community's domestic market mainly rests on the normative force of a
GATT ruling denouncing the disputed foreign practice.
This does not leave European industries empty-handed in the event
that they need instant protection against foreign imports. If they do need
instant protection, the Community authorities could, of course, consider
taking safeguard action pursuant to one of the common import re-
gimes.371 If such action involves a GATT Contracting Party, it need
only be notified to the GATT and can be taken unilaterally.37 A disad-
vantage for the Community would be that safeguard action may lead to
requests for compensation from the affected suppliers 373 and does not
establish unfairness in the terms of trade of the injurious imports.
On the contrary, safeguard action presupposes that the keenly com-
petitive imports are fairly traded. Disadvantage for the industry is that
safeguard procedures presently do not admit requests for protection from
private petitioners. Accordingly, the industry concerned would have to
persuade its national government to intervene with the Commission, or it
might approach the Commission directly.374 Both the national govern-
ment and the Commission are free, however, to dispose of such a com-
plaint at will.
The instrument's usefulness in protecting the EEC domestic market
is limited further. Regulation 2641/84 generally is not applicable in
cases covered by other existing rules in the common commercial policy
371 E.g., 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1 (1982) (Reg. 288/82, art. 15).
372 GATT, art. XIX does not require that national escape clause measures are notified to the
GAYT membership. If, however, an import quota has not been notified as a safeguard measure, this
quota does not benefit from the suspension of the prohibition on quantitative restrictions granted by
GATT, art. XIX. Accordingly, the restricting country would then be vulnerable to attack under
GATT, art. XI.
373 The right to compensation of exporting countries following safeguard restrictions pursuant to
GATT, art. XIX is controversial. BRONCKERS, supra note 216, at 28, 70 and 89-91.
374 See 25 0.. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 1 (1982) (Reg. 288/82, art. 15). Under certain circum-
stances, the Member States do have authority to make emergency restrictions themselves. Id at art.
17.
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field, an important difference from Section 301, which does not contain
this restriction. 375 Thus, complaints which can be handled by the an-
tidumping or countervailing duty law will not be admissible under the
instrument. In this connection, note that if subsidized products originat-
ing in country A displace EEC exports to country B, the industry is able
to lodge a complaint under Regulation 2641/84.376
What then can be expected from the instrument in respect of the
EEC domestic market? The Commission has been apprised of a number
of controversies which the European business community may submit
under Regulation 2641/84. For example, it appears that several coun-
tries maintain a system of differential taxation. The sale of raw materials
mined or manufactured in these countries is taxed with a surcharge if the
sale concerns an export transaction. In this way, the domestic processing
industry of those countries receives protection, because their competitors
in the Community suffer a price disadvantage. Likewise, it seems that
certain vertically-integrated United States corporations have agreed on
relatively high minimum prices for exports outside the United States of
products such as raw materials and intermediate products which they
process themselves. This dual-pricing strategy gives their processing af-
filiates a competitive edge over their European counterparts.377
b. Restrictive business practices
The last example raises an important issue under the new instru-
ment and, for that matter, under Section 301. Can restrictive business
practices be attacked through these private complaint procedures? This
question is not without significance, since roughly thirty percent of world
trade could be classified as trade between related parties.378 All the
same, the answer is negative, unless foreign governments become in-
volved in private practices.
Recall that both the instrument and Section 301 are directed against
foreign unfair trade practices which are attributable to foreign govern-
375 Compare 27 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 1 252) 6 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 13) with supra text
accompanying note 203. Note that the instrument does operate by way of complement to Commu-
nity rules regarding trade in agricultural products.
376 See 27 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 252) 4 (1984) (Reg. 2641/84, art. 8(1)(b) (referring to third
country subsidies undercutting the prices of Community producers).
377 These examples are drawn from an interview with Dr. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Head of the
Trade Policy Instruments Division, Commission of the European Communities (Aug. 20, 1984). In
the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the Contracting Parties made provision for a study of dual pricing
practices. GATT, 29th Supp. BISD 21 (1983). At the time of this writing, no report has been
published.
378 U.N. Center on Transnational Studies, Transnational Corporations in World Trade Develop-
ment-Third Survey 160 (1984) (quoting a 1978 UNCTAD estimate).
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ments. The question then becomes to what extent public authorities
must be involved in private practices before they are vulnerable to attack
under the instrument. Arguably, it would not be sufficient if the foreign
government refuses to intervene and condemn these restrictive practices
(assuming it could do so under its antitrust laws). Yet the requisite pub-
lic involvement may be present if the government does take affirmative
action and approves or even compels the restrictive practices of private
industries. For instance, if the United States government pursuant to the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982179 grants antitrust immunity to
the exporting industries participating in a dual pricing scheme, this ac-
tion might attract an investigation under the new instrument.
Such an investigation would undoubtedly be complicated. The
GATT so far has not asserted authority over restrictive business prac-
tices.180 Even if the GATT were to condemn this grant of immunity"',
and the United States government were to subsequently repeal the rele-
vant certificate, it would be quite a different matter to have the United
States government take positive steps and prosecute the dual pricing
scheme under United States antitrust laws. The GATT's preparatory
work suggests that a contracting party cannot, through an Article XXIII
procedure, impose on other members positive obligations that are not
contained in the Agreement.3" 2 Outside of the GATT, there appears to
be no international norm which creates an obligation for national govern-
ments to challenge restrictive business practices of their constituents.
In sum, though restrictive business practices may become the target
of private complaints under the new instrument and under Section 301,
when government involvement can be demonstrated, it is uncertain
whether such a complaint would actually succeed in attacking the root of
the problems which these practices create.
5. Summary
The instrument contains quite a number of hurdles for private com-
plainants. For instance, the admissibility requirements will not always be
easy to meet. Adding a separate internal examination procedure after a
379 Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982). Immunity would be granted by the Department of
Commerce, in concurrence with the Attorney General, in the form of a so-called "certificate of
review." 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b) (1982). See generally Acheson, The Export Trading Company Act" A
Year Downstream, 18 INT'L LAW, 389 (1984).
380 See Petersmann, Protektionismus als Ordnungsproblem und Rechtsproblem 47 RABns ZErr-
SCHRIFr 478, 497-98 (1983); J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 522-27.
381 The grant of immunity might be considered to amount to a quantitative export restriction,
unjustifiable under GATT, art. XX(i) and inconsistent with GATT, art. XI.
382 J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
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complaint has been declared admissible has needlessly delayed Commu-
nity action. The Commission has been left with large discretionary au-
thority to pursue or not to pursue a complaint on the international plane.
Petitioners are not entitled to participate in the international investiga-
tion of their complaints. Several phases of the instrument's decision-
making process are not subject to time limits.
Yet it is too soon to pass judgment on the effectiveness of this proce-
dure. The Commission's attitude towards private complainants is as yet
unknown, but may well prove to be a decisive factor in the instrument's
implementation. If the Commission restrictively interprets the admissi-
bility requirements pertaining to private petitioners, there is not much
that they can do, particularly since the possibilities for judicial review of
administrative decisions under the instrument appear to be limited.
Perhaps though, the Commission will go so far as to encourage pri-
vate complaints by broadening private access. In order to appreciate
this, one should recognize that the Commission does not enjoy independ-
ent authority to investigate and challenge unfair trade practices. It can
merely act upon a complaint from a Member State or from a private
petitioner. Only when it has received and admitted a complaint, is the
Commission able to exercise its newly-gained authority in the interna-
tional trade area.
It remains to be seen whether the Member States will bring many
complaints under the new instrument. Presumably, those Member States
which opposed its adoption will be disinclined to avail themselves of the
instrument in the immediate future.383 Member States generally may
hesitate to espouse the grievances of one of their industries and submit a
complaint against a foreign government in their own name. Instead,
Member States may prefer that industries ifie a complaint, an action
which does not have the same political connotations as a government-to-
government dispute.
In comparison, it is difficult to predict the number of private com-
plaints which will be filed under the new instrument. Industries are un-
likely to make the effort if they do not anticipate that the Commission
will admit and investigate their complaint. It will therefore be interesting
to see how the Commission handles the first private petitions.
383 Indeed, the government of the Netherlands, in an answer to a parliamentary question dated
Oct. 20, 1984, emphasized that the Netherlands will only reluctantly invoke the instrument itself,
and intends to critically examine complaints brought by other Member States or by private petition-
ers. AANHANGSEL HANDELINGEN He K. 141 (1984-1985).
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IV. APPRAISING PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF GATT COMMITMENTS
The foregoing analysis rests on the assumption that international
trade policy should move from a "power oriented" to a "rule oriented"
approach. s From the perspective of the business community, trade pol-
icy decisions which are not guided by well-established rules, but by mo-
tives of political expedience and power, create an unpredictable
commercial environment. Indeed, a recent GATT report highlighted
business insecurity resulting from deteriorating trade policy discipline as
a major reason for sluggish investments in export capacity during recent
times.
38 5
Section 301 and the new EEC instrument constitute means to in-
crease private involvement in the enforcement of international trade
agreements. They ensure that complaints will be handled carefully and
in a timely manner. To a different degree, furthermore, they place re-
sponsibilities upon governments to investigate complaints of their con-
stituents on the international level. Thus, private petitioners have the
possibility to invoke and rely on the normative force of GATT commit-
ments. In sum, private complaint procedures go some way towards pro-
tecting individual interests in international trade policy.
These procedures can contribute to the reinforcement of the GATT
regime as well. Private complaints arising in the marketplace help to
clarify the scope of GATT norms. They elicit governments to publicly
articulate their actions and policies. Also, because government measures
involving trade directly affect private petitioners, their vigilance in expos-
ing transgressions will reinforce multilateral surveillance of GATT
commitments.
As a further proposal, this article submits that the admissibility
threshold of Section 301 and especially of the new EEC instrument is
needlessly restrictive. Whenever private petitioners invoke GATT law
and meet the requirements of an "interest to sue," the presumption ought
to be that they are admissible under the complaint procedures established
by Section 301 and the new EEC instrument.8 6 In particular, petitioners
should not need to demonstrate injury caused or threatened by foreign
unfair trade practices in a manner similar to countervailing duty and
384 This proposition has been developed in Jackson's pioneering study, The Crumbling Institu-
tions of World Trade, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978).
385 GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1983/1984 7-11 (1984).
386 The concept of an "interest to sue" in connection with private complaints about foreign unfair
trade practices has been discussed at supra text accompanying notes 129-83.
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anti-dumping investigations.8 7 The latter two instruments seek to deter-
mine whether foreign trade practices affecting the domestic market of
national producers warrant import restrictions. In contrast, the primary
objective of Section 301 and the new instrument should be to remove
foreign barriers to trade through international normative pressure. The
imposition of import restrictions as a retaliatory measure (which at that
stage should be contingent upon a significant injury test) is an unlikely
and undesirable outcome of these investigations.
Facilitating private access could increase the effectiveness of Section
301 and the new EEC instrument. Yet one should not expect too much
from these complaint procedures in liberalizing international trade,
partly because of limitations imposed by the GATT regime, and partly
because of limitations connected with governmental dispute resolution.
Presumably, private complaints can be most effective if they are di-
rected at relatively clear-cut violations of GATT commitments. These
cases lend themselves to straightforward disposition in accordance with
preconceived procedures. On the other hand Section 301 and the new
EEC instrument appear less effective in dealing with "grey area" trade
restrictions (VRAs, surveillance systems, price undertakings or export
forecasts, but also industry-to-industry arrangements where the role of
governments is not always clear 388). The GATT's normative force in
these areas is weak, and if invoked by petitioners, cannot be expected to
bring about the removal of disputed restrictions.8 9
In other words, private complaints are best suited to reinforce com-
mitments which enjoy a fair amount of support in the GATT member-
ship. That objective by no means is unimportant, because the
improvement of GATT's viability in areas of relative consensus is likely
to reflect positively on the "grey areas". Yet private petitioners cannot
hope to speed up consensus-building within the GATT on how to ap-
proach these "grey areas" by alleging violations of norms which have not
crystallized yet. In these instances, the GATT membership first has to
develop a modicum of consensus, at its own pace. Indeed, pressing com-
plaints in these areas risks sharpening opposing viewpoints.
The structure of governmental dispute resolution also confines the
effectiveness of private vigilance in reinforcing the GATT regime. In-
387 See generally supra text accompanying notes 144, 338-40.
388 These examples of "grey area" measures are taken from the interim Chairman's report on the
current consultations within GATT regarding safeguard measures. GAIT, 30th Supp. BISD 216,
217 (1984).
389 See supra text accompanying note 45. One should not exclude the possibility that, irrespective
of or in combination with GATT principles, other bilateral norms may on occasion be helpful to
private petitioners in clearing up grey area measures.
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creasing the number of potential complainants by lowering the admissi-
bility threshold creates problems of scale for the administerng authorities
in terms of manpower and resources. In addition, through government
intervention, private complaints are converted into government-to-gov-
ernment disputes. Because governments probably would continue to as-
sert that they have a measure of discretion to investigate private
complaints of unfair trade practices, the incriminated government may
view these investigations as an "unfriendly" maneuver. Thus, even rela-
tively minor or unambiguous complaints attract political considerations.
Although frequently unrelated to the merits of the complaint, such polit-
ical concerns will influence, if not restrain, the government's pursuit of
private petitions on the international plane.
The obvious way to avoid sensitizing diplomatic relations between
governments is to grant private complainants the right to petition the
GATT directly. So far, this idea has been an anathema, probably be-
cause of lingering suspicions that a private right of petition might trans-
form the GATT into a supranational body. In actuality, however,
private petitions could fit well into the existing GATT framework. The
Tokyo Codes have established supervisory committees which might
charge subsidiary bodies with the task of investigating private
complaints.39 °
Once a surveillance body would have determined that the petitioner
has demonstrated an interest to sue, different methods are conceivable to
pursue the complaint. One could envisage, for example, that the surveil-
lance body administer further proceedings between the petitioner and the
respondent government. Yet given current political realities, it is un-
likely that GATT contracting parties will agree to be confronted with
private complainants before an international surveillance body.
The scope of this article does not allow an in-depth analysis of how a
private petition right within the GATT framework might be fashioned.
Instead, some prefatory observations are offered here with a view to-
wards stimulating further discussion.391 It is submitted that in order to
390 See supra text accompanying note 109.
391 A private petition right to GATT, of somewhat different design, has been advocated recently
in J. JACKSON, J. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND-NATIONAL
CONSTrrUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULEs 208-09 (1984). But see Tumlir, 8
WORLD ECON. (book review to be published in 1985). On this point Tumlir disagrees with Jackson,
arguing that a private petition right to GATT might collide with the national judicial process. This
author does not share Tumlir's concern. Enabling the individual to obtain preliminary interpreta-
tions from a GATT surveillance body may actually substantiate his alletations of GATT inconsisten-
cies or of the irregularities under domestic trade law in national court proceedings. Even though
these interpretations are unlikely to be considered binding on national authorities, and even if they
are not officially recognized by the courts, they are likely to have some persuasive force.
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make a private right to petition palatable to GATT contracting parties,
one could build in a number of filters, both substantive and procedural.
First, legislative measures probably should be excluded from the pe-
tition right. Without the endorsement of its government, it does not
seem appropriate that a private petitioner can call into question the legit-
imacy of trade policy measures which have passed national democratic
control. The petition right should be directed primarily against adminis-
trative practices affecting international trade. Indeed, trade-restricting
administrative practices which often escape judicial as well as legislative
control in national jurisdictions, are chiefly responsible for what is com-
monly referred to as the New Protectionism.392
Second, one might exclude administrative decisions in areas which
are not subject to effective GATT control (e.g. agriculture and export
restrictions). In this way, the surveillance body would be saved from
giving an opinion to private parties on controversial issues, an action
which might tarnish its reputation. Perhaps the petition right should be
further restricted to practices covered by the Tokyo Codes, because the
Tokyo Codes contain relatively sophisticated rules and would appear to
make provision for the institutional machinery equipped to deal with pri-
vate petitions.
Third, the surveillance body should not issue rulings against con-
tracting parties on the basis of a private complaint. Instead, it could
issue non-binding "preliminary interpretations", reviewing (without in-
dependent fact-finding) the disputed practices against relevant GATT
obligations. These interpretations presumably would have some norma-
tive force of their own, but would be different from panel rulings in that
they would not involve the respondent party and would remain fairly
abstract. For example, an interpretation could say "if such and such
were factually true, then a contracting party could be deemed to have
violated its commitments." By taking a rather detached view, a surveil-
lance body would be less likely to provoke the wrath of contracting par-
ties, which might impede its effectiveness on subsequent occasions.
Fourth, if following an unfavorable interpretation by the surveil-
lance body, the respondent government would not eliminate or adjust the
disputed practice, then the petitioner should be allowed to ask its govern-
ment to intervene and request a formal ruling from the GATT Con-
tracting Parties after a full investigation of the facts. On the other hand,
if the private petitioner found a preliminary interpretation disagreeable,
the petitioner's government should not be barred from raising the matter
392 See, eg., B. HhiDLEY & E. NICOLAIDEs, TAKING THE NEW PROTECTIONISM SERIOUSLY 10
(Thames Essay No. 34 1983).
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before the GATT Contracting Parties. Either way, preliminary interpre-
tations of an international surveillance body could give the disputing par-
ties the benefit of an "expert opinion".
Fifth, the surveillance body which initially entertained the private
petition should not be charged with the "full" investigation. Rather, a
panel elected in accordance with GATT customs ought to investigate the
complaint brought by the government of the petitioner. This would en-
sure an independent assessment of the facts and submissions put forward
by the litigating governments.
Limiting governmental intervention to "second phase" complaints
in appropriate cases might balance private participation and government
discretion in surveying compliance with GATT commitments. Whatever
method is chosen, in a world of proliferating trade regulation without a
parallel extension of democratic control and judicial protection, involv-
ing the individual in the supervision of GATT commitments deserves a
lot of thought.
POST SCRIPT
At the time this article was written (Fall of 1984), the President had
never imposed retaliatory measures pursuant to Section 301. Although
there was concern among United States trading partners that the Presi-
dent might ignore GATT obligations in applying Section 301, no such
instance had ever occurred. Very recently, however, in a dispute with
the European Community, the President appeared willing to retaliate
without regard to GATT procedures. Although soon dubbed the Spa-
ghetti-War by the press, the origin of this dispute concerned citrus
products.
In a petition filed under Section 301 in November of 1976, a group
of American growers of citrus products alleged that the Community's
prefential (lower) import duties on orange and grapefruit juices and fresh
citrus fruits from certain Mediterranean countries adversely affected
United States citrus producers. Specifically, complainants maintained
that the Community's preferential treatment of Mediterranean citrus
products violated the non-discrimination (most-favored nation, "MFN")
principle of Article I of the GATT.
393
The USTR initiated an investigation, obtained some concessions on
fresh grapefruit from the EEC during the Tokyo Round, but failed to
achieve an overall solution to the problem presented by complainants.
Finally, in 1982, the GATT Contracting Parties established a panel at
393 41 Fed. Reg. 52,567 (1976).
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the request of the United States to investigate this matter. Apparently
the United States government waited this long before initiating GATT
dispute settlement proceedings, because of the political importance of
these preferential tariffs to the EEC.
394
In December of 1984, the panel found unanimous that the EEC
preference nullified and impaired benefits arising under the GATT with
respect to United States exports of oranges and lemons, two of the eight
categories of United States citrus exports affected by the Community's
tariff preferences. It recommended that the EEC reduce its MFN-rate of
duty on fresh oranges and lemons no later than October 15, 1985.195 The
panel's ruling proved controversial and was not immediately adopted by
the GATT Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, the USTR went ahead and
proceeded to make a recommendation as to what action the President
should take under Section 301, in response to the Community's preferen-
tial scheme.396
Thereupon, on June 20, 1985, President Reagan decided to retaliate
against the Community, and to increase substantially the duties on pasta
imports from the EEC (hence the epithet Spaghetti- War).397 With this
decision, the President tackled two problems at once. Following another
Section 301 complaint, resulting in GATT dispute settlement proceed-
ings, a panel had ruled in 1983 that 'restitutions' granted by the Commu-
nity on pasta exports did not conform with the GATT Subsidies Code.
Due to resistance by the European Community, this panel report as well
was not adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties.398
As the Community was quick to point out in the citrus dispute, the
United States retaliatory measure was not authorized by the GATT Con-
tracting Parties and therefore was inconsistent with the GATT.399 The
EEC promptly announced it would raise import duties on imports of
United States lemons and walnuts, should the increase in United States
duties on European pasta products become effective. 4  Of course, the
Community's imposition of retaliatory duties on United States products
would likewise have lacked a legal basis in GATT, not having been ap-
proved by the Contracting Parties. Hectic diplomatic negotiations fol-
394 Presidential Memorandum, June 20, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg, 25,685 (1985).
395 Id. at 25,686.
396 See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,266 (1985).
397 Presidential Memorandum, supra note 392.
398 See E. McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 11.323 (1983 Supp.). The relevant Section 301 complaint was
filed by the Miller's National Federation. 40 Fed. Reg. 57,249 (1975).
399 U.S. Plans Tariff Increases on European Pasta Imports, Wall St. J., June 21, 1985, at 2.
400 E.C May Raise Citrus Duty in Row with U.S. on Pasta, Wall St. J., June 25, 1985, at 2.
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lowed, whereupon the Community and the United States authorities
reached a temporary stand-still agreement in mid-July of 1985.
The compromise solution ultimately reached consists of four ele-
ments: (1) The United States will not effectuate the retaliatory duty in-
crease on European pasta imports; (2) the Community will not increase
the import duty on United States lemons and walnuts; (3) the Commu-
nity will 'unilaterally' decrease the restitutions on pasta exports destined
for the United States, without thereby accepting the 1983 GATT panel
disapproval of these restitutions; and (4) the United States will withdraw
its GATT complaint about the EEC export restitutions on pasta prod-
ucts so that in effect the 1983 panel ruling will be void of interest and
hence of legal force. This armistice is valid for only four months, during
which period the Community and the United States will seek to negotiate
a mutually acceptable solution to the citrus dispute. Failing this, each
party has reserved the right to increase its respective retaliatory duties.40 1
While it is difficult to assess the implications of the Spaghetti War at
the time of this writing (August of 1985), before the outcome is known,
certain observations can already be made. The Spaghetti War is not just
another fascinating exercise in trade diplomacy. It may represent a shift
in United States trade policy, which so far favored a resolution of dis-
putes through diplomatic channels, in accordance with GATT and other
applicable international rules. Incoming Administration officials lately
have advocated a more aggressive approach to persuade United States
trading partners to dismantle their trade barriers.4"2 Presumably, the
considerable trade deficit which the United States has been experiencing
for some time has influenced their thinking, as it has affected the mood in
401 Agence Europe, July 17, 1985, at 8. One of the unresolved ambiguities of this compromise
solution appears to be whether the United States government would feel bound to withdraw its
GAIT complaint about the EEC's export restitutions on pasta products, even if no agreement is
reached on the citrus dispute in the fall of 1985. In this connection, it is worth noting that the
Community has already reduced the restitutions on pasta products destined for export to the United
States. 28 0.. EuR. COMM. (No. L 188) 29 (1985) (Reg. 2010/85).
402 E.g., the remarks of the new United States Trade Representative, Dr. Clayton Yeutter, during
his nomination hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, US. Trade Nominee Yeutter Urges
Tougher Pressure, Wall St. J., June 27, 1985, at 2. Similar suggestions were made by Mr. Bruce
Smart, the new Under-Secretary for Commerce, in discussing a major review of United States trade
policy. Washington begins review of trade policy, Financial Times (London), Aug. 14, 1985, at 4.
Most recently, in the aftermath of his controversial decision not to grant import relief to the
United States shoe industry, President Reagan initiated a spate of Section 301 actions at lowering
foreign trade barriers to United States exports. Specific actions were directed against Brazil, the
European Community, Japan and South Korea. At the same time, the administration reportedly
was drafting amendments to Section 301, sharpening its bite in general. Reagan Issues Complaint on
Trade Partners' Practices, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1985.
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Congress." 3 A more favorable trade balance which may well come
about independently from the imposition of retaliatory restrictions (nota-
bly through a decreciation of the dollar') could easily assuage such mil-
itant trends.
Perhaps though, the Spaghetti War signals more fundamental dissat-
isfaction in the United States with the prevailing international trading
regime (Le., the GATT). In that case there is cause for serious concern.
If as important a trading block as the United States gradually, but effec-
tively, distances itself from the GATT, international trade relations risk
changing dramatically. Bilateralism and 'power diplomacy' may become
the rule. In all likelihood, relatively weak countries would be the prime
victims of such a change in trade policy.
It would be all to facile to blame the United States for a possible
rupture in international trade relations. In varying degrees, many GATT
Contracting Parties (including the European Community) are responsi-
ble for the mounting tensions in the GATT regime. Rather than a round
of accusations, the time has come for a GAT round of negotiations
which strives toward restoring confidence in multilaterally established
rules and procedures concerning international trade.
403 More than 400 trade bills have been introduced in Congress in 1985, many aiming at protect-
ing specific industries, or at bashing specific countries which are accused of maintaining unreasona-
ble trade restrictions on United States exports. America's War on Imports, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985,
at 18.
404 Thus, Mr. Malcolm Baldridge, the UN Commerce Secretary, recently observed that a de-
crease of 20% in the dollar's value would allow United States exports to compete overseas.
Bonn, "Can weather fall in $ with ease," Financial Times (London), Sept. 25, 1985, at 8.
